Ordinances that need legalisation

There appears to be some uncertainty regarding the legalisation of ordinances issued during the immediate past interim government. According to Article 93(2) of the Constitution, ordinances must be placed before Parliament at its first session and converted into law within 30 days. If this is not done, the ordinances automatically lapse.

Media reports indicate that the BNP(Bangladesh Nationalist Party)-led government may not place most of these ordinances before Parliament for conversion into law, except for a few. The justification cited is time constraints. During the 18-month tenure of the interim government, 133 ordinances were hurriedly issued—roughly one ordinance every four days. To convert all of these into law within 30 days in Parliament, the current government would have to approve about four and a half ordinances per day.

The question is whether the situation is really this rigid, or if decisions can be made based on the type and importance of the ordinances. First, it should be noted that not all ordinances are the same—their scope and significance vary. Many ordinances issued at that time were short and specific, aimed at running the daily functions of the caretaker government or implementing demands from popular movements.

For example, among 17 ordinances issued in 2024, four ordinances were issued to remove elected representatives from district, upazila, city corporation, and municipal bodies and appoint alternative administrators, two ordinances related to revoking security arrangements for the Sheikh family and placing the caretaker government’s chief adviser under SSF security, one ordinance removed Sheikh Hasina’s name from the National Youth Development Institute, one ordinance aimed to remove and appoint WASA Managing Director, one ordinance increased the retirement age of Bangladesh Bank Governor, one ordinance set the maximum age for government service entry at 32, and the others included the Indemnity Law and ordinances repealing provisions for fuel price adjustment without public hearing.

Deciding the fate of these ordinances should not be overly complicated or time-consuming. Some ordinances are no longer relevant due to the dissolution of the interim government, while others are highly significant for the public interest. For instance, ordinances repealing provisions that allowed fuel pricing without public hearing are important. If the newly elected government refuses to approve such ordinances in Parliament, laws used as instruments for past authoritarian looting could be revived, which is undesirable.

In 2025, a total of 80 ordinances were issued. Some aimed to remove the Sheikh family’s name from various institutions, and several ordinances were issued multiple times or amended repeatedly. Examples include amendments to the International Crimes Tribunal Act (four times, thrice in 2025), cyber security, human rights commission, VAT and supplementary duties, government employment, and local government (city corporations).

In 2025–2026, a total of 10 ordinances were issued to form or revise development authorities in regions like Barishal, Rangpur, Mymensingh, Narayanganj, and Maheshkhali. The necessity of issuing development authority ordinances under a temporary caretaker government may be debatable, as such decisions are typically under the mandate of elected governments.

Other ordinances with questioned justification include Microfinance Bank Ordinance, 2026; Grameen Bank (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025; National Freedom Fighters Council (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025; National Sports Council (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025; Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025–26; Civil Aviation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026; Registration (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026; Bangladesh House Building Finance Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance; Bangladesh Private Export Processing Zone (repeal) Ordinance, 2026.

However, some ordinances issued by the caretaker government aligned with public demands for state reform after the popular uprising, such as: Supreme Court Judges Appointment Ordinance, 2025; Public Procurement (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025; Bank Resolution Ordinance, 2025; Cyber Security Ordinance, 2025; National Human Rights Commission Ordinance, 2025; Bangladesh Labour (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025; Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance, 2025; Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Ordinance, 2025; Forest and Tree Conservation Ordinance, 2026; Bangladesh Haor and Wetlands Conservation Ordinance, 2026; Land Use Control and Agricultural Land Protection Ordinance, 2026.

Some of these ordinances faced criticism, but in many ways, they are superior to previous laws. For instance, the Cyber Security Ordinance, 2025, had some undemocratic clauses such as  content block and arrest without warrant but it exclude some of the oppressive clauses of the Digital Security Act and Cyber Security Act that curtailed freedom of expression.

Similarly, the Labour (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025, introduced progressive measures, such as setting minimum wages every three years instead of five, allowing trade unions with consent of 20 workers, mandatory future funds for establishments with over 100 workers, extending maternity leave from 112 to 120 days, and prohibiting blacklisting of workers. Although not immune from criticism, this ordinance can be deemed a major progress in terms of labour rights.

Therefore, no blanket decisions should be made regarding caretaker government ordinances. Those directly related to daily functions and no longer relevant can be excluded, while the rest should be presented at the first session of Parliament. Multiple parliamentary review committees should assess the ordinances democratically, using clear standards and documented reasoning, to ensure decisions are transparent and in the public interest. The same process should apply to foreign agreements, regulations, and gazettes signed by the caretaker government.

It must be remembered that as the first elected Parliament after the popular uprising, this Parliament carries extraordinary responsibility. The success of Bangladesh’s sustainable democratic transition will largely depend on the responsible role of the newly elected members of Parliament.

* Kallol Mostafa, writer on electricity, energy, environment, and development economics