Political divisions and disagreements over the implementation of the July Charter’s recommendations and the proposed referendum are becoming increasingly visible. How do you think this will affect the national election? Is there any reason for doubt about the election?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: We can already see that the recommendations presented by the National Consensus Commission have fueled division and discord among political parties. It is also undeniable that, following the commission’s recommendations, uncertainty surrounding the national election scheduled for February 2026 has deepened.
However, the first issue to consider is whether the commission’s recommendations were sound and well-considered. Another question is how democratic the commission’s outlook and process were. Over the eight months of discussion, we saw that the commission acted less as a consultant and more as a decision-maker. By ending their process with undemocratic directives and a confusing recommendation for a referendum, they made matters even more complicated.
The commission was supposed to play two roles — that of an adviser and a facilitator. They were expected to advise the government and act as a facilitator in dialogue with political parties. But they failed to play the facilitator’s role. In both agenda-setting and decision-making, there was a strong tendency to impose their own perspective. When the history of this commission is written, there will be a question: was the commission part of a narrow civic elitism that was disconnected from grassroots concerns, and did its members harbor a deep distrust toward politicians and politics — a mindset that led them to focus on creating obligations rather than fostering political unity?
So, you’re saying that grassroots concerns were not reflected in the commission’s work?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: What I’m saying is that the individuals involved with the commission were neither sensitive nor attentive to the needs and aspirations of the grassroots. I was very disappointed that even those commission members who had spent their careers working on corruption and strong local governance failed to make those issues central to the agenda. The commission’s focus and agenda became entirely one-dimensional. The constitutional issues prioritised by the commission were treated as the only matters of importance. The commission could have encouraged political parties to make commitments on anti-corruption and strengthening local governance — but that did not happen.
But the political parties themselves were part of the Consensus Commission. What do you think of their role?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: Yes, different political parties participated, and there was diversity of thought among them. But while they spent days talking at the state guesthouse Jamuna, behind the scenes they were more focused on strengthening their own spheres of influence within the state machinery, the administration, and educational institutions.
This behavior from politicians was disappointing. It was also disappointing that they unquestioningly accepted every decision of the commission’s leadership. They gave a “blank check” in determining the agenda. At the outset, they were made to fill out an Excel sheet answering various questions — how could they agree to that? They failed to pose any effective challenge or raise any meaningful questions. The political parties did not play their representative role on behalf of the people; instead, they became engaged in a competition for bureaucratic and institutional dominance — influencing transfers, postings, detentions, and cases. All this was driven by the notion of “our people.” As a result, the culture of flattery and favoritism has been revived.
What was the outcome? The Consensus Commission failed to build unity and instead created a web of complications. Rather than a solution, it generated unease.
Prothom Alo: You mentioned unease and complications — for example, over the referendum. The proposed referendum involves 48 constitutional amendments. How many citizens can reasonably assess and vote on so many issues? How do you view such a “yes” or “no” referendum on this scale?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: As I said earlier, I haven’t seen any reflection of public aspirations in the commission’s activities. The people are distant from the process. Holding a referendum on a bundle of complex proposals is an injustice to the public. I’m not saying that a referendum is inherently wrong — it is, of course, a democratic instrument. My question is about the form of this referendum, as designed by the commission — it is complicated and incomprehensible.
The commission has made its recommendations, which, as you say, have made the situation more complicated. But the authority to decide rests with the interim government. How do you assess its role?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: The government cannot evade responsibility here. The final decision must be made by the government. Trying to hunt with a gun on someone else’s shoulder will only make things worse. The Consensus Commission has left the government with three complications. First, instead of limiting itself to non-controversial matters, it imposed a form of “consensus” through coercion, ignoring dissenting opinions. Second, under the guise of recommendations, it opened a constitutional Pandora’s box. Third, it has attempted to impose a convoluted referendum on the people.
So, what should the interim government do now?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: There are three main questions and apprehension regarding the interim government. The first is its lack of overall capacity. The machinery of governance — the bureaucracy, law enforcement, and other state organs — all exist on paper. The Election Commission, the army, and the police are all there. Yet, law and order remains fragile. The root cause is a lack of effective governance, which is affecting both politics and the economy. Investment is stagnant — not because people lack money, but because they lack confidence to invest. Even the IMF has said it will disburse loans only to an elected government. This lack of capacity has produced a syndrome of uncertainty.
The second problem, increasingly evident recently, is the question of neutrality. Political parties have raised concerns from various quarters. Earlier, there were mild criticisms about impartiality; now, whether true or not, these criticisms have intensified.
The third issue arising from this mix of incapacity and bias is the crisis of trust. What is said in words is not reflected in action. This contradiction is repeatedly visible in the government’s conduct. After the mass uprising of 2024, there was immense political potential — but the government failed to utilise that political capital.
Given the current situation, how capable is the government of holding the February election? Do you see any risks to democracy or the electoral process?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: We don’t just want an election — we want a free and fair election. That adjective “fair” is crucial. To ensure a fair election, the government must overcome the deficits I’ve mentioned — in trust, capacity, and neutrality.
Yes, risks exist — that’s natural. But what matters is whether there’s genuine effort and goodwill to overcome them. The question is whether the government can rise to that moral height. Goodwill isn’t abstract — it’s proven through action, not declarations. Now is the time to demonstrate that goodwill.
The responsibility to prove it also lies with the political parties. Will they again resort to unhealthy competition to secure election results through influence? The public is watching — especially the younger generation.
Given this, what kind of role do you expect from the government now?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: Let’s return to the various recommendations of the Consensus Commission. As I’ve said, the commission can offer advice, but advice is not an order. The government must avoid inheriting the commission’s complications and think independently. I believe the government understands these complications. The government has set a time limit for political parties to reach a common understanding. If that fails, it must decisively make the election its primary focus.
The government needs to proceed step by step. First, it must deliver a new message to the public — a message marking a new chapter beyond the Consensus Commission. The government must acknowledge its limitations and the challenges it faces. This message cannot come through a mere press release; it must be communicated credibly across society.
Second, the government must bridge the communication gaps among various state organs.
Third, it must establish moral authority. I have doubts about how much of that moral authority the government currently possesses.
The spirit of the July Uprising was to put people at the center. But in practice — through commissions and committees — people have been pushed to the background. Under this government, people have mostly remained spectators or victims. That must change.
Finally, as an economist, you recently conducted a major survey on poverty, which showed an alarming picture. The World Bank has said that at least three million more people will fall into poverty. How do you interpret this, and how can the country recover?
Hossain Zillur Rahman: The economic crisis didn’t originate under this government. During the COVID-19 pandemic, conditions worsened globally, including in Bangladesh. Then the Russia–Ukraine war further weakened Bangladesh’s economy. Political uncertainty and transitions have deepened the crisis. From 2010 to 2020, the development model was neither pro-poor nor employment-friendly. It was a corruption-prone model of growth. Yet there’s been little sign of moving beyond that. Yes, foreign reserves improved — but reserves aren’t the sole indicator of economic health. The current government, too, has reduced the economic discussion to reserves alone, while ignoring severe weaknesses in other areas. The old syndrome of denial persists.
Macroeconomic stability is not the only indicator-- we must look at opportunities, poverty levels, and employment. Some positive steps have been taken, such as reforms in public procurement. But these small improvements are overshadowed by much larger deficiencies. There’s no room for complacency. Those in charge of governance — past and present — are trapped in two mental fallacies: denial and self-satisfaction — the belief that “Bangladesh is progressing.”
This isn’t just the mindset of the rulers; many economists also share it. But where is the discussion of how Bangladesh is progressing? Two million young people enter the labor market each year — what are we doing for them? People point to Vietnam and other countries — they are racing ahead, while we move at a snail’s pace.
For a country like Bangladesh, the agenda must be speed — creating effective economic opportunities, moving forward with momentum, and bringing new drivers of growth into play.