Enforced disappearances: No scope for senior officials to evade responsibility

Although many officials have claimed that incidents of enforced disappearance during the Awami League’s period in power occurred without their knowledge, the commission of inquiry into enforced disappearances has stated that there is no scope for those responsible to evade accountability in such cases.

This observation is contained in the commission’s final report, which was submitted on Sunday to the chief adviser of the interim government, professor Muhammad Yunus.

On Monday, the commission’s chairman, justice Mainul Islam Chowdhury, highlighted various aspects of the report at a press conference.

Following the mass uprising that led to the Awami League’s forced removal from power, the interim government formed this commission in August 2024 to investigate incidents of enforced disappearance that occurred during the party’s over 15 years' rule.

After more than two years of investigation, the commission confirmed 1,569 cases of enforced disappearance and submitted its final report.

The commission reported that enforced disappearances were primarily politically motivated and that evidence had been found indicating the involvement of the then prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, in the disappearance of several high-profile individuals.

Many officials from various forces claimed before the commission that the incidents of enforced disappearance had occurred before they assumed their respective responsibilities and that they had merely inherited custody of detainees or control of detention facilities.

The commission rejected this argument, stating that responsibility does not end with a change of command; rather, it transfers to the subsequent office-holder.

No detainee can exist without a custodian and as such custodians, the relevant officials cannot evade responsibility.

The report notes that even in an internal investigation by the Bangladesh Army, successive directors general were held equally responsible for the eight-year detention of former army officer Brigadier General (dismissed) Abdullahil Aman Azmi.

Senior officials involved in cases of enforced disappearance frequently claimed that they were unaware of the actions of their subordinates or of the existence of secret detention facilities.

The commission dismissed this claim as well, stating that these were matters the senior officials ‘ought to have known’. There is no scope for them to avoid responsibilities.

According to the commission, the detective branch (DB) and counter terrorism and transnational crime (CTTC) offices on Minto Road, the rapid action battalion (RAB) headquarters and the joint interrogation cell (JIC, known as the ‘Aynaghar’) of the directorate general of forces intelligence (DGFI) were located in such a manner that it would not have been impossible for senior officials to hear detainees’ cries or observe their movement from their offices.

In many cases, detention cells were situated very close to, or on the same floor as, the offices of senior officials.

The report further states that the former director general of the DGFI, Lieutenant General Akbar Zaman, testified that he had directly discussed the detention of Hummam Quader Chowdhury (son of Salauddin Quader Chowdhury) with the then prime minister, Sheikh Hasina.

Similarly, former RAB director general Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun admitted that he was aware of the detention of Mir Ahmad bin Quasem Arman (son of Mir Quasem Ali) and that the previous director general, Benazir Ahmed, had informed him of the matter.

Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun also informed his successor, Khurshid Hossain, of the issue at the time of handing over charge.

The commission concluded that the claim that enforced disappearances were merely the actions of ‘a few rogue officers’ is also inaccurate.

The use of similar abduction methods across different parts of the country, identical types of detention facilities, and an organised process of detainee transfers between RAB and the DGFI demonstrate that this was a coordinated institutional system.

Furthermore, the routine practice of later showing disappeared persons as arrested in lawful cases, using identical charges and extracting forced confessions, clearly indicates the structural nature of this system.

The commission holds the view that, during the Bangladesh Awami League’s period in power, enforced disappearances evolved into an institutional system operating within the state’s security architecture.

The report, therefore, concludes that these incidents were not isolated aberrations, but rather constituted a well organised and premeditated system.

Although attempts were made to justify enforced disappearances as a tool for countering terrorism, the commission’s report states that this method was in fact primarily used to suppress political opponents and critics.

Rejecting the claim that unlawful detention was necessary to combat terrorism, the commission stated that detaining individuals on the basis of personal judgement rather than evidence is legally and ethically indefensible.

This practice has undermined the admissibility and integrity of evidence within the justice system. It has also enabled actual terrorists to portray themselves as ‘victims’, thereby weakening national security instead of strengthening it.

The commission has rejected allegations that it is singling out the armed forces. The report states that the commission issued summonses to 98 police officers and 108 military officers, figures that are broadly comparable.

Investigations were conducted on the basis of the nature of the offences and the level of secrecy involved, not on the basis of institutional bias.

A section of military officers had argued that any proceedings against them should be conducted under the army act.

The commission rejected this position, stating that enforced disappearance is not defined as a specific offence under the army act and that the act does not contain clear provisions regarding the ‘command responsibility’ of senior officers.

The commission of inquiry into enforced disappearances also questioned the credibility of internal military investigations.

Referring to the disappearance of Bangladesh Nationalist Party leader M Ilias Ali, the commission noted that the inquiry board formed in that case ceased its work without reaching a conclusion and that the evidence collected subsequently ‘disappeared’.

The commission described this as an example of obstruction of investigations at the highest level.

The report highlighted that, at a critical stage of the investigation, several military officers, including former Lieutenant General Akbar Hossain and Major General Saiful Abedin, left the country.

It questioned how they were able to do so from a highly secured area such as Dhaka Cantonment, despite the cancellation of their passports and the imposition of travel bans.

While expressing serious concern, the commission characterised the incident as a major failure on the part of the intelligence agencies and law enforcement bodies.