After the formation of the caretaker government on 8 August 2024, perhaps the most frequently asked question by citizens has been: “Will there be an election?” As a journalist, I find myself hearing this question more often than others at any event.
Every time I hear it, I am transported 18 years back to 2007. At that time, I was working in the Election Commission beat for the daily Janakantha newspaper. Whether on assignment, within my family, or at the local neighbourhood shop—wherever I went, people asked the same question: “Will there be an election?”
The nearly two years leading up to the 2008 election were marked by extensive preparations—but also by deep uncertainty.
This uncertainty was not entirely unfounded. It is not a very old event, and many may still remember it, but a brief context is necessary. After the popular uprising of the 1990s, Bangladesh witnessed its first election under a “non-partisan government.” In the 1991 election, BNP came to power.
However, widespread allegations of rigging in the Magura by-election raised questions about whether free and fair elections could occur under a partisan government.
Subsequently, the then-main opposition parties—the Awami League (now banned), Jatiya Party, and Jamaat-e-Islami—led sustained movements, which resulted in constitutional amendments introducing a non-partisan caretaker government system. Under this system, the June 1996 election was won by the Awami League. In the 2001 elections, the BNP-led four-party alliance returned to power with a two-thirds majority.
In 2004, the ruling four-party government amended the constitution to raise the retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67. Opposition parties, including the Awami League, alleged that this amendment was designed to ensure the government’s preferred candidate could become head of the caretaker government.
Facing objections, in 2006, Chief Justice K. M. Hasan refused to become the Chief Adviser. Subsequently, the then-President, Md. Iajuddin Ahmed—who had been nominated by BNP—appointed himself as Chief Adviser. His assumption of this role sparked intense controversy, which at one point escalated into widespread political violence.
I also witnessed the backdrop of the 1/11 situation firsthand. A group of us journalists would sit outside the gates of Bangabhaban. Initially, the election was announced for 22 January 2007—but there was considerable uncertainty.
Amid violent political unrest, Iajuddin Ahmed resigned from the post of Chief Adviser on 11 January 2007. He declared a state of emergency and cancelled the 22 January election. Retired Bangladesh Bank governor Fakhruddin Ahmed was appointed Chief Adviser, and a military-supported government began administering the country. At that time, the army chief was Moeen U Ahmed.
It was during this period that I had to do reporting using a curfew pass for the first time. Nothing like this had ever happened before.
‘Prolonged’ uncertainty over the election
After assuming office, Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed delivered a speech on 21 January 2007, hinting that elections would be held within two years. The Election Commission (EC) led by M A Aziz was dissolved and reconstituted on 4 February. ATM Shamsul Huda became Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), while Muhammad Sohul Hossain and Brigadier General (Retd.) M. Sakhawat Hossain served as Election Commissioners.
Yet public doubt and suspicion about whether elections would actually take place had already taken firm root. Nothing seemed to indicate that a free and fair election, with the participation of political parties, would occur. I do not know whether uncertainty over an election had ever lingered so deeply in people’s minds for such a long time.
From morning to afternoon, we would sit at the Election Commission office—then located at the Planning Commission premises in Sher-e-Bangla Nagar. As the CEC left his office, we tried to stop him for comments, but received no answers. Observers from home and abroad came and spoke with the CEC and commissioners, and occasionally chatted with us as well.
On one such occasion, while talking casually with a foreign observer, I blurted out, “Even a worse democracy is better than this.” At the time, I did not realise the remark had been noted. Later, when I saw the line quoted anonymously in that organisation’s report, I understood it was my comment.
The atmosphere of doubt is also reflected in M. Sakhawat Hossain’s book, Five Years at the Election Commission (2007–2012), published in 2013. He wrote, “Even after the success of the Sreepur pilot (the digitised voter list with photographs), suspicion about our intentions persisted in political circles… Not only among politicians, but even among government officials.” Elsewhere he reflected on his own doubts, writing: “I felt the election could be postponed on any pretext. My perception was not unfounded.”
The electoral ‘roadmap’ and the arrests of Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia
As days passed amid daily uncertainty over whether elections would take place at all, the long-awaited moment arrived for the announcement of an electoral roadmap. We knew it would not only indicate the election date but also signal how long the government intended to remain in power. No one had any clear idea. Everyone waited in anticipation. Political parties were also prepared to respond.
That much-anticipated day came on 15 July 2007. The Shamsul Huda Commission announced an electoral roadmap stating that elections would be held by December 2008—an extensive 18-month plan. At least a timeframe had been set. The two major political parties offered mixed reactions.
But a second wave of anxiety about the election began the very next day. At dawn on 16 July, Awami League President Sheikh Hasina was arrested in a corruption case. Two months later, on 3 September, BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia was also arrested on corruption charges.
The residences of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker in the National Parliament complex were declared special detention facilities, where Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina were held respectively. Sheikh Hasina was released on 11 June 2008, and Khaleda Zia on 11 September 2008.
The ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ and controversy over BNP
The Election Commission held three rounds of dialogue with political parties between 12 September 2007 and 9 September 2008. The entire country watched these talks closely. During this period, controversy arose over a letter sent to the BNP. Before her arrest, Khaleda Zia had expelled party Secretary General Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan and appointed Khandaker Delwar Hossain in his place.
However, the Election Commission invited Major (Retd.) Hafiz Uddin Ahmed—identified with the reformist faction—to the dialogue.
Chief Election Commissioner Shamsul Huda described the decision as based on the “doctrine of necessity,” arguing that BNP’s internal conflict could disrupt the electoral roadmap.
Amid the controversy, the EC later held dialogue with the BNP mainstream under Khandaker Delwar Hossain’s leadership. In his book Five Years at the Election Commission, Sakhawat Hossain later acknowledged that sending the letter to Hafiz Uddin Ahmed had been a mistake. He wrote, “We were misled by the reformists’ provocation.”
Even then, BNP’s participation in the election remained uncertain. About a month before the polls, in November, the party confirmed that it would take part. When BNP requested additional time, the election—originally scheduled for 18 December—was postponed by 11 days, and voting was ultimately held on 29 December 2008.
What was the election like?
After 1991, 1996, and 2001, the 2008 election was the fourth held under a non-partisan caretaker government. Yet even this election was not entirely beyond question. BNP alleged irregularities at 220 polling centres across 72 constituencies.
There was also widespread discussion about an alleged understanding between Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed and Awami League President Sheikh Hasina. A probe commission formed by the current interim government has described the 2008 election as questionable and recommended an investigation into it as well.
That said, the election atmosphere was festive, and security arrangements were in place. Apart from the recovery of bombs and a few isolated incidents, there was no major violence. However, after the polls, attacks and looting targeting the homes of BNP supporters were reported in different parts of the country.
Campaigning followed the electoral code of conduct. There was no graffiti on walls, and posters were not pasted directly onto them. Instead, black-and-white posters were hung with string. There were no large arches or gates bearing candidates’ images, no motorcycle processions, and no indiscriminate loudspeaker campaigning.
The main contest was between the Awami League-led Grand Alliance and the BNP-led Four-Party Alliance. Voter turnout was recorded at 86.29 per cent—though this figure itself sparked debate, as no previous parliamentary election had seen such participation.
The Awami League secured 230 seats, while BNP won 30. Jamaat-e-Islami, a partner in the Four-Party Alliance, contested 39 seats and won two.
Subsequent national elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 have largely come to be known as uncontested polls, “night-time voting,” or rigged elections. As a journalist and a citizen, I hope that uncertainty will never again cloud elections in the future, and that they will never become one-sided.