For years, India has believed that maintaining constructive relations with Bangladesh depends on the Awami League being in power. Such a stance has had negative consequences for both Bangladesh’s domestic politics and long-term bilateral relations.
If the BNP forms the next government, both sides should seize the opportunity to bring the relationship to a stable footing. However, New Delhi should go a step further and strengthen relations with all actors across Bangladesh’s political landscape.
The Brussels-based non-profit research organisation International Crisis Group (ICG) made this observation in its analytical report on Bangladesh–India relations. The 53-page report, titled After the “Golden Era”: Getting Bangladesh-India Ties Back on Track” was published on the ICG website on Tuesday.
Highlighting the historical dimensions of Bangladesh–India relations, the report outlines what is new in the current context, why it matters, and what should be done in the future.
ICG said that the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government has led to a deterioration in relations between Dhaka and New Delhi.
However, Bangladesh’s upcoming election has created an opportunity to recalibrate the relationship.
The report noted that Bangladeshi political parties should refrain from using anti-India sentiment as a tool to win votes in elections.
After the election, New Delhi should extend cooperation to the new government, while the new government in Dhaka, in return, should show due consideration for India’s security concerns.
ICG said New Delhi’s support for Sheikh Hasina fanned longstanding anti-India feeling in Bangladesh, contributing to her ouster. Poorer relations could spell violence, further destabilisation of the border and hindered economic development.
So, Bangladeshi political parties should refrain from stoking anti-India sentiment, while New Delhi should avoid further inflaming tensions and undermining potential partners in Bangladesh.
According to the report, much of New Delhi’s anger is directed at Yunus personally. Many in official circles already viewed him with suspicion because of his longstanding links to the West and perceived hostility to India. Accordingly, New Delhi initially rebuffed repeated requests from Dhaka for a meeting between Yunus and Modi. Citing security reasons, India massively scaled back the issuance of visas to Bangladeshis, rising resentment in Bangladesh. New Delhi also suspended cross-border train connections and stepped up security along the border, causing disruption to other transport services, hindering trade and people-to-people ties.
According to the report, there have been divisions in Indian policy circles over how to respond to the end of the Hasina era. Many in the policy establishment would have preferred to normalise ties and engage more closely with the interim government. Citing a former senior Indian diplomat, the IGC report said some top officials close to the Indian government defend their response, arguing that New Delhi needed to show strength.
Professor Yunus’s visit to China by breaking the tradition has also become a source of concern for Delhi. At the same time, the Indian media’s persistent misinformation has widened the distance between the two countries.
The August 2024 ouster of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was a major setback for India, which had been her staunchest ally during her fifteen-year rule. New Delhi’s support had enabled her party, the Awami League, to prevail in three controversial elections. But aligning so closely with an increasingly unpopular ruler amplified anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh and left India poorly positioned when a mass uprising forced Hasina from power. The two countries have since struggled to repair ties, instead swapping rhetorical barbs, imposing trade restrictions and engaging in confrontations along their shared border.
The report said New Delhi is unlikely to normalise relations with Dhaka’s interim government, but Bangladesh’s national elections scheduled for 12 February 2026 offer the chance for a reset.
To make the most of the opportunity, New Delhi should prepare to make goodwill gestures in the election aftermath and step up engagement with a wide range of political stakeholders, including those it disagrees with; for their part, political parties in Bangladesh should avoid anti-India rhetoric during the campaign.
Though India’s support was crucial for securing Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, and the countries share deep historical and cultural ties, bilateral relations have often been strained by border disputes, security threats, perceived Indian hegemony and communal tensions. Sheikh Hasina’s victory in the December 2008 elections paved the way for what New Delhi has described as shonali adhyay, or a “golden era”, in the relationship.
The two sides demarcated land and maritime borders and accelerated economic integration, including through reductions in tariffs, transshipment agreements and infrastructure development.
Bangladeshis also began visiting India in large numbers for tourism and medical treatment.
But there was a widespread sense in Bangladesh that India was getting favourable political, security and business deals in exchange for propping up Hasina’s autocratic regime. India’s decision to give Hasina refuge after she fled the country in August 2024, despite Bangladesh’s insistence she face justice, only added to the ill feeling.
Since Hasina’s departure, New Delhi and Dhaka have settled into a pattern of recrimination. Both insist they have reached out to mend ties but have been rebuffed; each has accused the other of provocations; at times, the two have engaged in border standoffs and what appears to be tit-for-tat retaliation on trade. The tension has entrenched negative perceptions without benefiting either side.
The report said, still smarting from Hasina’s downfall, India is now unlikely to normalise relations with the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus; policymakers are instead waiting for the outcome of the Bangladeshi elections.
With Hasina’s Awami League barred from contesting the polls, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is considered the front runner. Historically, India and the BNP have had a troubled relationship. But in Bangladesh’s much-changed political landscape, the party is likely the best option for safeguarding New Delhi’s interests.
Domestic politics in both countries could undermine efforts to rebuild ties, however. Fanning anti-India sentiment is a common strategy for Bangladeshi political parties. In India, the Hindu nationalism of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), including its muscular foreign policy and focus on illegal immigration, could increase Bangladeshi resentment of New Delhi.
Elections in the Indian border states of Assam and West Bengal in March-April 2026 are potential flashpoints, as is the looming expiration of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty.
While most political leaders in both countries appear to recognise that better ties would be beneficial, there is also a risk that they could settle into a pattern of acrimony and distrust. The prospect of state-to-state conflict remains remote, but strained relations could manifest in destabilising ways short of war, including violent protests, communal attacks, border killings and insurgent activity.
Underscoring the risks, anti-India violence erupted in Bangladesh in mid-December following the killing of a student leader whose group criticised India and supported the Awami League ban.
For many years, India has viewed constructive relations with Bangladesh as dependent on the Awami League being in power, to the detriment of both Bangladeshi politics and long-term cross-border ties.
If the BNP indeed forms the next government, both sides should grasp the opportunity to get relations back on to a stable footing.
New Delhi should seek to go further, however, by strengthening ties across the Bangladeshi political spectrum – not only with the post-election administration, but with other parties as well – and further develop people-to-people links and economic connections to help insulate bilateral relations from political shifts.
The report said while India will logically put its own economic and security interests first, it should also ensure that its initiatives are mutually beneficial and consider domestic sensitivities in Bangladesh.
It should begin planning a charm offensive of good-will gestures and new policies that it could present to the incoming government, starting with the reversal of visa restrictions imposed in August 2024.
Bangladeshi political parties, meanwhile, should resist the temptation to use anti-Indian sentiment to win votes in the forthcoming elections.
Such electoral tactics would reinforce the widely held belief in India that the major parties contesting the polls are inimical to its interests, particularly on security – a view informed by historical precedent.
The incoming government should instead reciprocate New Delhi’s overtures, adopt a balanced foreign policy, keep a lid on insurgency and extremism, and do more to curb cross-border smuggling and illegal migration.
Assuaging Indian security concerns will be paramount for putting the relationship on the right track, and making it a source of stability, in the years ahead, the ICG said.