Will it create opportunities or obligations for Bangladesh?

A defence agreement should not be evaluated in terms of religious sentiments or the language of friendship, but rather by considering its advantages, disadvantages, and obligations. Is the Mecca Agreement an opportunity or a liability for Bangladesh? AKM Ahsan Ullah seeks to answer this question.

For Muslims, Mecca is not just a city; it holds profound religious and symbolic significance. Thus, when Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, or the ‘Mecca Agreement,’ there on 7 August 2026, the event transcended a mere military understanding. The most crucial principle of the agreement is that any armed attack on any one of the three countries will be considered an attack on all. This language naturally brings to mind NATO’s Article 5. As a result, some have already referred to it as a ‘Muslim NATO’ or ‘Islamic NATO.’

However, while the comparison is appealing, it is not entirely accurate. NATO is not just a ‘Collective Defence Clause’—it possesses an integrated military command, long-term joint planning, ‘interoperable forces’ (multiple military or security forces from different countries, agencies, or divisions that can participate in joint operations), ‘institutionalised decision-making’ (institutional decisions based on specific rules, well-established frameworks, evidence, and predetermined policies), and a relatively clear structure regarding the responsibilities of member states.

In the case of the Mecca Agreement, the information published so far does not reveal such an extensive institutional framework. Instead, its ‘operational architecture’ (a structural design of an institution or system that determines how daily operations will be conducted, decisions will be made, and various tasks will be implemented), definition of an attack, geographical limits, and specific military obligations of the members are still largely unclear. Therefore, it would be premature to label the Mecca Agreement as a ‘Muslim NATO,’ but equally wrong to dismiss it as merely a symbolic declaration.

The capabilities of the three founding members who signed the agreement complement one another. Saudi Arabia holds economic power, energy resources, and special political influence in the Arab and Muslim world. Turkey has a NATO-experienced military and a rapidly growing defence industry. Pakistan has a large military and the Muslim world’s only declared nuclear arsenal. Therefore, if these three countries deepen cooperation in defence production, military training, intelligence cooperation, drones, cybersecurity, and other emerging defence technologies, their regional influence could be significant.

Why now?

The timing of the signing of the Mecca Agreement is perhaps more significant than the agreement itself. For a long time, the security framework of the Middle East heavily relied on the US military presence and security assurances. However, recent years have seen regional states being pushed towards alternative security arrangements due to the Iran-Israel rivalry, conflicts in Yemen and the Red Sea, the spread of missile and drone attacks, and questions regarding the future of US security assurances. The Mecca Agreement should, therefore, not be seen merely as a religious identity-based coalition, lest its major political significance be overlooked. It is simultaneously an attempt to create ‘regional strategic autonomy.’

Is the agreement against Iran or Israel?

The formal answer to the above question is neither. Turkey has clearly stated that no specific state has been identified as a ‘common threat, ’ and the agreement is defensive. However, military alliances are never born in a geopolitical vacuum. Iran’s military influence, Israel’s regional military supremacy, the uncertainty in the Gulf region, and the desire to reduce dependency on the US—all form the strategic context behind it.

Therefore, instead of labeling it outright as an anti-Iranian or anti-Israeli alliance, it could be viewed as a new ‘regional balancing mechanism’—a type of strategy or arrangement that maintains the balance of power in a specific region by preventing any one country from becoming overwhelmingly strong or dominant. This alliance sends a political message to both Iran and Israel while also being an effort to diversify from regional security arrangements dependent on the US.

This is where the question becomes crucial for Bangladesh. On 27 August, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman stated in the national parliament, "This pact is among three countries. We view this pact positively. The issue of joining or not joining has not yet arisen, as it depends on the intention of the pact’s members. If they express the desire to include Bangladesh in this pact, we will certainly consider it positively."

He (the Foreign Minister) further stated, "Before that, discussing the pros and cons of this (pact) may not be timely. We will certainly consider these matters. However, we must remember one thing: if this pact expands, it is a measure for the self-defence of the global Muslim community. It is our family. It is an internal matter of the Muslim family. There is no room for concern on anyone else’s part about it." (Bangladesh joining the Mecca Agreement depends on the intent of member countries: Foreign Minister, Prothom Alo Online, 27 August 2026)

Therefore, the issue is no longer a distant regional incident; it is a real policy-making moment for Bangladesh.

What can Bangladesh gain?

There are significant arguments in favour of joining the Mecca Agreement. Saudi Arabia is one of Bangladesh’s most important labour markets and among its most significant economic and political partners in the Middle East. Turkey holds the potential to become an increasingly important partner in Bangladesh’s defence modernisation. Bangladesh’s relationship with Pakistan is also expanding in new ways recently.

Hence, a structured security partnership could create new opportunities for Bangladesh in military training, defence technology, drone capabilities, cybersecurity, intelligence cooperation, and defence production. Bangladesh’s own security environment is not easy either. Myanmar’s prolonged instability, the Rohingya crisis, border security, and big-power rivalry over the Bay of Bengal necessitate new ‘security options’ for Bangladesh.

However, it is crucial to draw an important distinction here: defence cooperation and joint defence obligations are not the same thing.

Bangladesh can work with Turkey in the defence industry, increase security cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and strengthen military training and exchange programmes with Pakistan. But none of this automatically means that future wars involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Turkey would become Bangladesh’s wars.

Where is the risk?

The most immediate question will come from India. Pakistan is a founding member of the Mecca Agreement. India also has some important geopolitical differences with Turkey. Hence, if Bangladesh becomes a full joint defence member, New Delhi might interpret it as a strategic tilt towards a joint security bloc centered around Pakistan and Turkey.

Bangladesh’s foreign policy certainly shouldn’t be dependent on India’s approval. As a sovereign nation, Bangladesh will determine its own security partners. But strategic autonomy and strategic insensitivity are not the same thing. Nearly the entire land border of Bangladesh is surrounded by India; there is deep mutual dependency between the two countries regarding water, electricity, trade, connectivity, transit, and border management. Therefore, Bangladesh should not make any decision that creates more unnecessary neighbourly distrust than tangible security benefits.

The second major question is Iran. Bangladesh has no fundamental security conflict with Iran. But should a conflict arise between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the future, what exactly will the ‘collective defence clause’ mean for Bangladesh? Would Bangladesh have to send troops? Allow the use of military bases or airspace? Provide intelligence? Or would political support suffice? The same questions might arise concerning Turkey. Would any regional conflict involving Turkey create a ‘collective defence obligation’ for Bangladesh?

Until the answers to these questions are clear, determining the true value or risk of membership remains impossible. Bangladesh must also consider China. Bangladesh has deep economic and defence relations with China. At the same time, the US and Europe are Bangladesh’s main export markets, and Japan is one of its primary development partners.

A key strength of Bangladesh’s foreign policy is its ability to work simultaneously with rival powers. It wouldn’t be prudent to constrict that ‘flexibility’ by joining any military alliance.

Bangladesh has a third path

Bangladesh doesn’t have to choose only between ‘will join’ or ‘will not join. ’ First, Bangladesh should examine the full legal and military framework of the agreement. Clear answers are needed to at least four questions: under what circumstances the ‘collective defense clause’ will be triggered; what is the geographical scope of the agreement; what type of military assistance member states need to provide; and whether Bangladesh would retain its ‘sovereign veto’ regarding participation in any conflict.

If Bangladesh desires, it could propose to become an observer, a partner in dialogue, or a partner in defence cooperation rather than becoming a full member initially. Participation in joint training, cybersecurity, maritime security, disaster management, peacekeeping, military technology, and intelligence cooperation is possible without automatic war obligations.

If a decision is eventually made to become a full member, ‘preventive diplomacy’ is necessary before proceeding. It would be essential to clearly communicate to India, Iran, China, the US, and other important partners of Bangladesh that Bangladesh’s involvement is not against any state and is not an alternative to existing relationships. A high-level strategic dialogue on this matter might be particularly important with India.

The primary principle for Bangladesh should be simple: make more friends, but do not import the enemies of friends. If the Mecca Agreement enhances Bangladesh’s defence capabilities, technological expertise, diplomatic significance, and strategic autonomy, there is ample reason for deepened cooperation with it. But if membership means bringing the Middle East’s wars, rivalries, and security obligations onto Bangladesh, the cost could be very high.

The religious appeal of Mecca naturally runs deep for the people of Bangladesh. However, a state’s defense agreement should be judged not on the basis of religious sentiments or language of friendship, but on the ‘obligations in the fine print.’

Therefore, the real question before Bangladesh is not whether to deepen relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan—it certainly should. The real question is how Bangladesh will enhance security collaboration with them while retaining the freedom to decide when, where, and against whom to go to war. That is the most crucial test in Bangladesh’s decision regarding the Mecca Agreement.

#AKM Ahsan Ullah is a professor of International, Security, and Migration at the University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei.
akmahsanullah@gmail. com

*Opinions expressed here are the author’s own.

#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online edition, has been written in English by Rabiul islam