The session of the United Nations General Assembly occurs every year. World leaders travel to New York, deliver speeches, hold bilateral meetings, pass some resolutions, and make many promises. However, for Bangladesh, the 81st session cannot be viewed through the customary lens. This time, the President of the General Assembly is Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, Khalilur Rahman. The high-level week of the session, which began on 8 September, will be from 22-29 September, with general debates taking place on 22-26 and 28 September. The main theme this year is 'Rebuilding Trust, Managing Change, and Creating an Effective United Nations for All'.
Having a Bangladeshi citizen chair the General Assembly is undoubtedly a rare diplomatic achievement. In the election held on 2 June, Khalilur Rahman was elected with 99 votes, while his opponent from Cyprus received 91 votes. Therefore, this was not merely the formal result of a regional rotation but a competitively won position.
However, it is important to understand a key boundary here. The President of the General Assembly does not preside over the session as Bangladesh's representative; he is the President of the General Assembly of 193 member states. He needs to maintain neutrality, strive for consensus, and create space for dialogue among member states. Thus, this position should not be seen as a direct tool for advancing Bangladesh's national claims.
Rather, its greater value lies elsewhere—Bangladesh is now unusually visible on the international diplomatic stage. If Dhaka can connect this visibility with mature, restrained, and planned diplomacy, this session could open a 'diplomatic window' for Bangladesh.
In this session, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's speech should most strongly focus on the Rohingya crisis. However, it will not suffice to stick to the familiar phrase 'Rohingyas must be repatriated'. After more than eight years of bearing the burden of over 1. 1 million Rohingyas, Bangladesh needs to present several specific questions to the international community—where is the practical plan for repatriation? Who is responsible for creating a safe environment in Rakhine? Why is financing for humanitarian aid becoming increasingly uncertain? And who will bear the long-term costs of security, human trafficking, crime, and regional instability due to this crisis?
In last year's 80th session, the UN held a high-level conference on the situation of the Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar and acknowledged that Bangladesh cannot bear this burden indefinitely. This acknowledgment needs to be translated into effective diplomatic steps this time. Bangladesh's statement should be humane yet firm—repatriation must be voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable, but the phrase 'the situation is not conducive' should not become a permanent excuse.
The most immediate economic issue for Bangladesh in this year's UN session is likely to be the graduation from the list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). According to the current schedule, Bangladesh is set to graduate from the LDC list on 24 November 2026. However, the Bangladeshi government has requested an extension of the preparation period, and the UN's development policy committee believes there is justification for an extension, conditional on progress in necessary reforms to address structural weaknesses. General Assembly action may also be required on this matter.
Therefore, the Prime Minister's speech should not merely present graduation from the LDC list as a symbol of national success but also raise the question of 'smooth transition'. This is because graduation involves the issues of tariff benefits, intellectual property rights-related advantages in the pharmaceutical industry, development finance, and preferential market access in some markets. Bangladesh's request could be that graduation should not become a punishment for a country's development achievements.
The UN is not a place to create trade agreements. However, New York serves as the political platform where the political foundations for future trade relationships with the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, Japan, India, Canada, and other markets and development partners can be created. Therefore, the schedule of bilateral meetings during the Prime Minister's visit is no less important than the speech.
Another strong diplomatic field for Bangladesh could be migration. Millions of Bangladeshis work abroad, and the remittances they send are one of the main pillars of the country's economy. Yet, in international migration discussions, Bangladesh's narrative often halts at remittance income. This time, the discussions need to advance towards migrant rights, excessive recruitment costs, wage theft, skill recognition, social protection affordability, safe migration pathways, and reintegration of returning migrants.
If Bangladesh desires, it can go beyond the identity of a 'labor-sending country' and speak about the future of the global labour market. Demographic changes, artificial intelligence, and automation technology are altering labour demand in many countries in Europe and East Asia. Bangladesh needs market-driven skill diplomacy—not merely sending people, but creating partnerships around skills.
The 80th session in 2025 was the UN's 80-year anniversary session, themed 'Together Better: 80 Years and Beyond for Peace, Development, and Human Rights'. During that time, Bangladesh had an interim government, and the country's internal political transformation was a significant subject of international interest.
The context in 2026 is different. There is an elected government in place; Prime Minister Tarique Rahman assumed office on 17 February. Consequently, the international community will now want to hear not just about political transformation from Bangladesh, but also about the direction of its foreign policy and economic strategy for the next five or ten years.
A good speech at the UN is important, but a speech is not diplomacy. The success of this visit should be measured by several tangible outcomes—whether new commitments for Rohingya repatriation and financing have been secured, whether support has been garnered for Bangladesh's necessary transition facilitation upon LDC graduation, whether new trade and investment partnerships have been opened, whether there has been progress on the rights of Bangladeshi migrants and labour market expansion, and how much of a coalition has been formed in favour of Bangladesh's demands for climate financing.
Moreover, another aspect should be included—integrating the identity of Bangladesh's peacekeeping, multilateralism, and development diplomacy with issues of the new generation—artificial intelligence, digital divide, cybersecurity, energy security, and global health.
In the 81st General Assembly, Bangladesh faces two platforms. One is visible—the famous green marble rostrum of the UN. The other is behind the scenes—in corridors, bilateral meetings, small conference rooms, and diplomatic negotiation tables. On the first platform, Bangladesh needs a concise, confident, and forward-looking statement. On the second platform, specific national goals must be pursued.
When a Bangladeshi foreign minister is presiding over the General Assembly, the world's attention on Bangladesh will undoubtedly increase slightly—this is almost certain. However, international attention itself is not an achievement. The real test of diplomacy lies in how much that attention can be utilised for national interests, regional stability, and global welfare. Bangladesh is faced with that rare test in the 81st session.
#AKM Ahsan Ullah is a professor, International, Security, and Migration. University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei.
Email: akmahsanullah@gmail. com
*Opinions expressed here are the author's own.
#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam.