In a densely populated country like Bangladesh with a large youth population, there is no more significant economic indicator than employment, particularly for the youth. In July 2024, the initiation of the mass uprising began with the students’ movement against quotas in government jobs. The onset of a movement regarding employment was not coincidental. In an economy where opportunities for secure and decent jobs are very limited, government jobs had become one of the most reliable paths to attaining security and social status. Two years later, the issue of employment has become even more intense.
According to the World Bank, from 2016 to 2022, while 14 million young people in Bangladesh reached working age, only 8.7 million new employment opportunities were added. Among those who have found work, about 70% have been engaged in low-productivity agriculture.
Government statistics indicate that roughly one-third of the country’s total labour force comprises the Gen-Z generation, aged 15-29. The government’s pledge to create 10 million jobs in five years is effectively a commitment to Gen-Z. However, the big question is, what will the nature of this employment be?
Gen-Z is not a homogeneous group
In many analyses, Gen-Z is often assumed to be a city-dwelling, smartphone-dependent generation moving towards white-collar service sector jobs. The reality in Bangladesh is much more diverse. Most of this generation has attended school, but there are significant differences in their learning, skills, and potential. Many are working or will work in agriculture, factories, small businesses, transport sectors, or as migrant workers abroad. Even though for highly educated Gen-Z individuals in Bangladesh, government jobs remain attractive due to security, social protection, and status.
In the context of Bangladesh, special attention is needed for young women. The female labor force participation rate dropped from 42. 77 per cent in 2022 to 38.4 per cent in 2024. At a time when the demographic dividend is shrinking, bringing more women into the workforce and retaining them there is one of the key ways to prolong its benefits. It’s not just demographic outcomes that will determine this; how effectively we can enable people to engage in productive work is equally important.
Forces changing the nature of work
A recent study by CPD identified 27 driving forces for the transformation of future employment. Key global drivers include AI and automation, the digital economy, green transition, the post-aging and youth-dependent South, reconfiguration of trade and value chains, stricter standards, and changing values regarding work. At the national level, there are automation in the manufacturing sector, climate-related disasters, digital inequalities, skills mismatches in domestic and foreign labor markets, shrinking demographic dividend, platform-based work, policy instability, and LDC graduation challenges.
For Bangladesh, automation is the most immediate challenge. Up to 1.22 million jobs in the ready-made garment industry could be at risk. By 2041, up to 60 per cent of female employment in this sector could be lost. Employment in the manufacturing sector has remained stagnant at about 8.1 million, which is lower than the 2013 level.
AI constitutes the second wave. According to IMF forecasts, about 40 per cent of jobs worldwide are within the influence of AI. The organisation warns that young new entrants to the labour market are initially at the most risk because AI can easily perform many of the routine tasks on which early-stage jobs depend.
Where are the challenges?
Low risk does not mean security. The World Bank has shown that moderately educated young workers in the business service and IT sectors in South Asia are the most at risk. The organization has also warned that low risk for Bangladesh today could turn into a competitive disadvantage in the future.
The major risk is increasing inequality in both income and opportunities. In this region, AI-skilled jobs offer approximately a 30% wage premium. If internet access, digital devices, and training remain limited to urban, affluent, and male youths, then the very technology that could reduce inequality would instead exacerbate it.
The skills development system is also not ready. The World Bank has spoken of a chronic mismatch between the necessary skills for institutions and job seekers. The enrollment rate in technical and vocational education at the secondary level is below 20 per cent and government spending in the education and skills sector has dropped to just 1.3 per cent of GDP. The primary challenge for Bangladesh is that even though problems are recognized in our policy, they are rarely reflected in policy design and implementation.
Where is the potential?
In recent years, three major doors have opened for employment.
The first is outsourcing. In the first six months of 2025, revenue in this sector reached $900 million, which was more than the full-year revenue for 2024. However, the World Bank has warned that AI is threatening early-stage work in call centers and business services, and many other outsourcing jobs could gradually fall under the domain of AI. Policymakers and individuals in Bangladesh often do not prepare in advance for such changes. In order to survive in the competition, there is no alternative to continuous skills development, re-skilling, and moving up the value chain.
The second is employment overseas. In 2025, over 1.1 million Bangladeshis went abroad for work, but only about one-fifth of them are classified as skilled or professional. Increasing this proportion is one of the fastest ways to boost income.
The third is the creative and digital economy, which is now a government priority. In the 2026-27 fiscal year budget, income from freelancing and content creation has been made tax-free. To advance this sector, structural barriers need to be removed. Policy thinking needs to be more future-oriented. Although the platform-based economy and employment have grown rapidly over the past decade, workers in this sector, who are comparatively young, still lack a specific legal identity and transferable social protection.
However, the greatest potential lies in combining technology with the traditional sectors where most of Gen-Z will work. A young farmer with a smartphone can learn improved farming techniques, check market prices, and sell products online. Research has found a link between mobile phone ownership among female-headed farming households in Bangladesh and higher yields and profits. The same logic applies to factories, small producers, and local services. The goal is not just to create new professions; improving the productivity, income, and work environment of existing jobs is equally important.
Is it too late for Bangladesh?
Perhaps not yet, but there are three ticking clocks running simultaneously.
Demographic clock: The labour force will expand only until the late 2030s.
Trade clock: The pressure of automation in the garment industry will be at its peak when trade benefits for LDC graduation are withdrawn.
Commercial clock: Along with LDC graduation, Bangladesh will stand to lose special trade preferences at a time when automation will place the readymade garment industry under tremendous pressure.
Technology clock: Developing countries will benefit from AI only if the government takes swift action. Low risk has given Bangladesh a slight lead, but that advantage is not permanent. The real danger is spending time only recognising problems instead of utilising that advantage.
How to prepare
Much of this transformation is impending and largely beyond Bangladesh’s control. However, how prepared we become is in our own hands. Seven priorities particularly come to the forefront.
First, the pledge of creating 10 million jobs should be evaluated based on the quality of work, and industrial incentives and export support should be linked to job creation and skill development.
Second, technical and vocational education and training should be made industry-demand-based, the Bangladesh National Qualifications Framework should be implemented, and youth digital skills should be developed not just for the digital economy but also for agriculture, factories, and small enterprises.
Third, educational reforms inside and outside schools are necessary so that the youth learn not only ‘what to learn’ but also ‘how to learn’.
Fourth, an effective ‘labour market information system’ should be developed, including tracking graduates’ careers.
Fifth, a policy framework for new types of employment, like platform-based work, should be established, and social protection should be made transferable.
Sixth, investments in women’s participation in work should be increased through care services, safe transport, and targeted re-skilling.
Seventh, pathways for skills-certificate-based migration should be created, supported by a verifiable certification system, rebuilding the confidence of foreign employers in Bangladeshi workers.
Many of the elements mentioned in this writing are not new in policy discussions; what has been lacking for many years is implementation and accountability. Bangladesh has succeeded in near-universal enrollment in primary education and a nationwide immunisation programme because there was a broad consensus on these goals despite political changes.
Preparing Gen-Z for the jobs of the future will require the same type of commitment. The target of a trillion-dollar economy by 2034 will only be meaningful when it ensures productive, dignified, and inclusive employment for the generation that took to the streets demanding fair opportunities.