Bangladesh on the eve of a pivotal election, major challenges ahead for next govt

Bangladesh’s forthcoming national election is not merely about returning the country to a constitutional path. For the first time since December 2008, a government with genuine popular legitimacy is expected to assume power.

Precisely for this reason, the International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that organising a credible election, despite numerous challenges, is the central key to restoring democratic governance in Bangladesh.

This assessment was presented in an analytical article titled “Curtain Falls on Bangladesh’s Interim Government as Critical Elections Approach”, published on the ICG website on Monday.

The Brussels-based research organisation notes that the election will be crucial for Bangladesh’s democratic transition, given its far-reaching political, social and international implications. It warns that the post-election government will face a complex array of challenges, both domestically and externally.

Domestically, these include weak state institutions, a sluggish economy heavily dependent on the garment sector, the growing impact of climate change, and mounting social pressures in one of the world’s most densely populated countries.

There are also concerns about the increasing influence of extremist groups. On the external front, the next government will need to manage relations with India while carefully navigating the strategic rivalry between the United States and China.

The election, scheduled for 12 February, will be the first since the mass uprising of July–August 2024 that led to the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian government. Through a question-and-answer format, Thomas Kean, the ICG’s senior expert on Bangladesh and Myanmar, examines the election’s significance, risks and prospects, evaluates the performance of the interim government, and outlines the broader political landscape.

According to the ICG analysis, one of the defining features of this election is the absence of one of Bangladesh’s two largest political forces, the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) of Sheikh Hasina, whose activities are currently banned. As a result, the contest is expected to be fiercely competitive between two major alliances—one led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the other by Jamaat-e-Islami.

BNP has historically been one of the country’s largest political parties and the Awami League’s principal rival. It governed Bangladesh from 2001 to 2006 and retains a strong nationwide organisational network and broad popular support. However, the party’s image has suffered over the past year amid allegations that grassroots leaders and activists have been involved in extortion and criminal activities.

That said, two recent developments may have worked in the BNP’s favour. The first was the return of the party’s acting chairman, Tarique Rahman, from the United Kingdom on 25 December 2025 after 17 years in exile. His homecoming rally drew a massive crowd, overshadowing much of the negative media coverage surrounding the party.

The second was the death of his mother, former prime minister Khaleda Zia, just five days later. Her funeral drew an enormous turnout, including not only BNP supporters but also many ordinary citizens paying their respects to one of the most significant political figures in Bangladesh’s post-independence history.

On the other side, BNP’s principal rival in the election is Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s largest Islamist political party. The party was subjected to extensive repression during Sheikh Hasina’s rule. However, Jamaat emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the 2024 mass uprising, largely due to the active role played by its student wing.

The party’s ameer, Shafiqur Rahman, has recently emerged as one of the country’s most influential political figures. Jamaat’s popularity among young people appears to be growing, particularly as many younger voters show comparatively less interest in the party’s controversial role during the 1971 Liberation War, including its alignment with Pakistani forces and alleged involvement in mass atrocities.

Jamaat has further strengthened its position in recent weeks by forming an electoral alliance with the National Citizen Party (NCP), a youth-led party that emerged from the mass uprising. While the alliance may improve the NCP’s short-term prospects of winning seats, it has sparked internal controversy, leading to the departure of several leaders. In the longer term, the ICG warns, the NCP risks being perceived primarily as a junior partner of Jamaat.

The ICG identifies several key achievements of the interim government, including stabilising the economy, maintaining consensus with the military and political parties, and drafting the “July Charter”.

The charter contains 84 proposals, 48 of which relate to constitutional amendments. These include reducing the powers of the prime minister, strengthening the role of the parliamentary opposition, and limiting partisan influence in judicial appointments.

However, progress on law and order reforms has been minimal. Public trust in the police has not been restored, and the force’s weakened capacity has coincided with a rise in mob violence, particularly incidents of people being beaten to death by groups. Agencies such as the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) have not undergone meaningful reform. Many recommendations of the Women’s Reform Commission and the Media Reform Commission also remain unimplemented.

As a result, a section of the public believes that the interim government has failed to live up to its ambitious reform agenda.

According to the International Crisis Group, the next government will confront major foreign policy challenges, including managing relations with India, navigating US–China rivalry, and addressing the uncertain future of more than one million Rohingya refugees.

There are also growing concerns about the rising influence of extremist Islamist groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, as well as the state’s capacity to monitor and counter terrorism.

Perhaps the most serious risk lies in failing to meet the expectations of the country’s young population. Nearly half of Bangladesh’s population is under 30, and many young people are unable to find jobs commensurate with their education, fuelling deep frustration. Their demands extend beyond employment to include integrity in governance and a fair distribution of the benefits of economic growth.

Even limited failure to implement the July Charter could reinforce the perception that political change has been merely cosmetic.

The next government will also face the difficult question of political reconciliation. Given its history and social base, the Awami League cannot remain permanently excluded from politics. However, any return without genuine remorse for the violence of 2024 would remain highly contentious. Influential countries, including India, could play a role in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation.

The ICG concludes that a five-year elected government will be better positioned than an interim administration to manage these complex crises.

At the same time, the international community bears a responsibility to support Bangladesh as it seeks to move beyond its recent period of instability and consolidate a durable democratic transition, it noted.