Your papers indicate you work on party system institutionalisation, which you call essential for a stable democracy. What do you mean by party system institutionalisation?
Fernando Casal: To summarise the concept, for a party system to be considered institutionalised, you need to have stable and predictable relationships among parties. This means that on the night of an election, you should predict who is going to form the government and with whom. In the United Kingdom, for example, if the Labour Party wins, they form a monocolor government; if the Conservatives win, they do the same. The interactions are predictable. In Sweden, you have predictable blocks—socialists with communists and greens, or conservatives with others.
When a system is not institutionalised, it is unpredictable, and you don’t know how the government will be formed. This predictability is important because it stabilises behaviour. If you have a long-term perspective and know you can alternate back into power in the next election, you have fewer incentives to abuse state resources or be corrupt. If the system is unstable and you think your party might disappear in four years, you are more likely to steal and benefit only your friends. This lack of stability can lead people to get tired of the mess and eventually ask for a charismatic leader to establish a dictatorship.
You gave examples from European liberal democracies, but a country like Bangladesh, which has never experienced two consecutive fair elections since its inception. We have a history of political violence where parties in power cannot be removed without a powerful movement. The trust between parties is vulnerable; the government always tries to remove the opposition. How does your concept apply here?
Fernando Casal: There are institutionalised party systems in Asia too, such as in Japan, Taiwan, and even India or Indonesia. It is possible. The problem in Bangladesh is not just institutionalisation, but the very notion of democracy held by the parties. They are obsessed with staying in power, but democracy is about alternation, mutual tolerance, and institutional forbearance. Even with a majority, you must respect the rights of the opposition to express views and act freely. You can only have a true party system when you have democracy where at least two parties compete freely and fairly. Without that, you might have ‘over-institutionalisation’, like in the Soviet Union or Mexico before 1994, where one party always won, but it isn't democracy, as it it isn’t competitive at all.
Is the system you are referring to like a ‘social contract’ or something managed by the state?
Fernando Casal: No, the system refers to the interactions and relationships among political parties, similar to how organs interact within a human body. In a dictatorship or a hegemonic system, you don’t have these democratic interactions because one party imposes its will on the others. Democracy must be ‘the only game in town’, involving not just elections but the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and respect for the opposition’s access to media. I think Bangladesh currently faces problems with the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, among many otheres.
You mentioned public funding in your works. What is that relationship with the party system?
Fernando Casal: I am finishing a study on the causes and consequences of party system institutionalisation in all Asian democracies since decolonisation for a new book to be published by Cambridge University Press. As part of the project, my co-authors and I look look at the relationship between public funding and system institutionalisation. We found that the simple presence of the former does not lead to the latter. It depends on the amount of funding and the liberal character of the public funding regime. Higher public funding can socialize and strengthen relevant parties, but it requires a proper oversight authority. People in Bangladesh might be skeptical of giving money to ‘rich and corrupt’ parties, but if they see an institution controlling how that money is used, it will create trust. You need both the ‘carrot’ of funding and the ‘stick’ of oversight for the party funding system to work.
When you are talking about ‘oversight’, do you refer to any state institution, and which state institution should provide that oversight?
Fernando Casal: It could be the Election Commission, the Court of Auditors, or an Anti-Corruption Commission. In my experience, anti-corruption commissions often work better for controlling finance because they have powers the Electoral Commission may lack, such as accessing bank statements or tax returns. However, in some places like the UK, the Electoral Commission handles it rather well.
Since the ‘90s, there has been a disregard for parties. It is evident from recent uprisings. Why is this systemic shift occurring globally, and what are the implications for the broader political atmosphere?
Fernando Casal: The crisis of parties has been discussed since the late ‘70s. More often than not, parties have not fulfilled their functions. In consolidated democracies, we see ‘cartelisation’, where parties entrench themselves in the state and focus on management rather than representing voters or ideological competition. When voters see no difference between the left and the right, they become disappointed. This leads to the rise of populist or anti-establishment parties.
However, you cannot have representative democracy without political parties. Only tiny micro-states like Tuvalu can function without them. Large countries need parties to agglutinate interests. These social movements will eventually have to convert into parties to govern. The cure is to have functional, transparent, and responsive parties that have long-term perspectives rather than just worrying about the next tweet.
You’ve written that populism isn't always bad. Is it an opportunity for a stagnant democracy?
Fernando Casal: Populists are very good at detecting problems that traditional parties, acting like ostriches, ignore, such as immigration. Immigration is a problem in many European countries, so let’s talk about it. We have to find a solution between accepting all immigrants and denying them completely. Since traditional parties did not talk about it, populists took the opportunity to address this, but what these populists are suggesting is not the solution.
However, populists are usually bad at providing solutions. If you have strong institutions, having populists in government can be an opportunity for people to realize they cannot deliver on their promises. The real danger is when they get constitutional majorities, as in Hungary, and change the whole system to an illiberal democracy.
You know, following the fall of a 15-year autocratic regime in Bangladesh, the activities of the former ruling party were banned pending trial, primarily due to their direct responsibility for grave human rights violations. Given your research on party bans, what is your opinion on banning a previous autocratic regime’s party during a transition?
Fernando Casal: Peaceful transitions often require dealing with the previous regime. In post-communist countries, many communist parties converted into socialist or democratic parties. As long as individuals were not involved in criminal activities like murder or torture, they are often accepted because they still have supporters. You should try the people—the leaders or the dictator's family who benefited—not necessarily the entire party.
However, democracy must defend itself—this is ‘militant democracy’. If a party refuses to accept the rules of the democratic game, uses violence, or continues to threaten the opposition, then it is normal to ban them. In Europe, parties generally cannot be banned unless they use violence. All in all, international guidelines suggest that banning a political party should be the last resource.
However, here in Bangladesh, there are allegations of crimes against humanity against that party.
Fernando Casal: If a party is considered responsible for crimes, it could be tried. For example, the Nazi party was banned in Germany, and communist parties have been banned in many countries. In principle, I am against banning parties, but if a party is held responsible for crimes against humanity, like the Nazis or certain communist regimes, then it could be banned.
However, this is nuanced. Even if a party is banned, if it re-establishes itself under a different name—with leaders who are not responsible for those crimes and who support democracy—it should be allowed to participate. The beauty of democracy is that as long as you respect the democratic system, you are okay.
Currently Bangladesh is going through a transition phase. What should the civil and political sphere of Bangladesh focus on during the transition period?
Fernando Casal: Based on the Spanish experience in the late 1970s, it is essential to build respect and trust among political parties and to achieve compromises. In Spain, we had the Moncloa Pacts, where parties came together to solve essential issues like the economy, pensions, health, and education. Democracy is about talking to each other and reaching the middle ground.
I see a problem currently in Bangladesh where a government with a constitutional majority may not implement the agenda they signed, which not only betrays voters, but hinders citizens’ trust in democracy. This is a ‘suicidal tactic’.
As I mentioned before, a stable democracy requires mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance. This means even if you have the legal power to impose your will, you should still try to accommodate, compromise, and negotiate. There must always be room for alternation where you win the will of the voters freely and fairly. Bangladesh has a great opportunity now; please take it and don't waste time as has been done since independence.
Thank you.
Fernando Casal: Thank you.