Dynastic politics won't sustain for long in Bangladesh

The July mass uprising is about to mark its one-year anniversary. During last year’s uprising, some university teachers stood beside the students. As a teacher of Dhaka University, how do you now remember those days?

There are three aspects to standing beside the students on July 2024—as a human being, as a teacher, and as a conscious citizen, I saw it as my responsibility. I believe my colleagues and I who stood by the students were motivated by all three of these considerations. In essence, we were standing beside Bangladesh itself. Personally, I consider July a unique chapter in my life. Being part of the struggle to reclaim citizens’ rights by standing up against authoritarian rule is, to me, a matter of deep pride.

A year later, how would you interpret the mass uprising? What, in your view, were its core characteristics?

The July 24 mass uprising was a multi-layered, multi-dimensional explosion involving a diverse set of stakeholders. Mass uprisings are not new in our country’s history. However, the July uprising was a watershed moment in Bangladesh’s political narrative. It wasn’t just about toppling a government—it was about people standing up against an entrenched system.

This was not merely the result of a student movement. It was the culmination of long-standing frustration, deprivation, and political stagnation—a remarkable public awakening. Historically, it’s significant because it introduced a new dimension to our political culture and raised fundamental questions about the nature and legitimacy of the existing governance structure. Its distinctiveness lies in its ability to redefine citizenship rights, the nature of political leadership, and political culture itself.

This uprising had no single leader. No one individual or organisation led it. A notable feature was its decentralised leadership—not dependent on a singular figure or party, but shaped by numerous emerging political voices and actors. It was driven by a distributed, network-based leadership structure. From cities to villages, from campuses to factories—parallel leadership structures emerged everywhere, something unseen in previous political movements.

How would you evaluate the expectations, achievements, and limitations of the mass uprising? What impact has it had on Bangladesh’s political system and culture?

Of course, there is a gap between the expectations and the outcomes. The current situation does make me feel disheartened. However, I also believe it’s too early to pronounce final judgment on the results of the uprising. It has only just initiated a qualitative shift in Bangladeshi politics. There’s a long journey ahead with many challenges, but it is a step forward.

Take one example—dynastic politics. The uprising has clearly challenged this tradition. I don’t think the old model will survive much longer. This movement struck a blow to the very foundation of dynastic control in politics.

Following the uprising, we’ve seen a growing desire among stakeholders for a new political settlement. How would you describe the practical social, economic, and political shape of this new political settlement?

To me, a new political settlement means a reconfiguration of power. That is, bringing balance in responsibilities and authority among traditional power centers—political parties, the parliament, judiciary, universities, local government, bureaucracy, the banking sector, and the media—while simultaneously building institutional capacity to uphold those responsibilities.

For example, breaking the unitary power of the parliament and introducing a bicameral legislature; amending the Bank Company Act to prevent concentration of financial power in the hands of a few investors; reforming the police structure under an independent commission—these could all be practical steps toward a new political settlement.

A democratic economy, meaning one with equal opportunity for competition, transparency, freedom from corruption and exploitation, and equal rights for both employers and workers, should also be a part of this new settlement.

We’ve seen broad social consensus on not returning to the old political system. What is your opinion on the proposed reforms aimed at institutionalising that consensus?

Institutional transformation doesn’t happen overnight. But the hopeful sign is that people are more politically aware now. The 11 reform commissions have proposed very important reforms in their reports.

I worked in the Local Government Commission and saw firsthand how 10 individuals worked tirelessly to draft their recommendations. It was the same in other commissions. These suggestions weren’t conjured up out of thin air—they were based on stakeholder consultations, national and international experiences, and research. If even a quarter of these proposals had been implemented, we would have seen massive systemic and structural improvements in the country.

That said, institutional change is never linear. It doesn’t always move forward; it can sometimes regress. But again, the positive thing is that there is growing public consensus on key issues. It will not be easy for any future political actor to completely ignore the demand for reform.

A selected group of proposals from the reform commissions have been discussed with political parties through the Consensus Commission. What do you think about the future of those discussions?

We’ve seen the Consensus Commission’s report. The 19 core reforms on which consensus were achieved are highly significant. For the rest, where disagreements remain, I believe further dialogue will yield progress. Given our political culture, even this much progress is not insignificant.

There is no shortage of good proposals. The real challenge is implementation. Since we rely on political parties for implementation, if they fail to respond to public aspirations, they too will be discarded. But we must recognise that the very process of dialogue has value. Multiple parties are sitting together, listening to one another’s arguments, responding with counterproposals—I see this as a sign of progress.

The Consensus Commission is facilitating negotiations between parties on reforms, including constitutional and institutional changes. Even if consensus is reached now, do you think it can be maintained in the future?

Predicting the future is difficult—especially when it comes to political consensus. Whether or not a consensus lasts depends on three factors: legal or institutional alignment, cultural internalisation, and the presence of incentive structures.

That is—first, how much of the consensus is embedded in legal frameworks; second, how deeply it is internalised in our values, attitudes, and collective psyche; and third, whether the benefits of honoring the consensus or the consequences of breaking it are clearly defined.

That’s why a legal foundation is necessary, though not sufficient. Alongside it, cultural factors and political-economic incentives must also be clarified.
I believe the July uprising has taught us one basic lesson-- if any party seeks to become authoritarian, the consequences will be severe. Ultimately, it’s citizen pressure that will sustain the consensus. If civil society, the media, and our youth can keep up the pressure, breaking that consensus will not be easy.

The July Charter raised many key issues, but it appears that disagreements still remain among political parties on several of them. There’s also uncertainty about how the Charter will be implemented. Given this situation, how much impact do you think this Charter can have in bringing about the desired political transformation?

The Charter is not a sacred scripture—it’s just a document. By itself, it cannot change the prevailing political system. However, a consensus-based Charter can tell us what our collective aspirations are, how much of them we’ve achieved, and what remains unfulfilled. When we fail to meet these goals, we’ll be compelled to ask ourselves as to why we failed? Who stood in the way?

There are precedents in countries like South Africa, Tunisia, and Nepal, where such Charters of understanding were created and, to a considerable extent, adhered to by political parties. In our ongoing reform dialogue, the country’s leading political party is currently showing reluctance to support several fundamental changes. The party is trying to capitalise on its size and strength—this is not uncommon in politics generally. But Bangladesh is not going through an ordinary time. This is a historic turning point. All parties must rise above narrow party interests and show willingness to compromise.

What if parties that agreed to the Charter lose interest in implementing its promises after an election or once in power?

Whether the Charter will be honored depends on the stakeholders, primarily the political parties. To compel them to adhere to it, a legal foundation must be created. It could be integrated into the Constitution or codified into law. Legal grounding makes enforcement and negotiation easier.

Since no consensus has been reached on the NCC (National Constitutional Council), I propose creating a Citizens’ Council on Constitutional Affairs. This council could be formed outside the formal state framework and include former judges, lawyers, political scientists, media professionals, and civil society representatives. It could play an advisory and oversight role.

Ultimately, it’s also about the development and assertion of citizens’ political agency. Citizens must evolve into a politically aware community, capable of detecting and challenging any process that undermines their civic dignity.

Since political parties ultimately have to face the people, a functional electoral democracy serves as a prerequisite for the implementation of any Charter or agreement. It also acts as a deterrent.

There’s much discussion around the upcoming national election. What challenges or risks do you foresee?

The interim government, for various reasons, has not been able to exercise its authority effectively. As a result, a national election has now become absolutely essential. However, the problem is whether the conditions for a fair election currently exist—this remains questionable.

The main issue is that, despite much dialogue, trust between the political parties remains weak. There are still concerns about the effectiveness of law enforcement on the ground. Large quantities of weapons and illicit money remain at the grassroots level, which could disrupt the electoral process.

In my opinion, a fair election requires active involvement of law enforcement, cooperation from the civil administration, a minimum consensus among political parties, and a neutral, robust role from both the Election Commission and the interim government. The absence of any of these elements could jeopardise the possibility of a free, fair, and participatory election.

In our current political culture, how likely is it that a credible alternative to the dominant party will emerge?

Our problem is that the number of viable alternatives in the current political space is very limited. From an ideological standpoint, BNP, Jamaat, and NCP broadly represent right-wing politics. But historically, the Bangladeshi people have preferred centrist political values.
There still exists a large segment of centrist liberal voters—those who care about the spirit of the Liberation War, women’s rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of lifestyle. But there’s currently no political party that genuinely represents this group.
If the newly formed party can correct its early mistakes and reorganise itself as a liberal, centrist force that honors the values of the Liberation War and commits to the aspirations expressed in the July uprising, then it could emerge as a credible alternative outside the conventional political binary.

Thank you

Thank you as well.