How positive has the journey of democracy been?

In discussions about democracy, an important distinction is often overlooked—transformation and consolidation. A state may begin its journey towards democracy, but if it fails to institutionally strengthen or stabilise that democracy, the journey does not become sustainable.

In the new political reality of Bangladesh, the first session of the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) was, in a sense, a combined reflection of expectations, possibilities, and uncertainties. This session was an important opportunity to gain initial guidance on the new phase of democratic progress commencing with the 2026 elections. However, despite lively discussions, it is difficult to call the session entirely satisfactory as fundamental questions about reform remained unspoken.

In discussions about democracy, an important distinction is often overlooked—transformation and consolidation. A state may begin its journey towards democracy, but if it fails to institutionally strengthen or stabilise that democracy, the journey does not become sustainable.

Bangladesh’s political history bears witness to this reality. Even after returning to democracy in 1991, it did not take an institutional form; instead, over time, the country has experienced a tilt towards authoritarian rule. In that context, the period post-2026 was being viewed as an opportunity to institutionally shape democracy anew. However, the first session of Parliament could not provide an effective outline to fulfill those expectations.

Various topics were discussed and debated in Parliament, which could be seen as a sign of a lively Parliament. But the in-depth and structural discussions needed to strengthen the foundation of democracy—especially on how state institutions would be reorganised, how the balance of power would be ensured—lacked clarity.

This raises a fundamental question—how strong should a government be in a democratic state? In the political experience of Bangladesh, we have seen two types of scenarios. On one hand, there was a government that was very strong and administratively efficient but diminished civil rights.

Since this fundamental concept is not clearly reflected in political discussions, questions about reform often become abstract and unclear. This obscurity has given the ruling party an opportunity in the parliament to ignore all discussions related to reform or mold the reform discussion as it sees fit.

On the other hand, there have been times when the government was relatively weak and, despite its intentions, could not effectively protect civil rights or administer effectively. Where the balance lies between these two opposing experiences is a deep political and philosophical question. The state's institutional structure needs to be built by determining its answer. However, this fundamental debate was absent in the parliamentary discussions.

This absence becomes more apparent when we see the context of reform. In discussions about reform, it is often viewed as an ultimate goal. In reality, reform is not an end; it is a means through which democracy can be effective, civil rights assured, and state accountability established.

Since this fundamental concept is not clearly reflected in political discussions, questions about reform often become abstract and unclear. This obscurity has given the ruling party an opportunity in the parliament to ignore all discussions related to reform or mold the reform discussion as it sees fit.

In this case, it should also be noted that the BNP’s reform thoughts always emphasise establishing a strong government and is hence never enthusiastic about the redistribution of power.

Analysing the role of the opposition party further highlights this limitation. They speak of the necessity of reform, demand the establishment of independent institutions. But they cannot clearly explain how these institutions will bring about change in the real lives of people. For instance, consider the Human Rights Commission (NHRC) or Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).

There is a general statement that an independent Human Rights Commission is necessary. However, explicit answers cannot be obtained from the opposition on how its reports, investigations, or recommendations would be used in Parliament or how they would ensure accountability from the government.

There is a general statement that an independent Human Rights Commission is necessary. However, explicit answers cannot be obtained from the opposition on how its reports, investigations, or recommendations would be used in Parliament or how they would ensure accountability from the government.

As a result, the question of reform has turned into a distant discussion for the general public. For the person who is a victim of corruption, harassment, or deprivation at the local level, political pressure cannot be created if it is not clearly presented how an independent institution will bring real change to them. Public involvement in the democratic process is extremely important; but without creating this connection, the question of reform remains confined within the political arena.

Meanwhile, the two-thirds majority of the ruling party in Parliament has made the situation more complex. Such a majority in the political history of Bangladesh has not been a positive sign. In the past, such centralisation of power has often led to the establishment of singular control. Here, an important point is that democracy cannot survive solely on an individual’s goodwill or morality. It survives on an institutional framework, where there is effective control over power and, regardless of who is in power, they must work within that framework.

That is why the concept of checks and balances is extremely important. A strong parliamentary committee system, effective participation of the opposition party, independent organisations—all are necessary to maintain the balance of power.

Institutional reform is not just essential for democracy, but also for the survival of political parties themselves. A controlled and balanced power structure protects the government from overuse of power and aids in strengthening their position in future elections.

For example, if the leadership of the Public Accounts Committee is in the hands of the opposition party, effective oversight of the government's financial activities can be created. Similarly, having an independent Anti-Corruption Commission or Human Rights Commission can bring the government under accountability through parliamentary discussions of their information and reports. However, comprehensive discussions on such institutional frameworks are still absent.

Checks and balances are needed not just for the opposition party, but for the government itself. When a strong government is in power, it faces party and political pressures. Often, in fulfilling the expectations of party workers or supporters, the government can lean towards irregularities or corruption. In this situation, strong and independent institutions can provide the government with an ‘excuse’ or safeguard.

The government can argue that they are unable to engage in unethical practices due to legal or institutional constraints. This reduces corruption on one hand and maintains the government’s long-term acceptability and credibility on the other.

Thus, institutional reform is not just essential for democracy, but also for the survival of political parties themselves. A controlled and balanced power structure protects the government from overuse of power and aids in strengthening their position in future elections.

Overall, Bangladesh's current situation indicates a turning point. The journey towards democracy has started, but how permanent that journey will be depends on how much the institutional foundation can be strengthened. The first session of the National Parliament partially created an opportunity to construct that foundation but could not provide the necessary guidance.

Now, there is a need for open and deep discussions among political parties on fundamental questions. How strong will the government be, how will the balance of power be ensured, how will public participation be increased—by determining the answers to these questions, the path of institutional reform must be charted.

At the same time, the question of reform must be linked to the lives of ordinary people, so that it becomes not just a political slogan but a tool for real change. Otherwise, Bangladesh's democratic journey risks turning into an incomplete chapter again. Without strengthening the institutional foundation now, there is no effective alternative to avoid a repetition of history.

* Asif Mohammad Shahan is a professor at the Department of Development Studies of the University of Dhaka

* The opinions expressed here are those of the author.

* This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam