Sheikh Mujibur Rahman holds a unique place in the history of Bangladesh. As a leading figure in the country's independence movement, he is seen by many Bangladeshis as a source of inspiration. At the same time, following independence, his rule became a source of disappointment due to irregularities, nepotism, suppression of free speech, and the crackdown on political dissent.
His experiment in transforming the democratic system into a one-party state through BAKSAL reflected a failure in governance. His tenure is also often held responsible for the country’s fragile economy during that time and for extrajudicial killings of political opponents.
The creation of mobs, attacks on shrines, harassment of women, and assaults on dissenters are creating a situation that not only hinders the formation of a new Bangladesh-centered culture but also strengthens the hands of the defeated forces of the Liberation War. As a result, the defeated forces of the July uprising and those of the Liberation War are reinforcing each other’s existence and legitimising their actions. Stopping the political deification of Mujib by force is not the solution.
Mujib began governing from the peak of popularity, but within a few years, that popularity began to decline. Had he been overthrown through a public uprising or a mass movement rooted in popular support, his place in history might have been viewed differently. However, the brutal assassination carried out by a faction of the military — in which even women and children were not spared — turned Sheikh Mujib into a “tragic hero” in the eyes of many. His legacy and contributions were later reconstructed, and he was reborn in the national narrative.
In the decades that followed, we saw Mujib being reimagined in culture, literature, and public life as a figure above all fault — beyond question or criticism. Initially, this process was slow and limited to party-based and civic initiatives. Later, when the Awami League came to power, it institutionalised the shaping of Mujib’s image as a state priority, compelling all state institutions and affiliated organisations to support this effort.
From 2008 until July 2024, just before the government’s fall in a mass uprising, Sheikh Hasina’s administration consistently invested in what could be called the “Sheikh Mujib Reconstruction Project.” In the final decade of Hasina’s increasingly authoritarian rule, many were imprisoned or subjected to oppression simply for criticising Sheikh Mujib. Even children were not spared.
Using the Digital Security Act, criticism of Sheikh Mujib and his family was turned into a form of modern “blasphemy.” Major institutions across Bangladesh were forced to participate in Mujib’s birth centenary celebrations. Participation in Mujib-themed events became mandatory, as did public displays of reverence. Mujib-centric icons and symbols were created and celebrated, and questioning them was no longer permissible — a dominant narrative (or grand discourse) was established in which criticism was punishable.
This process of creating rituals, icons, and discourses signals a political deification. The idea of the "political god" is not new in global politics. A political god refers to a charismatic leader who is believed by followers to possess superhuman qualities. Scholars like professor Moumita Sen, Sharika Thiranagama, and Kenneth Bo Nielsen have explored the phenomenon of political deification in South Asia, particularly in India and Sri Lanka (see Sen & Nielsen, Gods in the Public Sphere: Political Deification in South Asia, 2022).
Professor Arild Engelsen Ruud, in his research, has shown how a process of constructing a ‘civil religion’ centered on Sheikh Mujib began in Bangladesh. In this process, both the person of Mujib and the state of Bangladesh were transformed into a singular sacred and sovereign symbol—Mujib himself came to embody a sovereign character, like the nation itself, demanding loyalty from all citizens (See Ruud, 2022, "Bangabandhu as the Eternal Sovereign: On the Construction of a Civil Religion").
A relevant question arises here: in a Muslim-majority country like Bangladesh, is it possible to openly deify a political figure as is done in India? In that context, I find the concept of "covert deification" particularly appropriate. According to this idea, all the characteristics of deification may be present, but the process remains unspoken or concealed. That is, unlike in some other South Asian countries, Mujib is not explicitly declared a god.
To foreground Mujib’s "god-like" attributes, narratives such as the 7 March speech and slogans like “Without Mujib, the country would not have gained independence” were widely promoted. Contributions of other major political leaders in the independence movement were downplayed, while Mujib was elevated as the sole leader
However, the key mechanisms of political deification—such as the creation of rituals, icons, and discourses—are used to regularly celebrate Mujib in daily and institutional life. This includes establishing compulsory rituals, turning him into a symbolic figure, and building a dominant narrative that presents him as a sovereign, unquestionable personality who must not be criticised.
We have witnessed this process during the Hasina era, where criticising Mujib became punishable, and efforts were made to portray his character as flawless and extraordinary.
To foreground Mujib’s "god-like" attributes, narratives such as the 7 March speech and slogans like “Without Mujib, the country would not have gained independence” were widely promoted. Contributions of other major political leaders in the independence movement were downplayed, while Mujib was elevated as the sole leader. His speech, raised finger, glasses, coat, and pipe began to be symbolically represented in literature and culture. Particularly under state sponsorship, Mujib’s pervasive presence was made institutional and social—his image featured repeatedly in currency notes, billboard advertisements, newspapers, textbooks, television programmes, and political speeches, portraying him as an almost invisible force guiding the nation.
This ubiquitous presence creates a visible yet covert form of deification, which turns Mujib into a towering figure—like a banyan tree—while effectively bonsai-ing all other significant leaders before and after independence.
Referring to Benedict Anderson, the nation is an “imagined community”, created by the elite to instill a shared identity among ordinary people. This imagined identity may arise among those who share a common enemy, similar experiences of deprivation and inequality, language, culture, or values.
The idea of the present-day Bangladesh as a territory-based nation is relatively new. Although it had been considered in various contexts before 1947, it took its definitive form during the anti-Pakistan movement. Several leaders played important roles at different stages of this nation-building journey. Their contributions as the founders of the Bangladeshi nation-state are undeniable. Even considering the 1971 War of Independence, Ziaur Rahman took the initiative to start the war and contributed on the battlefield despite the risk to his life, while Tajuddin Ahmad and Syed Nazrul Islam advanced the state-building process organisationally.
However, by downplaying the contributions of others and solely merging Mujib with the existence of Bangladesh, on one hand the process of deification began, and on the other, the people’s nature of the Liberation War was diminished.
The July mass uprising presented an opportunity to question the deification of Sheikh Mujib and to bring forth the people’s participatory history of the Liberation War in a new light. Unfortunately, subsequent events following the uprising—especially corruption allegations against student leaders, power struggles among political parties known as proponents of democracy, and the rise of far-right forces—have undermined this opportunity.
One of the strengths of the July uprising was its cultural dimension, which suggested a fresh perspective beyond Mujib’s deification. However, under the influence of extreme right-wing forces, many are moving away from the ideals of the Liberation War, free thought, and Bangladeshi civic nationalism.
The creation of mobs, attacks on shrines, harassment of women, and assaults on dissenters are creating a situation that not only hinders the formation of a new Bangladesh-centered culture but also strengthens the hands of the defeated forces of the Liberation War. As a result, the defeated forces of the July uprising and those of the Liberation War are reinforcing each other’s existence and legitimising their actions.
Stopping the political deification of Mujib by force is not the solution.
Rather, it is possible to build the people’s inclusivity in the concept of the Bangladeshi nation by fostering the development of new cultural and political values, recognising the various founders of the Bangladesh state, and presenting the people’s nature of the Liberation War along with the continuity of the July uprising.
*Dr. Saimum Parvez
*Senior researcher, School of Theology and Religion, Norway
*The views expressed are of the writer's own