What next in Iran?

It is clear now that 60-year-old Ebrahim Raisi will probably be the next president of Iran. Iran’s all-powerful Council of Guardians had cleared the way for Raisi’s ascendancy. The Council has to approve the candidacy of each contestant in the presidential poll and typically it disqualifies nearly all on the basis of their past records. Their connections with the Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei and Iran’s deep-state is also a point of consideration.

This year about 530 candidates faced the selection board to seek approval and only seven were allowed to contest in the 18 June poll. While there has been severe criticism of the Guardian Council-led selection process, friends and rivals of Iran have largely accepted the process realising that it is unlikely to change anytime soon.

Out of the seven candidates, five are believed to be hardliners and two are moderates, according to Iran observers. Mr Raisi– considered top of the line hardliner– is believed to be clearly ahead in the race as Ali Khamenei is keen to nominate a deep conservative like Raisi for the top job.

Aware that his time is running out, Ali Khamenei, 82, wants to see a hardliner replace the present president Hasan Rouhani, considered a moderate. For Ali Khamenei to “pave the way for the establishment of an Islamic civilization”, argues Saeid Golkar, an US-based political scientist, it is necessary to ensure that the “country is led by a truly Islamic government that is loyal to him and his vision for the country.”

Raisi, who heads the judiciary, is best suited to quell any internal quest for democracy or openness. He has a questionable past: he is unanimously held responsible for the 1988 purge of Iranian political prisoners. It is widely believed in Iran that some promised policies backed by Rouhani– like equal opportunity and the empowerment of women– will be rolled back. Rouhani is severely criticised for the many executions in Iran during his tenure, yet he pressed for a more liberal and equal society with access to the internet. The western press approved of Rouhani’s approach to go ahead with a crucial nuclear talks that turned into a deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with the West in 2015.

Future of JCPOA

One of the key challenges of Raisi, if he assumes power, will be to resurrect the JCPOA three years after its collapse.

How would Iran under Raisi shape the nature of its relationship with the P5 plus 1 –China France, United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and Germany– countries which signed the JCPOA is a far complex question to answer than what would possibly be the approach of Raisi in controlling Tehran’s freedom-seeking middle class. The balancing however would be delicate and difficult.

JCPOA has a timeline and one of the critical destination points mentioned in the timeline is October 2023, Transition Day. The JCPOA collapsed when US President Trump unilaterally– and rather whimsically– repudiated the JCPOA in May 2018.

Unless there is another unlikely setback leading to a postponement of the deadline, Raisi with his western counterparts will see through Transition Day when the European Union will remove all sanctions and the US will lift embargoes on particular items while seeking legislative approval for termination of specific sanctions.

Raisi cannot miss the incentive of successfully seeing through a ‘transition’ as it may ensure his second term, despite a predictably hard line and thus unpopular policy to suppress any anti-regime voices. If he can see through a 2023 deadline, it may help him to get re-elected in 2025 when he will have the opportunity to “terminate” the UNSC Resolution 2231 ensuring that Iran's nuclear chapter is closed. It may catapult him to the status of a legendary leader who unshackled Iran’s economy.

Iran’s GDP– despite forecasts predicting contraction in 2020– grew by 1.5%, highest among 13 of Middle East and Central Asian neighbours, according to the International Monetary Fund. It is now estimated to grow at 1.7% in 2020-21. This moderate growth was achieved following severe contraction of the economy prompted by years of sanctions, and despite being badly hit by Covid.

Contesting, albeit unsuccessfully, for office in 2017, Raisi focused on a populist agenda and reportedly argued that there is no point investing in “shopping malls” to “benefit foreign brands.” It is rather wise to develop the agriculture sector, he opined.

But 2017 and 2021 are two different years. In 2016-17, Iran witnessed robust growth buoyed by the signing of JCPOA. Following the unilateral US withdrawal from JCPOA, Iran had no option but to retaliate by violating the agreement; it led to large scale sanctions. The economy contracted by 5%, due to the sanctions, a dip in oil prices and the pandemic in 2020. The rebound in oil prices and Biden-administration’s decision to restart talks brought the economy back to growth, with a favourable forecast for 2022. It underscored that Iran's approach to its nuclear policy is inevitably linked to its economic fortunes.

Raisi may not be very keen on derailing JCPOA as the overall health of the economy Mr Rouhani’s time was poor. The city-centric middle class also is disenchanted and they do not approve of another derailment of JCPOA triggering one more decade of recession. But Raisi has the hardliners to answer as to why the previous president did not ensure enough safeguards against sanctions before signing the agreement to defang Iran’s nuclear programme.

Therefore, Iran is not expected to slow down JCPOA indefinitely and thus in all probability the next president will be proactive rather than reactive, while making periodic noises to appease his hard line constituency in Tehran. In the process, Raisi may impose his own sanctions on the people of Iran.

* Suvojit Bagchi is a Kolkata-based journalist