After the July mass uprising, Bangladesh's state system was going through an uncertain transformation. There was a growing concern about the rise of a right-wing fascist governance system. In this context, the 13th National Parliamentary Election provided a sort of temporary relief and political stability. Through a relatively fair and acceptable election, the BNP formed the government.
Naturally, the party now bears the heavy responsibility of realising the aspirations born from the mass uprising. It should be noted that the uprising not only caused the fall of a government but also gave rise to new expectations among citizens — democratic institutions will be reorganised, accountability will increase, and the centralisation of power will decrease.
However, recent steps by the newly formed government regarding the local government system are bringing these expectations into question. The recent decision to appoint administrators in 11 city corporations and 42 district councils is a significant example of this. According to the law, these institutions are supposed to be run by representatives directly elected by the people.
But the void created after the uprising — the removal, imprisonment, or exile of elected representatives — had created an administrative crisis. In that context, appointing bureaucrats as administrators for the interim period was acceptable as a temporary solution.
However, appointing political figures as administrators in the new reality sends a different message. Questions arise as to whether this is merely an effort to fill an administrative vacuum, or if there is a deeper political economy at play.
Firstly, analyzing the profiles of the appointees reveals a clear political motive. A large portion of them had recently contested the national elections with party nominations and lost or were expecting nominations but did not receive any. Therefore, this appointment can be viewed as a form of ''political compensation'' or ''political rehabilitation.'' This could be a strategy to keep party leaders satisfied while maintaining their influence at the local level.
Secondly, this initiative could also serve as a means to control internal party conflict and competition. There has been a long-standing tussle over nomination receipt and post allocation within Bangladesh's political parties. Through administrator appointments, a large section can be ''adjusted,'' which might bring short-term party stability.
Thirdly, this step could play a significant role in reorganising and strengthening party organisations at the local level. During the long years of the Awami League era, the BNP could not remain active at the local level. Communication with local people and power centres had decreased. Leaders appointed as administrators will have direct influence over local administration, development projects, and resource allocation, which will consolidate their political base.
However, besides this political explanation, there is an important economic dimension as well, which raises deeper concerns. City corporations and district councils are not merely administrative units; they are centres of a substantial flow of government resources and development budgets. A significant portion of funds allocated for local infrastructure development, social protection programmes, and various project implementations is spent through these institutions.
Without an elected council, the decision-making power effectively becomes centralised in the hands of a single administrator. This leads to a lack of accountability, and the decision-making process becomes opaque. There is an increased risk with political administrators because their accountability is primarily towards the party structure rather than to the people.
This situation can create an opportunity for a new ''rent-seeking'' economy. In areas like development project selection, tender processes, and expenditure prioritisation, personal and party interests may gain precedence. As a result, a portion of the resources meant for the welfare of the citizens might be diverted elsewhere through invisible channels.
In the political history of Bangladesh, the tendency to use local government institutions for party interests is not new. In the past, district councils or city corporations have often been used as ''rehabilitation centres.'' It is natural for citizens to feel doubtful about whether the current initiative is a new version of that continuity.
An important aspect here is the structural change in the local government system. At one time, elections were held outside party symbols within this system, which kept local leadership comparatively independent and people-oriented. But since the introduction of elections with party symbols, local government has increasingly become an extension of national politics. The current administrator appointments risk institutionalising that politicisation further.
What could be the outcome? Firstly, citizens may experience more disruption in service delivery. Because political loyalty will be prioritised over administrative efficiency. Secondly, democratic practice at the local level will weaken, as opportunities for direct public participation will be limited. Thirdly, in the long run, citizens' trust in the state may erode further.
In this backdrop, a fundamental question arises — what is the alternative? The answer is not very complex, but implementation is challenging. There is no alternative to organising quick, fair, and participatory elections for local government. Popular representation is the foundation of democracy, and if that foundation is weak at the local level, the entire democratic structure is at risk. However, elections alone are not enough. Structural reforms in the local government system are necessary. A neutral and competitive electoral system needs to be re-established by reducing the influence of party symbols. Additionally, financial and administrative decentralisation must be ensured so that local institutions can be truly autonomous.
The recommendations of the Local Government Reform Commission of 2025 might provide an effective framework. Implementing them could make local government more accountable, effective, and citizen-oriented.
In conclusion, while the initiative to appoint administrators may offer some immediate political benefits, its long-term impact is profound and complex.
#Kazi Maruful Islam is a professor at University of Dhaka
*Opinions are the author's own.
#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam.