Can old enemies unite for the sake of power

In a meeting of the BNP parliamentary party on 11 October, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman stated that the ''dictatorship'' and the ''secret forces'' may soon unite (Prothom Alo, 11 October 2026). Previously, he made similar comments in Feni on 1 October and Rajshahi on 20 October (Prothom Alo, 1 and 20 October 2026).

While the term ''dictatorship'' implicitly refers to the Awami League, the exact identity of the ''secret forces'' is unclear, though indications point towards Jamaat. Jamaat-e-Islami Amir Dr Shafiqur Rahman once also said, “Of course, I was underground. I remained underground in the country; I did not go abroad.” (Bangla Tribune, 3 June 2026). Therefore, examining the Prime Minister's concern in the context of history and today's politics is necessary.

In 1971, the Awami League led the Liberation War, whereas Jamaat opposed independence. Nevertheless, at various times, they have found themselves on similar paths. Though the BNP boycotted Ershad’s elections in 1986, the Awami League and Jamaat participated. Writer and researcher Mohiuddin Ahmad also noted Jamaat as an ally of the Awami League in that election (Prothom Alo, 4 August 2024).

In 1991, BNP formed a government with Jamaat’s support. The following year, under the leadership of Shaheed Janani Jahanara Imam, a movement to bring war criminals to justice began. On 26 March 1992, a mock trial of Jamaat's Ameer Ghulam Azam was conducted at Suhrawardy Udyan. The Awami League stood beside this movement as well (BBC Bangla, 30 March, 2022).

Again, following allegations of rigging in the 1994 Magura by-elections, Awami League, Jamaat, and Jatiya Party jointly campaigned for a caretaker government. Opposition MPs resigned, and they boycotted the 15 February 1996, election. Eventually, the caretaker government system was established, and new elections were held on 12 June (BBC Bangla, 15 February 2021).

Similar suspicions arose regarding the 2008 elections. Though Khaleda Zia was hesitant, Jamaat was keen to participate (The Daily Star, 5 November 2008). Later, Khaleda Zia claimed that Jamaat’s old friendship with Awami League still existed at that time, arguing that it was due to Jamaat’s pressure that the BNP participated in those elections (Dhaka Times, 10 April 2017).

The trial for war crimes subsequently increased the rift between the Awami League and Jamaat. In 2013, following Abdul Quader Mollah's life sentence, the Shahbag protests began. At that time, suspicions about a compromise with the government arose (The Daily Star, 5 February 2013). Later, the death penalties for Quader Mollah and several high-ranking Jamaat leaders were implemented.

However, instances of unification despite political differences have been seen in other countries. In 2015, in India’s Jammu and Kashmir, BJP and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) formed a government despite major disagreements on Kashmir's special status. Ultimately, the coalition collapsed in 2018 (The Indian Express, 25 February 2015; NDTV, 19 June 2018).

Political Scientist William Riker offered an explanation for such coalitions in his book The Theory of Political Coalitions, reflecting how political alliances can be formed due to the need for power despite ideological differences.
However, forming and sustaining a coalition are different matters.

Economist Douglass North and political scientist Barry Weingast emphasised the importance of credible commitment in their research "Constitutions and Commitment". Simply put, for a compromise to last, parties must trust each other's words. In this context, considering the antagonism from 1971, the trial for war criminals, and divergent stances during the 2024 mass uprising, can trust easily return between the Awami League and Jamaat?

The Awami League shares a longstanding relationship with India due to the Liberation War, border security, and safety issues. However, now that the Awami League is out of power, there are questions about how far India will go to bring them back into politics.

Reflecting on 2008, when a military-backed government attempted to oust Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia from politics, former Indian President Pranab Mukherjee mentioned in his book The Coalition Years (2017) that when Army Chief Moeen U Ahmed visited India, he expressed concerns about his safety if Sheikh Hasina returned to power, to which Pranab assured him (India Today, 13 October 2017). This illustrates India’s attempt to reassure relevant parties during Bangladesh’s political transitions.

However, political calculations do not remain constant. Changes in internal situations bring changes in external relations. Political Scientist James Rosenau's book Linkage Politics elaborates on such relationships. In that regard, India may seek a new approach considering Bangladesh's current situation.

There have been recent reports of India's contact with Jamaat as well. Jamaat Amir Dr. Shafiqur Rahman claimed that Indian diplomats met him and requested secrecy (Reuters, 31 December 2025). India described it as a regular diplomatic interaction (The Daily Star, 17 January 2026).

So, can India attempt to facilitate an understanding between the two parties? If bringing Awami League back into politics aligns with India’s interests, and Jamaat desires assurances for its leaders and activists' safety, could any compromise be impossible? However, given the anger over the trial for war crimes, to what extent Jamaat’s leaders and activists would accept it is also a question.

Of course, present situations differ from 2008. Just India’s desire is not enough. What matters is whether there’s an opportunity within Bangladesh for the two parties to find common ground.

Before 5 August 2024, the aim of BNP, Jamaat, and the student protesters was the fall of the Awami League government. But once the government was removed, new calculations began. Did former unity fracture over who will gain power, when elections will be held, and how much influence each will have?

Accusations arose that student groups associated with Jamaat increased their influence covertly in various universities while sidelining the student wing of BNP. Another slogan “The boat and the sheaf of paddy, both snakes have the same venom” also emerged. Did the BNP regard these as typical student politics or attempts to push them out? Did suspicion surround the use of the term ''secret forces''?

During the interim government, various attacks against the BNP and Tarique Rahman circulated on social media. Questions arose about the roles of people connected to the government. Later, several former advisors spoke of a ''kitchen cabinet'' or small influential group within the government (The Daily Star, 26 May 2026). Did BNP suspect that even within the government, some wanted to prevent them from gaining power?

From 5 August Tarique Rahman sought swift elections, advocating for forming a government through elections and running the country inclusively. However, delays over the election and disagreements over reform conditions continued. He accused an attempt to delay the election (BDNews24. com, 29 May 2025). Did BNP's fear of the ‘Minus Two’ formula from 2007-08, where Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia were threatened to be removed from politics, return? Did they fear that Tarique Rahman, after Sheikh Hasina, might also be pushed out?

Disputes over the July Charter further intensified. Although BNP signed the Charter, they raised objections over implementation issues. Professor Ali Riaz criticized the gap between BNP’s previous commitments and later positions (Prothom Alo, 11 October 2026). His questions hold importance. But was BNP’s objection only about reform? Or did they feel compelled to adhere to decisions imposed by those they suspected intended to push them aside?

BNP also had its own 31 points for state reform. Were they opposing reforms, or had the July experience merely made them more cautious? Did resentment build regarding Jamaat’s behaviour? Conversely, did Jamaat feel their demands post-movement weren’t being met?

In politics, words alone do not convey the whole picture. Fear, resentment, distrust, and calculations of gain and loss also occur behind the scenes. If the calculations change, can old allies seek new avenues? And could the interests of Awami League and Jamaat align at any point?

Is conspiracy new in power politics? There were betrayals behind Nawab Sirajuddaula’s downfall. Even today, there are power struggles; adversaries will look for opportunities. Then, is Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s concern about a merger of ‘dictatorship’ and ‘secret forces’ unusual? Or by saying this, is he aiming to keep his party members alert and unified while keeping the opposition under pressure? American researcher Robert Entman showed in his research on ‘framing’ that how an event is presented affects people’s perceptions. However, even if there is a fear of conspiracy, does it lessen the government’s responsibility?

Nonetheless, Bangladesh is not a utopia devoid of murder, discord, or tension. In such a densely populated country, deprivation, inequality, and conflict of interest will exist. Do people desire guarantees against all crimes, or do they want to see the government preventing wrongdoings, catching criminals, and ensuring justice?

If party members engage in land grabbing, extortion, or abuse of power, what will the government do then? When party affiliation becomes predominant for recruitment, transfers, government privileges, or fertilizer distribution, what was the point of so many sacrifices in July? Did families who lost their children yearn to see a return to the old system?

BNP might have political grievances, but would that impede necessary reforms from the July Charter? What about judicial independence, administrative accountability, citizens’ rights, or control over freedom of expression under the guise of cyber security—what will the government do about these? If the new government takes steps like the previous ones while denouncing them, where lies the change?

Hence, the question isn’t just about whether ''dictatorship'' and ''secret forces'' will unite. Can the Prime Minister keep his party intact? To what extent can he ensure people’s safety, justice, and governance? Ultimately, do people want to hear about conspiracies, or do they aspire to see the outcomes of changes for which they sacrificed in July?

#Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder is a teacher and researcher in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at North South University.

*The opinions expressed in this article are the writer's own.

#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam.