Bangladesh faces a growing threat that could undo years of diplomatic and humanitarian efforts on one of its top foreign policy priorities: resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis. The million plus refugees in Cox’s Bazar face worsening living conditions, squeezed by aid cuts and barred from earning a living. Armed groups operating inside the camps are recruiting frustrated and desperate young men with promises of returning to Myanmar through armed struggle over the border. Their target is the Arakan Army, the powerful ethnic Rakhine armed group that now controls much of Myanmar’s Rakhine State and draws its support primarily from the local Buddhist population.
While most refugees had long rejected these groups for their violent tactics, growing anger toward the Arakan Army and a deepening sense of hopelessness about the prospect of returning to Myanmar have made the camps increasingly fertile ground for recruitment. While many refugees remain sceptical about the armed groups’ real intentions, most say they now believe that insurgency is the only way to return home. This strategy of confrontation is not only doomed to fail – Rohingya armed groups are no match for the Arakan Army, which has wrested Rakhine State from the Myanmar military – it also risks derailing Bangladesh’s long-standing goal of refugee repatriation, and could plunge the region into a deeper and more complex crisis.
Since entering office in August 2024, Bangladesh’s interim government has taken several welcome steps towards refugee repatriation. Muhammad Yunus’ administration appointed a high representative for Rohingya affairs, opened dialogue with the Arakan Army’s political wing, and successfully lobbied the United Nations to convene a high-level conference on the side-lines of the General Assembly in New York this September. It also relaxed some rules on the refugee humanitarian response to make it more sustainable, such as permitting durable housing.
But while these diplomatic efforts deserve recognition, they are being quietly undermined by developments in the camps. Given the new situation in Rakhine state, the only way for the Rohingya to return to Myanmar is through negotiations with the Arakan Army, which now controls all the areas where refugees fled from, and the entire Bangladesh border. But the armed group – along with most refugees we spoke to – believe that elements within Bangladesh’s security agencies are allowing Rohingya armed groups to flourish. They point to the groups holding large meetings within the camps, sometimes even publicly thanking the authorities for granting permission. Individuals linked to the armed groups have also been allowed to meet with high-level visitors to the camps, deepening the perception that their activities are being tolerated, if not quietly enabled.
Whether this is part of a formal strategy or a breakdown in oversight is unclear, but the effect is the same: It fuels mistrust with the Arakan Army and weakens Dhaka’s hand at the negotiating table as the Rakhine armed group increasingly sees Bangladesh as speaking the language of diplomacy while allowing militants to operate freely. If that perception hardens, engagement will stall, and with it, any realistic prospect for repatriation.
The Arakan Army also enjoys strong support across Myanmar as one of the leading anti-junta forces. It is not only backing smaller resistance groups in Rakhine State’s periphery, but also has troops in the north and southeast of the country. If the Rohingya are perceived as fighting against the Arakan Army, they will de facto be seen by many in Myanmar as supporting the reviled regime. This could deepen communal hostility with the Rakhine people, and more broadly reverse nascent public acceptance for the Rohingya community in the country.
At least 120,000 more Rohingya have already sought refuge in Bangladesh over the past 18 months, fleeing fighting in Rakhine State, and the refugee flow could get far worse. The presence of Rohingya armed groups in the border area within Myanmar has coincided with an uptick in reports of human rights violations against Rohingya civilians from the Arakan Army. In northern parts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung, where the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has launched attacks, the Arakan Army has responded with so-called “clearance operations”, targeting Rohingya villages suspected of sheltering insurgents. In some areas, the group has begun forming ethnic Rakhine militias, and warned nearby Rohingya communities to relocate, likely fearing they will be used as cover by militants. This paints a bleak picture for the possibility of repatriation, and the prospect will only worsen should the Rohingya insurgency grow.
Bangladesh must make a choice. If the government’s ultimate goal remains repatriation of Rohingya refugees, then the country must close the gap between policy and practice. That means reducing the influence of armed groups within the camps, creating an environment for credible civilian leadership to emerge among refugees, and staying the course on political engagement with the Arakan Army. It may also need to rethink its recent engagement with the regime in Nay Pyi Taw, which has sown mistrust with the ethnic armed group for little gain since the Myanmar junta is no longer in a position to facilitate repatriation.
International donors, too, need to rethink their role. Aid cuts, particularly the sudden withdrawal of USAID funding, are feeding the desperation that armed groups are exploiting. Continued underfunding will only exacerbate the problem. Maintaining food support and basic services such as healthcare and sanitation, but also education is essential. But policy shifts from Dhaka, such as legalising small businesses within the camps and creating other economic opportunities for refugees, would help to both reduce the dependence on foreign aid, and to attract more international assistance.
At the same time, the Arakan Army must prove it can govern for all communities in Rakhine state, including for the Rohingya minority. Despite some inclusion efforts, many Rohingya say life under the group’s rule is no better than it was under the military. Ending discrimination and violent reprisals against civilians following ARSA attacks, and ensuring equal access to livelihoods and services will be key to building trust. The group will also need to engage Rohingya leaders in Bangladesh to counter the growing perception among refugees that it is a greater enemy to the Rohingya than the Myanmar military.
The September UN conference offers Bangladesh an opportunity to reset its strategy and build support for a more coordinated approach in dealing with the Rohingya refugee crisis. But that will only be possible if trust can be restored, not just with international partners, but with the actors now shaping the future of Rakhine on the ground.
* For more, see Crisis Group’s new report: Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency