As polling day for the national parliamentary election draws nearer, restlessness among rival political parties is steadily intensifying. Political competition is natural. Differences of opinion will exist; allegations will be made and counter-arguments will follow. But when such competition descends into physical violence, it ceases to remain within the bounds of politics. At that point, it is not only the election that suffers, but democracy itself—and the minimum standards of civility of the state are undermined.
Recently, a joint manifesto-declaration programme organised by the Jhenaigati upazila administration in Sherpur turned into a deadly clash. A local Jamaat-e-Islami leader was killed, while many BNP (BAngladesh Nationalist Party) activists were injured. That such violence could erupt in the presence of local administrators has deepened concerns about the overall electoral environment.
Around the same time, repeated incidents of egg-throwing at NCP (National Citizen Party) candidate Nasiruddin Patwary in the Dhaka-8 constituency have become emblematic of growing political intolerance. His remarks may be debated and criticised, but physical attacks can never be an acceptable response.
Likewise, attempting to humiliate a candidate on the grounds that he is not a permanent resident of the constituency is equally reprehensible. Under the Constitution, any Bangladeshi citizen may contest an election from any constituency. Whether to vote for a candidate or not rests solely with the voters.
Since the announcement of the election schedule, 16 people have been killed, 13 of whom were BNP activists or supporters. This statistic alone starkly illustrates the gravity of election-related violence.
The presence of rebel candidates in 77 constituencies has significantly increased the likelihood of vote fragmentation among BNP supporters. By contrast, Jamaat-e-Islami and its allies appear to be maintaining greater vote cohesion.
Although the 12 February election is competitive, it can hardly be described as a contest on equal terms. An even contest presupposes a balance of political power—and that balance is currently absent. In post-1990 Bangladesh, the Awami League and the BNP functioned as the two principal political forces, sometimes contesting elections independently and at other times through alliances.
That equilibrium was disrupted when the Awami League, while in power, abolished the caretaker government system and organised elections excluding the BNP. Bangladesh has seen governments fall through mass uprisings and movements before, but the extreme political crisis the Awami League now finds itself in is, to a large extent, the consequence of its own decisions.
With the Awami League absent from the field in this election, the BNP has emerged as the single largest political force. Several foreign media outlets have predicted an almost certain BNP victory, while others suggest that the outcome could defy expectations. Should such a reversal occur, its primary causes would be internal divisions within the BNP, the proliferation of rebel candidates and a weakening of party discipline.
According to a report in Prothom Alo, a total of 92 BNP rebel candidates are contesting in 79 constituencies, alongside one Jamaat-e-Islami rebel candidate. A senior Jamaat leader has indicated that the party has managed to resolve its internal disputes, with two rebel candidates ultimately withdrawing. The situation within the BNP, however, is markedly different. Despite expulsions, warnings and violations of party directives, many leaders have remained in the race. In several constituencies, multiple rebel candidates are contesting, heightening the risk of vote-splitting.
In Dhaka-12, the BNP has nominated Saiful Haque, general secretary of its ally Revolutionary Workers Party, while Saiful Alam Nirob, former convenor of the BNP’s Dhaka north city unit and the initial nominee, has entered the race as an independent. In Brahmanbaria-2, former BNP international affairs co-secretary Rumeen Farhana has not withdrawn her nomination, even though the party is backing Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam joint secretary general Junaid Al Habib. A significant section of local BNP leaders and activists has refused to accept this decision.
In Patuakhali-3, expelled BNP leader Hasan Mamun, formerly a member of the party’s executive committee and ex-president of Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal at Dhaka University, is contesting as an independent, while the BNP has thrown its support behind Nurul Haque Nur, president of Gono Odhikar Parishad. In Jhenaidah-4, district BNP member Saiful Islam Firoz is also contesting independently, despite Gono Odhikar Parishad general secretary Md Rashed Khan joining the BNP to contest with the party’s backing.
In Sylhet-5, district BNP vice-president Mamunur Rashid has not withdrawn his candidacy, even though the seat has been ceded to the president of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. A similar scenario has unfolded in Narayanganj-4, where two former central BNP leaders are contesting independently and have been expelled for breaching party discipline. Rebel candidates are also evident in Jashore-5, Kishoreganj-5 and several other constituencies.
The presence of rebel candidates in 77 constituencies has significantly increased the likelihood of vote fragmentation among BNP supporters. By contrast, Jamaat-e-Islami and its allies appear to be maintaining greater vote cohesion. Had the BNP fielded a single candidate in these seats, victory would have been far more attainable; internal division has rendered those prospects far more uncertain. In several constituencies, clashes have already occurred between supporters of official and rebel candidates, further destabilising the electoral atmosphere.
Under these circumstances, a substantial segment of non-aligned voters may choose to stay away from polling stations. In Bangladesh, electoral victory cannot be secured on the basis of core party supporters alone. No party in the past has formed a government relying solely on its own vote bank. Forming a government is impossible without the backing of floating voters and politically neutral citizens.
The fundamental strategy for winning elections lies in isolating the opposition while expanding one’s own base. The BNP successfully employed this approach in the past. This time, however, it has stumbled considerably. Like the Awami League, the BNP has often failed to accord sufficient importance to its allies or has politically marginalised them.
Yet amid these negatives, there remains one potential source of optimism for the BNP: fragmentation within the Islamist vote. The strategy once employed by Jamaat-e-Islami to consolidate Islamist votes into a single bloc is no longer proving effective. By bringing Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam into the alliance and through ideological realignments that have prompted Islamic Movement parties to exit the coalition, the BNP may gain some advantage.
Whether those gains will outweigh the losses caused by rebel candidates will ultimately be revealed in the results of the 12 February poll.
* Sohrab Hasan is a journalist and poet.
* The views expressed are the author’s own