Operation Epic Fury: Dawn of 5th generation warfare

The outbreak of hostilities on 28 February 2026, marked a decisive turning point in the Middle Eastern crisis that had unfolded between 2023 and 2025. This study contends that the 2026 Iran War was the direct result of three interrelated factors: the collapse of regional deterrence, diplomatic failure, and Western interventionist escalation. These developments converged to produce a conflict intentionally structured to reshape the regional order. Thus, the thesis advanced here is that the convergence of eroding deterrence, the shift from economic pressure to overt military action aimed at regime change, and the persistent diplomatic stalemate rendered war inevitable and collectively signalled the onset of a new phase in fifth-generation warfare.

Nevertheless, some may argue that diplomatic engagement or alternative regional security arrangements could have mitigated the path to war, suggesting that greater international mediation or confidence-building measures might have prevented escalation. While these counterarguments merit consideration, this analysis demonstrates that the combined pressures of declining deterrence, failed diplomacy, and escalating external intervention outweighed such possibilities, making large-scale conflict unavoidable in this context.

To address this thesis, the following analysis is organised into six key sections: the genesis of hostilities, the execution of Operation Epic Fury and initial military actions, regional escalation and allied involvement, the human and institutional costs of high-intensity conflict, the global economic impact, and the political and legal dimensions of Iran's succession and continued ambiguity. Each section examines how these interrelated pressures produced both the initiation and evolution of the 2026 Iran War.

Three main pressures shaped the strategic environment. Diplomatically, the 2026 Muscat nuclear talks failed when the United States demanded zero enrichment, and Tehran refused, despite Omani statements that an agreement was close at hand. Economically, the US Treasury created a dollar shortage, which led to the collapse of the rial and the worst unrest since 1979. The violent suppression of protests in 2025 and 2026, with some estimates of up to 32,000 deaths, set the stage for intervention. The military buildup that occurred was the largest since 2003, and there was a clear gap between public statements and intelligence assessments.

Imminent WMD Threat: Claims Iran was developing ICBMs capable of striking the US mainland. DIA Assessment (2025): Concluded Iran was at least a decade away from viable ICBM technical capacity.

Nuclear Emergency: It was asserted that Iran had immediately revived its weapons programme post-2025 strikes.

DOD Assessment (2025): Estimated earlier strikes had set back the nuclear programme by at least two years.

Diplomatic Intransigence: Alleged Iran refused all verification and enrichment limits.

Omani Intelligence: Suggested Iran had agreed to downgrade its stockpile just before the strikes irreversibly.

This illustrates the discrepancy between public strategic justifications for military intervention and the classified intelligence assessments available at the time. Critically examining these sources, including declassified summaries from the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI, February 2026) and leaked excerpts from the Joint Intelligence Committee (Appendix A, 2026), reveals a systematic divergence between official narratives and the underlying intelligence.

While public statements emphasised an imminent nuclear threat, primary intelligence reports highlighted a lack of technical advancement. They found no direct evidence of a weapons programme, as indicated in the March 2026 IAEA Verification Report. This suggests that public messaging was shaped to justify escalation, whereas intelligence did not substantiate such urgency. Similarly, while official pronouncements depicted regime instability, classified assessments, such as the Defence Intelligence Agency's 'Persian Gulf Situation Update' (February 2026), indicated that, despite internal unrest, Iran’s security apparatus remained resilient.

The alignment of public justifications with political objectives rather than with intelligence findings reflects an instrumental use of information to legitimate intervention. Additionally, assessments of Iranian proxies diverged, with public statements amplifying threats not fully supported by classified reports from CENTCOM briefing materials (2026).

The gap between intelligence and public justifications has significant implications: it undermines both the accuracy of policy deliberations and the legitimacy of military action in the eyes of domestic and international audiences. When strategic decisions are based on narratives rather than empirical intelligence, the risk of miscalculation, escalation, and diplomatic fallout is heightened. This process not only distorts the policymaking environment but also erodes trust in governmental institutions and complicates future efforts at conflict resolution.

Thus, in this context, the deployments of the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R Ford, and the ensuing cessation of diplomatic engagement, underscore how selective interpretations of classified intelligence sources served broader strategic aims rather than reflecting an objective assessment of the situation.

Decapitation strikes are military actions that target leadership to disrupt command and control. Operation Epic Fury by the United States and Operation Roaring Lion by Israel aimed to remove Iran's top leaders and prevent an organised response. On 28 February at 9:45 a.m. IRST, more than 200 Israeli fighter jets and several US carrier sorties attacked 500 targets in a coordinated air campaign.

The Pasteur Street district in Tehran was destroyed, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and over 40 senior officials, including Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh and IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour. This attack disrupted the structure of Iranian governance, leading to the rapid formation of an Interim Leadership Council.

Fifth-generation warfare, as explicitly defined by Hoffman (2007) and Hammes (2012), is a form of conflict in which the boundaries between traditional military operations and non-military domains are blurred, and adversaries employ non-kinetic methods, such as cyberattacks, information operations, and psychological manipulation, alongside conventional military force. Within this framework, the air campaign was closely integrated with a cyber offensive, illustrating core elements of fifth-generation warfare.

In this context, the deliberate targeting of information and communication infrastructure accompanied kinetic operations. A 60-hour internet blackout reduced Iran’s connectivity to 4 per cent, effectively severing security forces from command channels and disrupting public access to information. Simultaneously, the Bade Saba prayer app was manipulated to deliver messages inciting rebellion directly to mobile devices.

This approach, reflecting the principles articulated in contemporary information warfare scholarship, sought to bypass state-controlled media, manipulate the information environment, and encourage unrest as national leadership came under attack, thus demonstrating the fusion of psychological, informational, and cyber tactics emblematic of fifth-generation warfare.

Despite these attacks, the Iranian command structure remained functional throughout Operation True Promise IV. Within hours, ballistic missiles and Shahed drones struck regional targets, showing that decentralised command protocols were still in place even after the loss of senior leaders.
Iranian Retaliation Targets (True Promise IV): US Military Bases, Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar), Ali Al Salem Air Base (Kuwait), Al Dhafra Air Base (UAE) US and Navy Fifth Fleet HQ (Bahrain),

Allied Civilian Infrastructure: Kuwait International Airport (Kuwait), Dubai International Airport and Burj Al Arab (UAE), Aramco Ras Tanura refinery (Saudi Arabia) and Nakhchivan International Airport (Azerbaijan).

These strikes showed that the conflict would go beyond Iran and involve the entire Persian Gulf, putting US alliances under pressure.

Iran chose to strike neighbouring countries to punish Gulf partners for supporting US operations. The goal was to increase the cost of cooperation and create divisions between Washington and its allies. Instead of weakening the alliance, these attacks led to the rapid mobilisation of the European Defence Coalition. The UK, France, and Germany allowed the use of their bases for defensive operations, and naval forces from several European countries deployed to protect Cyprus and Jordan.

In the Levant, the killing of Khamenei led Hezbollah to resume rocket attacks on northern Israel. The Israeli Defence Forces responded with a ground incursion into southern Lebanon, ending the 2024 ceasefire. At sea, on 4 March, the USS Charlotte sank the IRIS Dena near Sri Lanka. The Dena was unarmed and returning from Exercise MILAN. This action marked a shift to total war, focusing on reducing Iranian assets rather than adhering to traditional rules of engagement.

This escalation exposed a significant rift within Iran’s leadership, characterised by a divergence between the civilian government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While President Masoud Pezeshkian issued formal apologies to neighbouring states in an effort to de-escalate regional tensions, the IRGC maintained operational autonomy by persisting with independent drone strikes. The IRGC’s institutional structure, rooted in a parallel command system and longstanding ideological commitments, allows it to operate with considerable independence from the executive branch.

This autonomy, as discussed in civil-military relations theory, complicates unified national decision-making and undermines the coherence of Iran’s strategic response. As a result, the United States faces increased difficulty in pursuing a negotiated unconditional surrender, since effective negotiation is impeded by the fragmentation of Iranian authority and the persistence of hardline military actions beyond the reach of civilian oversight.

In the current information environment, controlling public perception is critical. The way casualty data is reported shapes the narrative of the conflict. Accurate accounts of damage to schools and hospitals influence international support and shape perceptions of which side is seen as legitimate.

US and allied forces sustained combat losses primarily in the Persian Gulf and Gulf States, while Lebanese civilian deaths resulted from renewed hostilities in southern Lebanon.

High casualty rates among civilians and the destruction of critical infrastructure have attracted increased international scrutiny and condemned the legitimacy of military actions undertaken, shaping not only public perception but also governmental decision-making. The extent of these losses has prompted shifts in US policy, as humanitarian concerns and mounting global criticism pressure policymakers to reconsider escalation and prioritise diplomatic solutions.

Iranian state institutions have been severely damaged. Strikes destroyed the Assembly of Experts, the IRIB headquarters, and Parliament. The most serious incident was an airstrike in Minab that killed 180 at a girls’ elementary school. There are also reports of follow-up strikes hitting first responders. These incidents extend beyond immediate casualties to disrupt essential social infrastructure, exacerbating public health crises, service access, and community stability.

Furthermore, the cumulative humanitarian toll has diminished the effectiveness of the US information campaign, eroded international support, and led the United Nations to declare a major humanitarian emergency. With 25 million people affected, 32,000 Americans evacuated, and large numbers of Lebanese displaced, the visibility and scale of human suffering have intensified global diplomatic calls for a ceasefire. Thus, the casualty data not only convey the magnitude of the devastation but also directly inform policy discourse, compelling a reevaluation of military objectives and heightening the urgency of humanitarian and conflict-resolution efforts.

The Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s main tool for asymmetric warfare. By using strikes and maritime threats to restrict passage, Iran has disturbed global energy markets. The goal is to use economic pressure to force the United States into a ceasefire. Oil prices have risen to $114 per barrel, the highest since the COVID-19 period. Qatar has warned it may halt all LNG exports, increasing the risk of a global recession if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

The economic conflict also included attacks on digital infrastructure. Drone strikes on Amazon Web Services data centres in the United Arab Emirates caused structural damage and widespread outages of cloud services. This disrupted regional commerce and affected infrastructure beyond the immediate area of military operations.

The conflict has generated a pronounced bifurcation in international support, reflecting deeper fissures within the global geopolitical landscape. This division extends beyond surface-level diplomatic alignment, highlighting divergent national interests, security calculations, and ideological perspectives on the legitimacy and consequences of the military intervention. Explicitly engaging with alliance theory, as outlined by Walt (1987), clarifies that states forge alliances not only based on shared values or institutional ties, but also in response to threat perceptions, with alignment decisions influenced by assessments of aggregate power, geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities.

This is exemplified by Ukraine, Canada, and Germany expediting intelligence-sharing agreements and deploying reconnaissance assets to support US operations. These actions manifest balancing behaviour in anticipation of a perceived regional threat. Similarly, Australia and the E3 states authorised pre-positioning of allied munitions at regional bases, illustrating practical alignment to deter further Iranian escalation. Recent assessments by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2025) reinforce this theoretical framing, noting that alliance formation during a crisis often mirrors the calculations described in alliance theory—namely, balancing against the perceived central threat.

Conversely, opposing states such as China, Russia, and Pakistan initiated joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. They imposed export restrictions on key dual-use materials, collectively demonstrating a balance against external intervention by the Western bloc. North Korea’s pledge to increase oil shipments to Iran and Brazil’s convening of emergency UN General Assembly sessions are further behaviours consistent with counterbalancing strategies. These specific alliance responses reveal how the 2026 Iran conflict exemplifies the dynamics predicted by alliance theory, transforming the war into a focal point for contestations over international norms, shifting power structures, and debates about the evolving security architecture of the Middle East, as highlighted by recent analyses from the Council on Foreign Relations (2026).

Supportive Bloc: Ukraine, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Germany, and the E3.

Opposing Bloc: China, Russia, Pakistan, Brazil, and North Korea.

The Trump administration threatened economic retaliation against Spain for denying access to a base. This situation underscores the strain the conflict has placed on NATO and the broader Western alliance.

The goal of the decapitation strike, which was to collapse Iran’s political system, has not been achieved. On March 8, the Assembly of Experts elected Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader. President Trump regarded him as a lightweight, but the IRGC, police, and military gave him their support. The regime’s security core persists in place and has survived the first phase of Operation Epic Fury.

There is ongoing legal uncertainty about the conflict. Bipartisan groups of U.S. lawmakers have questioned the war under the War Powers Act, and some have called it a domestic distraction. International legal experts contend that the strikes may violate the UN Charter, since the IAEA had no evidence of an active nuclear weapons program in Iran at the time.

As of 9 March 2026, the conflict remains entrenched in a high-intensity stalemate, with the United States pursuing unconditional surrender while Iran’s new leadership employs a strategy of prolonged attrition using its remaining missile arsenal. In summary, the 2026 Iran War highlights several major policy lessons: the convergence of eroding deterrence, unresolved diplomatic tensions, and escalatory external interventions can make large-scale conflict unavoidable; reliance on public justifications not grounded in intelligence undermines both policy legitimacy and effective decision-making.

Consequently, policymakers should prioritise aligning public narratives with credible intelligence, invest in persistent and adaptable crisis diplomacy, and strengthen multilateral frameworks for conflict resolution. However, these recommendations are not without risk or limitation. Public narratives may prove difficult to align with classified intelligence due to political pressures or operational secrecy; diplomatic initiatives may be hindered by mutual distrust, fragmentation among stakeholders, or the lack of credible mediators; and divergent strategic interests among international actors could constrain multilateral efforts. Acknowledging these challenges is essential, as these measures, while critical to minimising unintended escalation and preserving both regional and global security, cannot guarantee rapid conflict resolution or universal compliance.

#Dr Mohammad Alam Tareque is a retired major of the Bangladesh Army, an Associate Professor of Business Management at Green University of Bangladesh, and the Army Institute of Business Administration