Killings were already part of army culture, enforced disappearances emerged later

Former army chief Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan has testified as the first witness in a crimes-against-humanity case filed against former military officer Ziaul Ahsan over the enforced disappearance and killing of more than a hundred people during the Awami League government’s rule.

Bhuiyan gave his testimony Sunday, before International Crimes Tribunal–1. The three-member Tribunal–1 is headed by Justice Md Golam Mortuza Mozumder, with Justice Md Shafiul Alam Mahmud and Judge Md Mohitul Haq Enam Chowdhury as the other members.

Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan’s testimony remains unfinished. He is scheduled to testify again, Monday. The full account of his first day’s testimony is given below—

“I am the former Chief of Army Staff of the Bangladesh Army. I served as army chief from 15 June 2012 to 24 June 2015. I have come to testify about how a culture of enforced disappearance and killing grew among members of the army. I have also come to describe my experiences regarding RAB during my tenure as army chief.

A culture of killing existed in the army earlier; the culture of enforced disappearances developed later. If we assume killings began in 2008, that would be incorrect. In reality, the culture of killing started right after independence.

At various times the army has been deployed outside cantonments to maintain law and order. During those times, alleged criminals were brought to army camps and tortured during interrogation, resulting in the deaths of some individuals. However, the numbers were limited.

Later, through courts of inquiry and application of law, such incidents were regularised. During army operations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, several deaths occurred. Those that came to the authorities’ attention were taken into account and the guilty were punished appropriately.

The primary duty of the armed forces is to defend the country against external enemies. However, when the internal law and order situation goes beyond the control of police and paramilitary forces, the military is deployed from time to time to assist them.

The army is also deployed during disasters and even during elections. There is a common perception that deploying the army ensures fair elections; thus this has become an unwritten norm.

Whenever the army is deployed outside, commanders face constant pressure regarding how quickly troops can be returned to cantonments. This is because they carry lethal weapons and their training is based on the principle of “one shot, one enemy.” Without this, an army could not fight wars.

For this reason, soldiers are dehumanised during training. Gradually they forget to see people as human beings and begin to see them as targets. Firing at human-shaped targets on ranges removes psychological barriers to killing. Bearing this in mind, it was never appropriate to mix the army with civilian policing. Yet that is what happened in 2003 with the formation of RAB. It was a grave and dangerous decision.

The training of army personnel was not suitable for recruitment into RAB. From 2003 to 2006 some extrajudicial killings occurred. Many killings also occurred during Operation Clean Heart prior to the formation of RAB. According to army sources, 12 people died of heart attacks; according to Human Rights Watch, the number was 60. Later, indemnity was granted to all Clean Heart Operations personnel. In effect, that indemnity amounted to a licence to kill.

In 2007, amid conflict surrounding the extension of the chief justice’s retirement age before the election, a state of emergency was declared. From 2007 to 2009, DGFI became the country’s major controlling authority.

At various times they picked up individuals and interrogated them in cells. Among them were ministers and political figures. BNP’s Tarique Rahman was also picked up and tortured. From that period, keeping civilians in detention cells became habitual. They began to think they could pick up anyone and do whatever they wished.

They came to believe they would ultimately escape consequences. During the emergency, changes occurred in the culture of military personnel: they re-entered politics, developed a sense of dominance, divisions grew between senior and junior ranks, a cash culture emerged, and blind obedience to superiors took root.

When the Awami League came to power in 2009, the BDR killings occurred, in which 57 military officers and 17 civilians were killed. After suppressing the mutiny, BDR members were detained and interrogated.

According to Human Rights Watch, about 50 BDR members died due to torture by RAB and military personnel at Pilkhana headquarters during interrogation. Later, courts sentenced 152 to death, 161 to life imprisonment, and 256 others to various prison terms.

After the mutiny, hostility toward India and the Awami League intensified among army officers, divisions between seniors and juniors widened, professional officers were sidelined in favour of loyalists, and the army’s involvement in national projects fostered corruption. A major reason, he said, was Sheikh Hasina’s belief that a corrupt army would be safer for her.

Later, Sheikh Hasina, learning from the weaknesses of her 1996–2001 tenure, began consolidating absolute control over the country and administration. She amended the constitution to abolish the caretaker government system, ensured death sentences for many political leaders through the International Crimes Tribunal, and introduced provisions in the constitution prescribing the death penalty for constitutional violations.

She appointed her relative Major General Tarique Ahmed Siddique as her security adviser and sought to control the army through him. Siddique soon established himself as a “super chief” between the prime minister and service chiefs. He brought institutions such as DGFI, NSI, RAB, NTMC, Ansar, and BGB under his control. Four networks emerged from this.

The first was a criminal network involving DGFI, NSI, RAB, and NTMC, through which repression of political opponents, killings, and disappearances occurred. The second was a “deep state,” run through MSPM, DGFI, NSI, and others, through which he made policy decisions about the armed forces, sometimes conflicting with service chiefs’ decisions. The third was a procurement network involving PSO, AFD, DGDP, and service chiefs, influencing purchases. The fourth was an engineering network formed with senior engineering corps officers, through which influence over national projects generated illicit income.

Now I will speak about RAB. Even before becoming army chief, like other officers I was aware of illegal and extrajudicial activities by RAB members. After assuming office, I summoned RAB’s then additional director general Colonel Mujib and told him to stop crossfires. I instructed him to control Lt Col Ziaul Ahsan, head of RAB intelligence. He assured me such incidents would cease. For some time I did not see crossfire reports in newspapers, but soon realised incidents were occurring and being suppressed.

The situation changed further when Benazir Ahmed became DG and Ziaul Ahsan became ADG. I directed my Director of Military Intelligence Brig Gen Jaglul Ahsan and Army Security Unit commander Brig Gen Fazal (now an election commissioner) to speak to Ziaul Ahsan. Jaglul reported he received no satisfactory assurance.

Fazal said talking was useless, describing him as obstinate. Fazal also reported that Ziaul Ahsan kept weapons at home with guards and CCTV. He was instructed to comply with military housing rules.

Later, under the patronage of Siddique and his coursemate Colonel Mahbub, Ziaul Ahsan began disobeying my orders. Even after posting orders to return two officers to the army, he refused. I banned him from entering cantonments.

To implement this, I assigned responsibility to Logistics Area Commander Major General Mizan. Later, he fell out of favour for not informing Major General Tarique Ahmed Siddique about the matter. Soon afterward, I received a phone call from MSPM Major General Mia Zainul Abedin. He informed me that the Prime Minister had said the restriction imposed on Ziaul Ahsan should be lifted. I refused.

Major General Mia Zainul Abedin then asked me whether declaring a serving officer undesirable constituted a special measure. I replied that yes, it was a special measure — and that if he disobeyed the Chief of Army Staff’s order, he would also face the same situation.

 Two days later, to avoid conflict, I myself withdrew the restriction.

What pained me the most was that we were sending professional officers from the army to RAB, and they were returning as professional killers. After that, I decided that any officer going on posting to RAB, DGFI, or BGB would meet me for an interview both before and after the posting.

I would motivate those heading to RAB by telling them that taking a human life is a grave sin, and that killing someone would bring the curse of that person’s family upon their own. Killing a person with their hands and feet tied is an extremely cowardly act. True courage lies in untying their hands and feet, placing a weapon in their hands, and facing them in combat.

When officers returned, hearing their chilling descriptions of various killings made me deeply worried about the future of the army. I met the Prime Minister and requested that army personnel serving in RAB be brought back into the army. She admitted that RAB was worse than the Rakkhibahini. She made no commitment, and no further steps were taken on the matter.

Later, I encouraged the officers who came for the interviews by telling them that if they were ever asked to take part in a killing mission, they should call me directly. I assured them that I would bring them back into the army with honour and reinstate them. Alongside me, those heading to RAB for the first time were also motivated by Military Secretary Major General Anwar, the DMI, and my PS Colonel Sazzad (now a Major General).

A few days later, DMI Brigadier Jaglul came to me and reported that our efforts to motivate the officers were having no effect. After joining RAB, the officers were being demotivated.

Yet, when two officers were asked to carry out a killing mission on their very first night, they left and reported to the MP checkpoint at Dhaka Cantonment. I reinstated them into the army with full honour.

During this period, DMI Brigadier Jaglul became an adversary of Colonel Ziaul Ahsan. Major General Tarique Siddique removed him from the DMI post. Normally, the DMI is the preferred officer of the Army Chief and is appointed by the Chief himself. But in this case, he was transferred against my wishes, which I found extremely humiliating. There was also an attempt to transfer the Commanding Officer of the Army Security Unit, Brigadier Fazal, but this was blocked due to my strong opposition.