Against the backdrop of the unfortunate attempted assassination of Inqilab Moncho convener Sharif Osman Hadi last week and the overall deterioration of law and order, the interim government has decided to issue firearm licences to important political leaders, potential candidates in the upcoming election, and leaders of the July movement for their personal security.
A related policy guideline was also published on 15 December. At a time when citizens, with the national parliamentary election approaching, are expecting a fearless, violence-free, and festive electoral environment—and when demands are being raised to curb the use of all kinds of weapons, both legal and illegal—what will this decision actually achieve?
As a responsibility of the state, efforts to ensure citizens’ security are undoubtedly important. But the question is: will this decision ensure security, or will it institutionalise the risk of insecurity?
In my view, this decision is not only flawed in principle but may also bring dangerous consequences for society, politics, and the state in the long run.
Electoral politics and the risk of violence
In Bangladesh’s political reality, elections inevitably mean intense competition, tension, and unfortunately, the risk of violence. In such a context, the presence of legal firearms in the hands of political leaders goes far beyond the realm of personal security and increases the potential for violence.
Recent political killings—such as those that occurred during political programmes in Chattogram and inside business establishments in Mirpur—show, through video footage, that the perpetrators planned the attacks in such a way that even if the victims had firearms, they likely would not have had the time or opportunity to use them. A review of past assassination incidents clearly shows that many of those who were killed had personal weapons.
In situations such as political programmes, processions, and counter-demonstrations, the presence of weapons puts not only the individuals concerned but society as a whole at risk. In sociological terms, this is a “spillover”—a side effect of a decision that can spiral beyond control. The argument of personal security may ultimately lead to a deterioration of collective security.
Normalisation of violence and militarisation of society
This decision may foster a deep and dangerous mindset in society—that security equals weapons. In political science and security studies, this is referred to as the militarisation of everyday security. This is not a sign of a healthy society. According to Danish political scientist Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School of security theory, when a state defines a social or political issue as a “security problem” and legitimises exceptional measures (such as weapons or the use of force) as solutions, violence gradually becomes normal and acceptable.
In this regard, there is much to learn from the experience of the United States. There, the cultural and legal legitimacy of carrying personal firearms has long created a certain tolerance for violence in society.
Research shows that when weapons are easily accessible, disputes, anger, or fear can turn deadly very quickly. Although the US context cannot be directly replicated in Bangladesh, the lesson of how social acceptance of weapons normalises violence cannot be ignored.
Shifting the state’s responsibility onto individuals: A constitutional question
Security lies at the core of the concept of the modern state. According to Thomas Hobbes’s theory of the social contract, people formed states primarily to ensure their own security. German sociologist Max Weber clearly stated that a defining feature of the state is its ‘monopoly of legislative violence.’ In this context, when the state itself declares that carrying weapons is necessary to ensure the security of important citizens, two serious questions arise. First, is the state failing to fulfil its fundamental responsibility? Second, does this not effectively weaken the constitutional promise that the state will ensure the security of citizens’ lives and property?
Pakistan’s experience is relevant here. There, armed personal security for political leaders, businesspeople, and influential groups has gradually become a normal sight. The result has been a loss of trust in the state policing system, the proliferation of illegal weapons, and a cycle of violence that continues to plague the country.
Privatisation of security and expansion of the arms market
Where firearm licences for personal security increase, the arms market—both legal and illegal—inevitably becomes more active. Considering Bangladesh’s weak border security and fragile policing system, it can almost be said with certainty that illegal arms markets will welcome this decision as good news.
In several Latin American countries (particularly Brazil and Mexico), the privatisation of security and the culture of armed guards have, instead of reducing crime and violence, weakened the rule of law—a widely discussed issue in security studies.
Final words
Security is never achieved through weapons alone. Security comes from credible state institutions, a professional policing system, political tolerance, and the rule of law. Putting weapons in the hands of leaders is not proof of state capacity; rather, it is a kind of admission that the state itself is unable to ensure the security of its citizens. In a densely populated and politically sensitive society like Bangladesh, this decision risks normalising violence, militarising society, and undermining the very foundations of the state–citizen relationship.
This policy needs to be reconsidered now—so that security is viewed not as a matter of weapons, but as a question of state responsibility and democratic governance.
● Kazi Maruful Islam is a Professor, Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka.