Has Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal weakened Iran’s hardliners?

Donald Trump’s announcement on 8 May to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear deal has proven many analysts wrong; it has not led to Iran’s withdrawal from the deal.

In the weeks and months before his announcement, most analysts were united in at least two conclusions: a) that his withdrawal would terminate the nuclear deal and plunge the Middle East into even deeper turmoil with the possibility of a nuclear confrontation; and b) that it would further aggravate the hardliners’ pressure on the reformists in Iran. These conclusions appear to have been uninformed.

Iran hardliners are considered to be taking their lead from Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. They are deeply antagonistic towards the West, strict in their implementation of some of the Islamic codes and determined to transfer Iran’s Shia revolutionary message to the rest of the world; the reformist on the other hand are in president Rouhani’s camp, keen to engage with the West and more liberal in their implementation of the Islamic code.

Following Trump’s announcement, both the reformists and the hardliners in Iran have agreed to continue with the dealas have the rest of the signatories of the nuclear deal who are France, UK, Germany, Russia, China and the EU.

It is not a big surprise that Iran reformists are keen to continue with the deal. They were the ones who pushed for it and would want it to stay in force. They might, ironically, even feel that they are in a stronger position now.

For the hardliners, it is a different story. Whether by design or accident, the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal has left them with no choice but to abide by its provisions. Any proven non-compliance will end the deal.

If the deal ends, the solid backing of the EU and its powerful partners, France, UK, and Germany will vanish. That prospect will add those three countries to the canon of vocal opponents against the revolutionary adventures of Iran’s hardliners in the Middle East. While the deal is in place, its European partners will remain silent about Iran’s presence in the region.

With this background in mind, Trump’s move in his game of chess with Iran appears to have given him the upper hand. Despite what most analysts foresaw, Trump’s withdrawal did not end the deal but cunningly enabled the USA to move towards a confrontation with Iran without worrying about Iran’s nuclear plans.

There are logical reasons why Iran’s hardliners will not move out of the nuclear deal. For one thing, they cannot maintain Iran’s presence in other countries simply by relying on their long-time ally, Russia. The recent unified stand against Russia by the three European countries who are guarding the Iran deal - on account of Russia’s reported involvement in chemical weapons and interference in internet traffic - is already a big set back to the Russian influence in the region. That makes Rusia’s long-term support for its chosen countries, such as Iran, unreliable.

At the same time, Iran cannot expect solid support from another non-Western giant, China. While China’s foothold in Iran is not significant, it is even less so in the rest of the Middle East.

China’s strategic objectives to spread itself around the globe clashes with Iran’s insistence in keeping the revolutionary flames burning in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other Middle Eastern areas in turmoil.

For China, two characteristics must be present in a country before engaging in a partnership with them. First, they must be seen to have peaceful coexistence with their neighbours. Second, they must have a government that will not be changed at short intervals either for a lack of popularity or through electoral processes.

These two characteristics have been by and large present in the countries of South Asia, South East Asia, and Africa where China has spread its wings.

Iran may fulfil the Chinese requirement for a lasting autocracy but is far from being at peace with its neighbours. At the same time, China might see Iran’s presence in the Middle East as more of a hindrance to its own project of full entry into the region.

Trump’s announcement appears to have weakened the hardliners’ position in Iran. By default, President Rouhanimay have gained more clout to implement some of the reforms that he has promised and has so far failed to deliver?

If his inaction continues,  which is the more likely scenario, hard economic pressure on the majority of the population will continue to grow.

The hardliners will blame that on Trump but in reality, it will be a continuation of wrong policies that have allowed units within the state structure to spendlarge budgetswith no transparency.

The pressure in coming years on Iran population will not be just from a malfunctioning economy. Internationally, the USA and its allies are also likely to take a more aggressive stance against Iran in the region. This will sap Iran’s depleting resources even further. Consequently, Iran’s position will become weaker to the point of becoming vulnerable to international aggression.

This can be prevented if the international community and Iranian authorities show a genuine will. Iran is now in a stronger position to negotiate a peace deal in the Middle East than it would be in the future. It will all depend, though, whether Iran hardliners will take up that challenge.

* Abbas Faiz is an Independent analyst on South Asia; formerly, he was Senior South Asia expert at Amnesty International.