Iran War and the future of our labour market in the Middle East

International labour migration is a crucial pillar of Bangladesh’s economy. Every year, many Bangladeshis go abroad for employment. According to the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), out of a total of 1,116,399 migrants in 2025, nearly 82.4 per cent (919,981 people) went to the Middle East or Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

In 2025, Bangladesh received a total of $32.8 billion in remittances. Of this, nearly 46 per cent ($15.07 billion) came from GCC countries (Bangladesh Bank, 2026). This highlights how dependent Bangladesh is on this region for work and income.

However, migration is not just an economic issue; it is also linked to politics and international relations. Rising tensions in the Middle East, especially a potential war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, are creating new uncertainties regarding Bangladeshi workers’ jobs, mobility, and safety. Therefore, migration should not be seen solely in terms of supply and demand but understood within the broader geopolitical context.

To understand the situation properly, we need to examine how countries behave in international politics. Renowned international relations scholars Hans Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations, and Kenneth Waltz, in Theory of International Politics, have shown that during a crisis, states prioritize their own interests and security. As a result, the importance of migrant workers diminishes. While they are considered necessary in normal times, when problems escalate, they can be easily sidelined.

In this reality, migration management also becomes weak. Agreements or treaties between countries often fail to function properly during crises because each country makes decisions independently based on its own interests. Migration researchers Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, in their book The Age of Migration, note that host countries often suddenly change rules or adopt new policies. The countries sending migrant workers have little influence over these decisions. Consequently, protecting their workers becomes difficult.

In such situations, migrant workers find themselves in vulnerable positions. They have no political representation or bargaining power. In many cases, due to the Kafala system in Arab countries, their legal status depends entirely on their employer’s discretion, making it difficult for them to change jobs or escape problematic conditions. Human Rights Watch, in its report EU: Human Rights Should Be a Priority at GCC Summit, notes that such circumstances increase the risk of exploitation and weaken protections for workers.

During any crisis, these problems intensify. Access to rescue, legal assistance, or other support becomes extremely limited. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), in its World Migration Report 2022, states that in such situations, migrants are among the most at-risk populations.
As a result, whenever a crisis begins, its impact falls directly on migrant workers. They are the first to lose jobs, many return home without any compensation, and their mobility is often restricted.

The same pattern was observed during the COVID-19 crisis in 2019 and the ongoing war in Libya since 2011. The International Labour Organization (ILO), in its report Protecting Migrant Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic, shows that migrant workers are the first to be adversely affected in times of crisis.

At the same time, during crises, xenophobia tends to increase. In a press release dated 21 May 2020 (Malaysia: Stop Crackdown on Migrants, Journalists, and Civil Society), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that during the COVID-19 pandemic, migrant workers were blamed for spreading the virus, detained, and in many cases, sent back to their home countries.

Similar incidents are being observed during the current Iran war. Many migrant workers are being detained or repatriated for allegedly sharing videos or photos of the war on social media. This shows that during crises, migrant workers are easily viewed with suspicion, and strict measures are often taken against them. Overall, migrant workers are not only a source of labour, they constitute a geopolitically vulnerable population.

The ongoing tension around Iran will not remain confined to politics; it will also affect the global labor market in the future. The war has already damaged critical infrastructure such as oil and gas facilities, which form the backbone of Gulf countries’ economies. As a result, government revenues may decline, major investments may be delayed, and economic uncertainty may rise across the region.

Saudi Arabia will experience the greatest impact, particularly on its Vision 2030 projects. The largest of these is NEOM, a future city project worth nearly $500 billion, which includes The Line smart city, advanced technology zones, and tourist centers. Alongside NEOM, large initiatives like the Red Sea tourism project and the Qiddiya entertainment city were expected to provide long-term employment for hundreds of thousands of migrant workers.

If instability continues in the region, these projects may face delays, increased costs, or downsizing. Moreover, hosting the FIFA World Cup in Saudi Arabia in 2034 will also depend on long-term political and economic stability.

The impact will not be limited to Saudi Arabia alone; it will also affect the United Arab Emirates (Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. Large real estate and infrastructure projects may slow down, investor confidence may decline, property sales could drop, and employment in construction and service sectors may decrease. At the same time, prolonged conflict could damage the reputation of these countries’ stability, leading to further reductions in investment and business in the future.

Structural changes are also underway. Over time, Gulf countries will increasingly invest in automation and digital technologies. This will reduce demand for low-skilled labor, and governments in the Middle East will strengthen nationalization policies to prioritize local citizens for jobs. Consequently, the demand for low-skilled workers from countries like Bangladesh will gradually decline.

The implications for Bangladesh will be serious. Job opportunities in the Gulf will become more uncertain, new employment will decrease, and obtaining visas will become more difficult. Reduced employment opportunities may lower remittances. Many workers may be forced to return home without savings, increasing pressure on the country’s economy. Families dependent on migrant earnings will face significant uncertainty.

These new risks also present an opportunity for Bangladesh to rethink its migration strategy. When risks rise, new opportunities emerge. In the current situation, it is urgent to explore new labor markets outside the Gulf region.

A good example of such an opportunity is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which major infrastructure projects are developing across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Many of these countries face labor shortages due to low populations or declining birth rates.

The World Bank’s Belt and Road Economics (2019) report notes that these investments are growing rapidly and creating new labor markets. Similar opportunities are emerging in Russia, Central Asia, and parts of Africa. Investments in gas, oil, and energy sectors are increasing in these regions, raising labor demand. Bangladesh can capitalise on these opportunities by developing skilled manpower.

To seize these opportunities, Bangladesh must strengthen its migration diplomacy. Future agreements should include protections during crises, such as rescue support, compensation, legal safeguards, and waivers for emergency residency renewal fees and other costs, not just stick to conventional contracts.

Additionally, an early warning system should be established to anticipate rising geopolitical risks in different countries, enabling timely adjustments to migration policies.

Beyond policy changes, Bangladesh must also adapt the type of migration by focusing on skill- and language-based strategies. Investment should be made in training for Russian, German, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese languages, gradually shifting from low-skilled labor to skilled labor markets. Language has become a crucial entry point to new labor markets, for example, knowing Russian opens opportunities across multiple countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

To achieve these goals, Bangladesh should establish new training systems that incorporate foreign trainers through bilateral cooperation and connect skilled expatriate Bangladeshis online. Digital training centers would allow learners to acquire language and job skills directly from experts. Partnerships with foreign governments or companies could allow them to prepare workers according to their needs and hire them directly. This would improve skills, reduce reliance on brokers, and make migration safer and more transparent.

Another strategic approach could be virtual migration, which differs clearly from traditional outsourcing. While outsourcing typically depends on intermediaries, virtual migration allows Bangladeshi workers to remain in the country and work directly for foreign employers through digital platforms. This can include IT services, freelancing, and other professional remote work.

Because this approach does not rely on visas, borders, or physical relocation, it is less affected by geopolitical instability. The growing global demand for digital services makes virtual migration a relatively stable source of income while reducing both the risks and costs associated with overseas employment.

Geopolitical instability should not be seen as a crisis; rather, it should be viewed as an opportunity to explore new labour markets and build safe, sustainable migration pathways, which should guide Bangladesh’s strategy.

* Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder is lecturer and researcher, Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University
* The opinions expressed here are the author’s own.