Well-known thinker and writer Farhad Mazhar, in two installments on July 3 and 4, extensively discussed the necessity of including media freedom and reform in the proposed July Charter’s joint commitment by political parties, referencing an article of mine. At the outset, I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to him for sharing my observations on media freedom.
The particular part of my statement that he quoted and supported was where I wrote: “In making democracy vibrant and effective, in the era of free-market economics, the autonomy of state-run media alone is not enough. Strong action is needed to bring about the changes in issues such as the dominance of black money in private media, the concentration of influence and power, and the absence of ethical standards.” Immediately afterward, he clearly stated, “However, I do accept or agree with the way he positively views the so-called ‘era of free-market economics,’ commonly known as liberal economic policy, and readily accepts it.”
Referring to the relationship between the development of market systems and the emergence and growth of democracy, he wrote, “The current unfettered free-market economy is not conducive to democracy; rather, it is a threat to democracy, especially to the media.”
In post-uprising Bangladesh, are the political parties that have expressed faith in democracy, civil society, and the interim government not attempting to rein in unrestrained plunder and unchecked inequality? Their success may be limited, but has there ever been a revolution where a mountain of irregularities and looting spanning a decade and a half was completely halted within just a year?
Farhad Mazhar’s theoretical discussion was primarily about the student-led mass uprising of July, the resulting interim government, its reformist thinking and initiatives, and the democratic future of Bangladesh. These do not align with his thoughts on revolution, people’s sovereignty, or constitutional vision. In his words, “There was a mass uprising on 5 August, but with the decision on 8 August to retain the existing constitution and state structure, Bangladesh entered a cycle of counter-revolutionary politics.”
If his political vision and his study-circle-based organisation can successfully negate the counter-revolution and usher in a genuine revolution, then his criticism will indeed have served a purpose. If not, the repeated and failed political experiments, under the banner of so-called "insaf kayem", risk becoming merely tiresome exercises
This analysis is not limited to theoretical discourse alone. It has also been attempted in practice. Whether it succeeded is a different question, and I will not enter that debate. “Kamal Ahmed has not been able to distinguish the constitutional counter-revolution of 8 August and the subsequent counter-revolutionary political process that consciously excluded the people from the 5 August uprising.” I will try to keep my discussion confined only to responding to this particular allegation.
Describing the swearing-in of Professor Muhammad Yunus as chief advisor on 8 August as a “constitutional counter-revolution,” on 4 July 4 Farhad Mazhar wrote, “The July Charter is a document that legitimises and justifies the constitutional counter-revolution. It is part of a continuing process to nullify the declaration of the mass uprising.” Yet only six months earlier, on 15 January, his opinion had been: “Through the July Declaration, the government will attain full authority.”
At that time, he wrote on Facebook: “The declaration is an important political and legal act of returning power to the people. In the absence of the declaration, the military-backed caretaker government is unlawful and illegitimate” (Without the July Declaration, the interim government is illegitimate: Farhad Mazhar, Dainik Kalbela, 15 January 2025).
We do not know how, in January, he expected the people to draft the declaration. But now, based on his current commentary, according to him “the National Consensus Commission, the so-called ‘Reform Commission,’ the ‘July Charter,’ etc., are essentially processes and documents of a new understanding between representatives of plundering and mafia classes and foreign vested interests.” Regarding the outcome of marathon negotiations among the country’s active and legitimate political parties, his position is: “A ‘charter’ formulated through consensus among political parties, excluding the people, can in no way establish the people’s sovereignty.”
It is admittedly difficult to discern the difference between the term "the people" so frequently used by politicians and the version of "the people" described by Farhad Mazhar. He refuses to recognise political party representatives as representatives of the people, but he does not clarify what the concrete form of representation should be. Are we then being asked to envision a system of representation based on intellectual merit, a kind of meritocracy? After dismissing political parties, surely no one would wish for the anarchic void that would follow.
Did even the ousted fascist Sheikh Hasina not invoke the will of the people? She considered all dissenters, beyond her loyal Awami League followers and their affiliated, subservient intellectuals and profiteering businessmen, as enemies of the state and nation. On what grounds, then, would political parties and civic groups or organisations, many of whom are labeled as NGOs or civil society, not be counted as part of "the people"? For that matter, even Farhad Mazhar’s own study-circle-based organisation, Unnayan Bikolper Nirdharoni Gobeshona (UBINIG), is often described as an NGO.
He laments that “there is no sign of any constituent assembly, public hearing, or ongoing dialogue on behalf of the people.” And yet, a close look at the activities of the 11 reform commissions formed, or even a glance at the annexes of their reports, would convince anyone of the kinds of public consultations that informed their observations and recommendations. The Media Reform Commission, for instance, heard from nearly 1,400 stakeholders and conducted public opinion surveys involving 45,000 individuals.
I fail to understand on what basis he observed that my writing reflects a vision of media being granted a kind of “official or corporate freedom,” where “the people’s right to audit information or construct public narratives is not recognised at all.” The Reform Commission’s report not only analyses in detail the steps necessary to ensure media accountability to its audience, that is, to the people, but also offers concrete recommendations. The report explicitly identifies ownership as a core issue, particularly the control wielded by owners of black money and mafia circles, and outlines measures to dismantle this dominance.
He writes that the state, by law, has the authority not only to legislate but even to curtail freedom of thought and conscience, done under the legal concept of “reasonable restrictions.” He perhaps did not notice that we have proposed removing even these constitutional limits. We have argued that only in the event of war, if and when the country is at war, should any such restriction on freedom of expression be considered acceptable, otherwise, not.
From his advocacy for a constituent assembly election, I gather that he is not against elections per se and that he acknowledges elections as an important vehicle for expressing public will. Even so, debate persists over what kind of election the victorious people of the mass uprising actually want.
Just as he has raised the idea of a constituent assembly, others have spoken of a referendum. And the political parties and civic groups that were, to varying degrees, active in opposing the regime throughout the era of autocratic rule have argued that a return to democracy is most realistically achievable through parliamentary elections.
The mass uprising was the result of a broad coalition of students and citizens, but aside from the single-point demand for the resignation of the autocrat Sheikh Hasina, there was no consensus on any other issue, then or now. Nor did any singular revolutionary leadership emerge. He may choose to label the discussions around reform agendas concerning elections and the democratic future as counter-revolutionary.
However, if his political vision and his study-circle-based organisation can successfully negate the counter-revolution and usher in a genuine revolution, then his criticism will indeed have served a purpose. If not, the repeated and failed political experiments, under the banner of so-called "insaf kayem", risk becoming merely tiresome exercises.
* Kamal Ahmed is a senior journalist and head of the Media Reform Commission
* The views expressed are the author's own.