Asif Bin Ali's analysis
Bangladesh's risks in new world order
The global system is going through its most fragile period. This collapse can present us with opportunities, but it can also create significant risks. No one can guarantee that neighbouring states like India and China will not become more aggressive under the guise of protecting their security and interests. Asif Bin Ali has written about Bangladesh's risks in the new global system.
The global system is at a strange juncture. The Liberal World Order, established after the Second World War, is gradually crumbling before our eyes. However, this structure was initially created to prevent wars.
After the end of the Second World War, leaders from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet union understood one thing: a subsequent world war could destroy not just Europe but all of civilisation. Thus, through the initiatives of these countries and institutions like the United Nations, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the World Bank, this entire system was built.
The main mandate of the United Nations was straightforward—to prevent a third world war. From that perspective, this system has been partially successful. There have been wars in places such as Vietnam, Korea, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but no additional world wars have occurred.
Following the end of the Cold War, many thought that the era of wars was coming to an end. The Soviet union collapsed, and Washington and its allies declared themselves victors. Francis Fukuyama wrote "The End of History" to demonstrate that liberal democracy and market economy were now humanity's ultimate destination.
We know that dream did not last long. After the attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001, the United States declared a ''war on terror.'' It occupied Afghanistan and later attacked Iraq. In both cases, the wars were prolonged, but no ''complete victory'' was achieved.
Meanwhile, America's moral position weakened, and the internal crises in its economy and politics increased. Exploiting this void, countries like Russia, China, and Iran began forming new power blocs or allies.
2. The current scenario is relatively clear. At the centre are three superpowers—the United States, Russia, and China. We are familiar with the faces of the three leaders—Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping. While their characters differ, they share a commonality: they all wish to shape the world according to the maps of their dreams.
Putin dreams of a ''Greater Russia.'' He views the disintegration of the Soviet union as a historical tragedy. Interventions in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and the subsequent attack on Ukraine—all are essentially politics of expanding borders. The old game of land grabbing has returned in a new language.
Ultimately, the question boils down to something very simple. Can Bangladesh realise that foreign policy is not ''party policy,'' but a national security policy? Can we at least reach a national consensus on a few fundamental issues? Like what our core interests are, that we will not go into conflict with anyone, where the ''red line'' is, where we can compromise, and where we should not.
China's dream is ''National Rejuvenation,'' meaning the resurgence of the Chinese nation. Building artificial islands in the South China Sea, establishing military bases, and conducting regular exercises around Taiwan are all parts of this grand project. Accompanying this is the Belt and Road Initiative, through which China builds ports and infrastructure on one hand, while increasing strategic influence in many countries on the other.
Meanwhile, America itself has changed. Previously, it considered itself the leader of the ''Free World.'' With allies in Europe, it tried to maintain a rules-based global order through NATO, the Bretton Woods system, and numerous treaties, while also benefiting from it. That policy shifted considerably from the Trump era.
Withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and various international treaties, repeatedly insulting allies—all of this happened within a short period. On one hand, the ''America First'' policy, and on the other, sanctions and the dominance of the dollar are being used as political weapons. Supply chains, oil, gas, dollar transactions—all have become tools of pressure.
Many are calling this situation the collapse of the ''Rules-Based Order'' or rule of law. There were rules before, but they weren't always followed. The problem now is that those who previously at least talked about rules have openly started adopting the ''might makes right'' policy. In such a situation, small and medium-sized countries are at greater risk.
The situation in Venezuela is an example. America unilaterally attempted to change the government there. The pressure exerted in the name of security and democracy demonstrated that major powers could bypass international norms if they wished. Meanwhile, Russia and China are exhibiting similar behaviour in many cases for their interests; thus, the pattern of imperialism or dominance has changed, but the nature hasn't.
The question is, where does a country like Bangladesh stand in this situation?
Until now, the Liberal World Order has created some safeguards for many countries, including Bangladesh. We have gained both respect and money by sending peacekeepers; we have received loans and grants from various institutions, and we have remained connected to the global economy through various trade regimes. Forums like the United Nations have at least provided a moral refuge where small countries could voice their opinions.
If the whole system shifts to a ''might makes right'' model, the picture will be different. We already have an example in front of us. The way Myanmar forcibly displaced the Rohingyas across the border, the international community could do very little. The major powers' security and business interests have come to the forefront. Consequently, millions of people are burdened on Bangladesh's shoulders, but the ''rules-based order'' has not worked effectively.
In this situation, another trend is appearing within us, which is more dangerous. It's the mixture of populist politics and complacent nationalism. Here, rhetoric and emotion are being prioritised over strategy and preparation. Politicians are making grand statements before the public, video clips are going viral, everyone is applauding, but no one is calculating what kind of suffering these words might bring us in the future.
For smaller and medium-sized powers, there is a general rule. They cannot enter the playing field and fight directly in the conflicts of great powers. They have to adhere to some minimum ''predictability rules.'' For example, staying a bit behind in global debates instead of being on the front line, working with all sides, acknowledging one's limitations before taking risks.
The example of Ukraine is before us. The whole world is witnessing the dire consequences of failing to align national pride with security calculations.
Bangladesh's problem is somewhat different. We lack a clear India policy, a China policy, and an America policy. Foreign policy is often guided by the party in power's mood. When a pro-India government comes to power, one kind of language is used; when Chinese investment comes, a different language is used; when a signal comes from Washington, a new narrative is adopted. It seems like we will utilize everyone simultaneously to protect our interests and if anyone gets upset, stand before the gallery and throw some nationalist rhetoric.
Such reckless play is dangerous in a ''free-floating,'' conflicting world. Because when the major powers themselves are more nervous and aggressive, if the smaller ones become too ''unpredictable,'' they might become targets of the great powers, or they might be ignored. Neither situation is beneficial for us.
Ultimately, the question boils down to something very simple. Can Bangladesh realise that foreign policy is not ''party policy,'' but a national security policy? Can we at least reach a national consensus on a few fundamental issues? Like what our core interests are, that we will not go into conflict with anyone, where the ''red line'' is, where we can compromise, and where we should not.
Such discussions are almost absent in our public sphere and, if they exist in policymaking circles, they remain very limited.
The global system is passing through its most fragile time. This collapse can provide us opportunities, yet it can also create significant risks. No one can ensure that neighboring countries like India and China will not become more aggressive in the name of protecting their security and interests. Therefore, it is necessary to think with a cool head, beyond the politics of words, Facebook politics, and talk show politics. Emotional nationalism can conquer Facebook, but it cannot handle geopolitics.
So, the current question is straightforward—will we be able to stand with calm, long-term strategic thinking in this new world order, or will we, driven by old habits, momentary emotions, and public applause, do something that we will have to pay for over many years?
*Asif Bin Ali is a geopolitical analyst and a doctoral fellow at Georgia State University, USA.
Email: [email protected]
*The views expressed are the author’s own.
#This article, originally published in online and print editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam