The events of recent weeks, following the United States and Israel’s attack on Iran on 28 February 2026, have exposed a harsh reality that Gulf Arab states have long tried to avoid: the American security umbrella—secured at enormous cost and sustained through decades of strategic alignment—offers protection only when it serves Washington’s interests, not necessarily when it is most needed.
The March 2026 escalation between the United States, Israel and Iran has transformed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states from protected allies into unwilling battlefields, exposing the fundamental contradiction at the heart of their security architecture.
For decades, the GCC states anchored their defence strategy in a simple bargain: host American bases, purchase American weapons, make US dollar the global currency and receive American protection in return. Qatar spent more than USD 8 billion to expand Al Udeid Air Base, home to US Central Command's forward headquarters and 10,000 American personnel. Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet. Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia accommodate thousands of American troops across multiple facilities. The assumption was ironclad: US presence would guarantee security. That assumption has now been shattered.
When Israel launched its strike on Doha on 9 September 2025, targeting Hamas leaders in the Qatari capital, the formidable US defence apparatus at Al Udeid remained conspicuously silent. Israeli aircraft flew unopposed over Jordan and Saudi/Iraqi air space, entered Qatari airspace, bombed their targets, and retreated safely.
The message was unmistakable: the primary mission of American bases is to serve US interests, not to defend host nations, particularly when the attacker is Israel. The Qatari prime minister's helpless lament, "we are betrayed", captured the essence of the security trap.
The betrayal was compounded by Washington's response. The White House took hours to react, with the US president describing the bombing as feeling "very badly" while stopping short of condemnation. White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt acknowledged that the attack did not advance American goals but simultaneously validated attack’s objective: "eliminating Hamas, who have profited off the misery of those living in Gaza, is a worthy goal". Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, emboldened, warned Qatar to expel Hamas leaders, declaring, "if you don't, we will". It took a personal intervention from President Trump weeks later, and a phone call from the White House, for Netanyahu to offer a belated apology and pledge not to repeat the attack. The damage, however, was already done.
If the Doha strike revealed the conditional nature of American protection, the February-March 2026 war with Iran exposed its deeper perils. When US and Israeli forces launched strikes against Iranian targets on 28 February 2026, Tehran's retaliation focused not on Israel alone but on American bases across the Gulf also.
The operational pattern was deliberate and strategic. Iran's new supreme leader, Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, made the calculus explicit in his first public message: "All US bases should immediately be closed in the region, or they will remain under attack". He warned GCC states: "These countries must clarify their position regarding the aggressors against our dear homeland. I advise them to close those bases as soon as possible because they must have realised by now that America's claim of establishing security and peace was nothing but a lie".
For Gulf governments, this presented an impossible dilemma. The very bases designed to protect them had become magnets for attack. Their expensive air defence systems-Patriot batteries, THAAD interceptors, advanced fighter jets, were pressed into service not to defend Gulf territories but to shield American assets that had drawn fire in the first place. And even this defensive effort carried its own risk-according to Iranian warnings, any attempt to intercept missiles targeting US bases be interpreted as participation in aggression, transforming the defender into a legitimate target.
The United States, meanwhile, demonstrated where its true priorities lay. As tensions were escalating early 2026, American forces quietly evacuated key assets from exposed Gulf bases. Satellite imagery confirmed that aerial refuelling aircraft were gradually withdrawn from Qatar's Al Udeid Air Base, from 15 planes on 9 February 2026 to none by 26 February 2026.
US naval vessels departed Bahrain's port for open sea, leaving the Fifth Fleet's home base empty. These assets were relocated to more secure positions, notably, to Israel. F-22 Raptors arrived at Ovda Airbase in southern Israel. Refuelling aircraft parked at Ben-Gurion Airport. American air defence systems were repositioned to help protect Israeli territory.
The message could not be clearer: when the crisis came, Washington''s first instinct was to protect its forces and its Israeli ally, leaving Gulf hosts to manage the consequences as best they could.
The Abraham Accords states-the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco-found themselves in an even more compromised position. Their normalisation with Israel, framed as a strategic realignment based on shared threat perceptions, left them with no credible option for retaliation or even meaningful protest.
Lindsey Graham, a US senator, has increased pressure on Saudi Arabia to take a more active role in the rising confrontation with Iran. Graham argued that the crisis is not solely America’s responsibility but a broader strategic challenge for regional partners that maintain strong security ties with Washington. The South Carolina senator questioned why Saudi Arabia, a country with substantial military resources and long-standing defence cooperation with the United States, has not yet joined military actions targeting Iran. He cautioned that there could be consequences if Riyadh chooses to stay on the sidelines while the United States and Israel confront Tehran.
Gulf Arab nations have largely avoided responding publicly to such pressure. But Dubai billionaire and business tycoon Khalaf Al Habtoor offered a glimpse of the sentiment in the Gulf in a response to Graham’s comments. “We know full well why we are under attack, and we also know who dragged the entire region into this dangerous escalation without consulting those he calls his ‘allies’ in the region”. Gulf states are reluctant to join a wider conflict against Iran because they fear the US will eventually withdraw, leaving them to manage the long-term consequences alone. This caution is fueled by a belief that the Trump administration's push for war prioritises Israel's security over that of its Arab allies, making the US an unreliable partner in a prolonged confrontation.
More fundamentally, the crisis has forced a long-overdue reckoning with the structural flaws in the Gulf's security model. As one analysis notes, "if Gulf states face such difficulty in defending themselves against a country like Iran, whose military capabilities are comparatively constrained by sanctions and technological limitations, how would they cope against an adversary like Israel, possessing far more advanced military technologies?"
The answer is uncomfortable: they would not.
The dependency trap is multi-layered. Gulf militaries, despite decades of lavish spending on purchasing US and European weapons, remain structurally incapable of autonomous defence against peer adversaries. Arms sales come with strict end-user agreements that prohibit using American weapons against Israel.
The United States has historically been reluctant to transfer its most sophisticated technologies to Arab states, to maintain Israel''s qualitative military edge. And the entire relationship is designed to foster interoperability, the ability to fight alongside American forces, rather than independent strategic capability.
What, then, are the options for Gulf states trapped in this security architecture?
Expelling US forces, as Iran demands and as some voices in the region increasingly contemplate, would be a monumental gamble for the GCC countries to venture. Terminating the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Qatar, for example, would remove the American security umbrella entirely, leaving the Gulf exposed to a resurgent Iran and an emboldened Israel, while risking severe economic repercussions from the USA and potential internal instability. The threat of “regime change”, whether through external pressure or domestic upheaval, cannot be dismissed.
Pivoting toward alternative partners, China, Turkiye and Pakistan, offers theoretical possibilities for diversification.
Chinese defence systems are cost-effective, come without the political conditions attached to American sales, and are designed for interoperability with existing Western equipment. Turkiye has developed impressive indigenous capabilities, demonstrated in recent conflicts. Pakistan maintains close military ties with Gulf states, has defence pact with Saudi Arabia and offers cost-effective alternatives. But neither China nor Russia can provide the immediate, on-the-ground security guarantee that American bases apparently represent. And any significant shift in defence procurement risks provoking tensions with Washington, which remains the dominant security player for the foreseeable future.
The security trap is complete. Gulf states cannot fully trust the American umbrella, which has proven conditional and self-interested. They cannot expel US forces without exposing themselves to greater dangers. They cannot build independent defence capabilities quickly enough to fill the gap. And they cannot unite in a common regional stance, divided as they are by competing visions, rivalries, and the legacy of normalisation with Israel.
As Iran''s new supreme leader declared, America''s "claim of establishing security and peace was nothing but a lie". The Gulf states are now learning this truth at immense cost. Their tragedy is that even recognising the lie, they have few good options for escape. The architecture of alignment, built over decades and purchased at the price of billions, has become a cage. And the keys are held in Washington and Tel Aviv, where Gulf interests are, at best, a secondary consideration.
*Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), is a retired Commodore of Bangladesh Navy, is a security analyst.
** * The views expressed are the author’s own.