July mass uprising and the message that it delivered

It has been a full year since the July mass uprising, a year rife with poignant memories and expectations, and all sorts of uncertainties. The uprising witnessed an extraordinary and daring unity of people across the country, a unit that overthrew the long, one-and-a-half decade of Sheikh Hasina's autocratic rule.

The uprising began with a movement against the unjust quota system in government jobs, led by young students. In response, the prime minister at the time Sheikh Hasina, and her government, tried to suppress the movement with increasing brutality. When the government unleashed indiscriminate killings on innocent protesters through police and party-backed goons, the repression reached a level of extreme ruthlessness. The people could not accept the unrestrained killing of the nation’s youth. People came out onto the streets in large numbers, defying fear of death, and forced Sheikh Hasina to flee from the country.

The long autocratic rule of the Awami League set the stage for the mass uprising. Through three consecutive controlled and one-sided elections in 2014, 2018 and 2024, Sheikh Hasina gradually centralised power in her own hands. By establishing exclusive control over state institutions, she effectively shut down all forms of dissent and opposition activities. With extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, fabricated cases, and all sorts of repression, the country saw a reign of terror. Expression of dissent became a crime, the media came under unprecedented attacks, and the judiciary was shackled by political control.

Although the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), one of the country’s major political forces, launched various political programmes from time to time, the government suppressed them through force and cunning strategies. The ruling party brutally persecuted BNP activists and suppressed their movements. Over the one and a half decades of Awami League rule, they endured immense repression. Activists of other political parties opposed to Awami League were similarly repressed.

The anti-quota movement emerged within this political vacuum. Its roots can be traced to earlier movements, such as the school students’ movement for safe roads and university students’ protests against VAT. These movements, which had strong public support, were led by young students often labeled as the “apolitical generation.” They sparked a spirit of resistance among the public against the Hasina government, culminating in the July mass uprising. Signs of a new, emergent politics were already visible in these movements, a politics the old order failed to recognise.

Despite government obstacles and repression in July-August last year, student leaders kept the movement alive with innovative programmes, engaging the public and transforming it into a mass protest. On 1 July, the movement was formally named the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement. The term "anti-discrimination" deeply resonated with the sentiments of the people who were enraged at the government. On 16 July when student leader Abu Sayeed was martyred by police gunfire in Rangpur, people began to flood the streets.

From that point on, despite the government’s continued brutal crackdown, the tide of public resistance could no longer be contained. Sheikh Hasina deployed the entire state machinery against her own citizens. In the final stages, she even attempted to use the military in her campaign of repression. The military’s refusal to follow her order marked a pivotal turning point in the movement. Ultimately, Hasina was forced to flee the country.

The July-August mass uprising did not emerge with any political blueprint or vision for the state. But when hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets and joined the students, the movement transformed into a political uprising. It took on a clearly political character when a single-point demand was announced: the resignation of the prime minister Sheikh Hasina. Citizens of all walks of life and affiliations rose up as a unified political force. The government had already closed the path to peaceful transfer of power through elections. With no other option, the people asserted their sovereign will and brought down the regime.

Though the movement had no formal state vision, the mass uprising itself gave birth to towering public aspirations. These aspirations surged visibly along at least three distinct lines:

First, the movement brought together school students, college and university students, madrasa students, teachers, women, workers, professionals, people from all walks of life. Political parties and their supporters from across the spectrum - left, right, and center - joined in. Women, workers, and religious and ethnic minorities - groups often marginalised in society - participated in the movement. Women played a key role in sustaining the movement at every level. In outskirts of the capital, workers held their ground on the streets, even sacrificing their lives.

Their collective expectation was that, along with the fall of the Awami League, the systemic discrimination and deprivation they had suffered would also end. In the final days of the uprising and shortly afterward, vivid expressions of the people’s diverse desires were seen in graffiti covering walls across the country.

Second, many of the student leaders who sparked the movement came from reading circles and university-based cultural spaces. Their minds had been shaped by contemporary global and local schools of thought. Through their study and debate on philosophy, history, and culture, they developed new political imaginations. Their writings, interviews, speeches, and statements reflected this intellectual grounding. The mass uprising gave them an unprecedented opportunity to begin realising their vision of the state.

Third, in the first few months following the uprising, the country witnessed a wave of public discussions and seminars. These forums brought together youth and elders, activists and experts, professionals and public intellectuals, to engage in deep conversations about the state, politics, and the economy. Through media coverage, these dialogues connected with broader civil society. A particularly significant phase of this discourse is still ongoing, spearheaded by the consensus commission formed by the government, chaired by Muhammad Yunus and co-chaired by Ali Riaz. Political parties are now actively exchanging ideas there about comprehensive state reform.

Although the collective aspiration for democratic transformation of the state did not manifest in a single, unified form, the underlying goal was shared, and came to be known popularly as state reform. Broadly speaking, the key agenda items included: drafting a new constitution or democratically amending the current one; decentralisation of power; restructuring the electoral system; establishing citizens' dignity and rights; institutional reforms of state bodies; fostering religious and ethnic harmony; and eliminating gender-based discrimination.

The euphoria that erupted among the people after the mass uprising, and the dream many held of a radically transformed progressive state, gradually began to fade in the face of subsequent developments. After the fall of the Awami League government, the administrative and institutional structures built along partisan lines became almost dysfunctional. The police force, which had fired upon protesters under state orders, lost its morale. With a broken administrative apparatus, it became difficult for the interim government, led by Professor Muhammad Yunus, to maintain control over the state.

In this vacuum, crime, chaos, and violence gave rise to widespread social disorder. Attempts to establish dominance by conservative ideologies and moral policing gained ground. Shrines, temples, and religious sites were attacked; cultural events like jatra (traditional theatre), performances, and film screenings faced disruption. Under growing ideological pressure, threats, and public humiliation, the space for vital participants in the movement - women, workers, and religious and ethnic minorities - began to shrink.

Murder cases came flooding in under various labels. Instigation, violence, road blockades for justified and unjustified demands, coordinated attacks, arbitrary detentions and arrests, the demolition of the house on Dhanmondi 32 in response to a series of inflammatory phone calls allegedly linked to Sheikh Hasina, debates over a humanitarian corridor in Myanmar, and the controversial decision to hand over management of Chattogram port to a foreign company, all fueled a volatile political climate throughout the year.

In this charged environment, various undemocratic forces sought to establish themselves through coordinated violence and mob attacks. While the interim government did take some commendable steps like signing international treaties against enforced disappearances, opening up secret detention centers, and allowing the media to function more freely, it failed to act decisively in many critical areas. In several major incidents, it simply issued statements instead of taking action, sending confusing signals to the public.

The government began to rely again on the old bureaucratic model. Its detachment, indecision, and lack of direction in widely discussed incidents drew criticism from citizens.

The most contentious conflict arose over the question of elections and reforms. The interim government had announced two possible election timelines: December 2025 for limited reforms, and June 2026 for more extensive ones. On 28 February this year, the student-led National Citizens' Party founded under the leadership of Nahid Islam, demanded thorough state reforms before any election. BNP took a firm opposing stance, calling for elections by December 2025 after minimal reforms.

In various interviews and statements, most notably on May 21, the army chief Wakar-uz-Zaman also said that elections should be held by December 2025. These conflicting positions created a political deadlock.
On May 23, news broke that Muhammad Yunus was considering resigning from his role as Chief Adviser. The deadlock finally ended on June 13, following a private meeting in London between Yunus and BNP’s acting chairman Tarique Rahman. A new national election date was set for the first half of February next year.

In reality, disagreements between the different factions trying to assert control over the legacy of the mass uprising fractured the unity among citizens. Rifts soon emerged. BNP, NCP, Jamaat-e-Islami and various leftist parties all adhered to their respective positions. This fragmentation, following a successful mass uprising, became one of the most unfortunate developments. The rapid disintegration of citizen unity brought the soaring hopes of the uprising crashing down to earth.

On 29 June, Ali Riaz, co-chair of the national consensus commission, also expressed concern, saying that no agreement on reforms was likely to be reached soon.

In this broader context, many who had actively participated in the uprising found themselves pushed to the margins, some withdrew, while others sought to realign themselves within new polarisations of the old way of things.

All said and done, Bangladesh cannot return to the time before 5 August. The July mass-uprising reminded the nation of the enduring power of its own history. No matter how powerful a ruler may be, when the people stand united as a sovereign political force and exercise their collective will, they can change the course of history as they did in 1952, 1969, 1971, and 1990. The July uprising has made it clear that the people are the true owners and guardians of the state.

The message was not only for the people but also for those in power: however ruthless and absolute the authority of a dictator may seem, in the face of a public uprising, they can be swept away like straw in a flood.
Above all, the July mass uprising marked the emergence of a brilliant new generation in Bangladesh. Their coming-of-age took place by crossing valleys soaked in blood; their political consciousness was forged in the crucible of struggle, within the framework of a new vision for the state. The future of Bangladesh lies in their hands. The July uprising will return again and again, not just as a tale of downfall, but as a reminder of immense possibilities.

* Sajjad Sharif is executive editor of Prothom Alo