Farakka Day: Will Bangladesh receive fair share of water this time after expiry of 30-year deal?

Every year on 16 May, a name inevitably comes to the forefront—Farakka. It is not just the name of a barrage; it is a symbol of the enduring crisis in Bangladesh concerning rivers, agriculture, economy, and geopolitics. On this day, some discussions happen, some memories are recalled, and then the issue goes into the shadows again. Yet, the dying rivers in the southwest, the increasing salinity in the Sundarbans, and the damage to agriculture are all somehow connected to Farakka.

This time the situation is more urgent. The 30-year-long Ganges Water Sharing Treaty of 1996 is set to expire in December. We stand at a historic juncture—a moment of opportunity, but there is no evidence of preparedness.

On 16 May 1976, 96-year-old Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani left his hospital bed and marched from Rajshahi towards Farakka with millions of people, with just one message—to give Bangladesh its fair share of water.
He said, "If the Farakka Barrage is not dismantled, Bangladesh will turn into a desert. If I don't come, you will come; if you don’t, your children will. ”

Fifty years later, it must be acknowledged that this prediction has partially come true. It was not just a political protest; it was a historic public uprising to reclaim the life-or-death river rights. That movement remains unfinished today.

Construction of the Farakka Barrage began in 1961 and was formally inaugurated on 21 April 1975. At that time, a short-term understanding took place between India and Bangladesh (from 21 April to 31 May 1975). After the political upheaval in August 1975, India unilaterally started withdrawing water, leading to a crisis in 1976.

The Indian government claimed that the barrage was built to maintain the navigability of Kolkata Port and to revive the Hooghly River. In reality, the Farakka project diverted 40,000 cusecs of water from the Ganges to the Bhagirathi-Hooghly through a feeder canal, most of which was due to Bangladesh.

However, the goal was not fully achieved. The Kolkata Port has not been entirely freed from sediment problems. Instead, sediment accumulation upstream in the Ganges is causing severe floods in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh every year. Riverbank erosion in Malda-Murshidabad is unending. That is, this barrage has become a ''death trap'' not only for Bangladesh but for India too.

Before the barrage was operational, the average flow of the Ganges at the Hardinge Bridge point during the dry season was about 65,000 cusecs. After the barrage became operational, in some years, it reduced to just 10,000 to 15,000 cusecs.

In the dry season of 2015, the flow at Farakka was only 25,000 cusecs; as per the treaty, Bangladesh should have received 12,500 cusecs, but it received even less. Post the 1996 treaty, studies show the minimum flow in the dry season has reduced by up to 75 per cent. Today, the Padma River is a vast desert.

Various studies show that in five decades, the direct and indirect financial losses for Bangladesh exceed hundreds of billions of US dollars. The number of affected people is over sixty million. Sediment flow through the Padma has decreased by 20 per cent compared to 1960.

Agriculture has suffered the most. In the Ganges-Kobadak irrigation project, over 121,000 hectares of land depend on this flow. But the water level has dropped so much that the pumps are either shut or operating at much less capacity.

Farmers in Kushtia-Chuadanga have become owners of single-crop lands during the dry season. In Rajshahi-Chapainawabganj, the first layer of groundwater, previously found at 8 to 10 feet, is now unreachable even at 15 feet. In many places, it has dropped 60 to 100 feet below, which seasonal rain fails to replenish.

Over a hundred rivers and canals throughout the country are nearly dead. Rivers like Kobadak, Bhairab, Nabaganga, Chitra now sound like names from history. Where there once was the raging Padma, now there are shoals. Where boats once sailed, people now walk.

The encroachment of salinity continues unabated. With the decline in freshwater flow, saline water from the Bay of Bengal has intruded 100 to 150 kilometers inland. The sundari trees in the Sundarbans are on the verge of extinction due to diseases caused by high salinity. Everything from the Bengal tiger's habitat to fish breeding is affected. This crisis coupled with climate change has created a sort of double impact. During winter, water supply ceases, yet without warning, gates are opened during monsoon. Two different attacks across two seasons stem from one source.

In 1972, the Bangladesh-India Joint River Commission was formed. In 1977, the first five-year water-sharing treaty was signed. However, from 1988 to 1996, for eight years, there was no effective treaty. During that time, India unilaterally managed Farakka, the severe impact of which was observed in Bangladesh.

The 30-year treaty signed on 12 December 1996, was a milestone.

According to the agreement, if the flow at Farakka is 70,000 cusecs or less, both countries will share the water equally; if the flow is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh is assured of receiving 35,000 cusecs, and the rest will go to India. If the flow exceeds 75,000 cusecs, India is assured of receiving 40, 000 cusecs, with the remainder going to Bangladesh. However, there is a condition that from 1 April to 10 May, over three ten-day cycles, both countries are assured of receiving 35,000 cusecs alternately.

Nevertheless, despite this treaty, Bangladesh often did not receive its rightful share. Due to internal uses within India and other upstream infrastructure, the water due to Bangladesh has frequently been reduced.
The term of this treaty ends in December 2026. No visible discussions have started yet between the two countries on a new treaty. If this inactivity continues, from 2027, Bangladesh might again fall victim to unilateral water management.

Stepping out of emotional politics, we must now move towards information-based diplomacy. Action is needed on several fronts.
Firstly, the opportunity in December 2026 must not be squandered. The new treaty should not only share water equitably but also include accountability processes for violations. Water-sharing formulas should be determined based on the principle of "equitable and reasonable use" under international river law. Strengthening the Joint River Commission and bringing it under third-party observation could be considered.

Secondly, Bangladesh has not yet ratified the United Nations International Watercourses Convention 1997. While discussions have occurred on this matter, no formal progress has been made. This convention provides a legal basis for downstream countries to claim their rightful share in transboundary rivers. Ratifying it will legally strengthen our position in international discussions. It could be the most effective tool in exerting diplomatic pressure on India.

Thirdly, not just Farakka but Teesta, Manu, Mahananda, and all 54 shared rivers need to be brought under a comprehensive river basin management. Negotiating separately reduces leverage. The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin’s overall management should include all upstream countries like Nepal, Bhutan, and China. The Danube Commission in Europe, the Nile Basin Initiative in Africa, or the Mekong River Commission have shown that viewing water-sharing as part of political, economic, and environmental security can lead to solutions.

Fourthly, a real-time data system must be developed for the entire Ganges-Padma Basin. Information such as incoming water amounts, areas of depletion, increasing salinity should be published internationally. Political statements alone won't suffice; data must be presented. We've approved the UN Water Convention 1992, hence we have the right to demand fair compensation.

Fifthly, there are voices within India against Farakka. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh blame the barrage for floods, while Malda-Murshidabad for river erosion. Building a connection with these internal voices could provide a strategic opportunity for Bangladesh. The water issue should be brought to the table through economic realities, not emotion. India too is now dependent on Bangladesh for its northeast, transit, and regional economy. Not using that card would be foolish.

Sixthly, domestic work must be done at home. Constructing a Padma Barrage at appropriate locations through studies to capture excess monsoon water for release in the southwest rivers during the dry season is now timely, and has been approved by ECNEC. Regular and planned dredging of the Padma's tributaries, rainwater conservation, controlling excessive withdrawal of groundwater, and wider cultivation of salt-tolerant paddy varieties like BRRI-47 and BRRI-67 must be expanded. Establishing a separate climate and water resilience zone for the southwest could also be considered.

Himalayan glaciers are shrinking, and rainfall patterns are changing. In the next two decades, water will be the biggest geopolitical issue in South Asia. India too is under water pressure. In this reality, conflict is not sustainable; joint management is the only way forward.

Diplomatic achievements may take five to ten years, but domestic adaptation work can start now. Steps like ratifying the UN Convention can be taken as early as tomorrow.

Farakka Day should not only be a day to remember past grievances. It should be a day for crafting future water security strategies. Losing a river means not only losing water but also losing economy, agriculture, and habitations, ultimately risking the state's stability.

Bhasani marched alone. Today, the state needs a collective march—uniting diplomacy, law, and science.

Farakka Day should not just be a day of remembrance; it should be a day for creating future water security strategies. If the rivers survive, Bangladesh will survive.

#Subail Bin Alam is a writer on sustainable development
contact@subail. com

*Opinions expressed here are the author's own.

#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo online edition, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam