Warnings about food safety cannot be ignored

The 2026 Global Report on Food Crises has delivered an uncomfortable message about Bangladesh. The country is not facing famine, nor does it belong to the world’s most severe food crisis zones. Yet it has appeared on a list where no country would want to be included. In 2025, Bangladesh was among the top 10 countries and territories in the world in terms of the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

According to the report, at the peak period in 2025, around 16 million people in Bangladesh were facing crisis-level or worse acute food insecurity. Among them, approximately 15.6 million were in the “crisis” phase, and about 400,000 were in the “emergency” phase. This represents 17 per cent of the analysed population, although the report notes that the analysis covered only 59 per cent of the country’s total population, not the entire population.

These figures should be interpreted with caution. The same report states that the situation in Bangladesh improved somewhat in 2025 compared to 2024. The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity decreased by 7.6 million. This improvement was mainly attributed to the absence of major natural disasters at the beginning of 2025, a slight reduction in food inflation, and an increase in remittances from abroad.

However, this is where the concern becomes clearer. Even in a relatively better year, when the impact of major disasters was lower and inflationary pressure on food eased to some extent, Bangladesh still recorded one of the largest numbers of people facing acute food insecurity in the world.

Food insecurity in Bangladesh is not only the result of floods, cyclones, droughts, or sudden price hikes. These shocks are certainly important, as they quickly push vulnerable families into hardship. However, the persistence of food insecurity points to deeper structural problems: low and unstable incomes, weak purchasing power, regional inequality, and climate-related vulnerabilities.

Risks, malnutrition, and gaps in social protection are all linked to this issue. For many households, the crisis is not a shortage of food in the market. Rather, it is a lack of purchasing power to buy food, a lack of nutritious diets, and the near exhaustion of traditional coping mechanisms.

Inflation is a crucial factor here. In recent years, food inflation in Bangladesh has not been a temporary inconvenience for poor people; it has changed household behaviour. Many families have reduced protein intake, shifted to cheaper food options, postponed healthcare spending, taken loans from informal sources, and cut essential expenses for children.

When the prices of rice, edible oil, lentils, eggs, fish, and vegetables remain high for a long period, the damage is not only economic—it becomes nutritional. Children suffer silently. Women often eat last and eat less. Elderly people in poor households become increasingly dependent on uncertain support.

In 2025, remittances provided some relief, which is positive. However, this should not lead to complacency. The benefits of remittances are not evenly distributed across regions and households. While they support many families, they cannot replace a national food security strategy. Households without migrant workers, landless seasonal labourers facing unemployment, urban informal workers struggling with high rents, and female-headed households with limited income opportunities do not automatically benefit from remittances. Therefore, food security is also a question of inequality.

The Rohingya situation adds another dimension to this crisis. The report notes that recent influxes of Rohingya refugees, flooding, and reduced humanitarian assistance have increased severe food insecurity among forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals in two districts of Bangladesh. This is not only a humanitarian issue but also a development challenge for Cox’s Bazar and surrounding local communities. When aid decreases, pressure increases on local labour markets, forests, public services, water resources, and social relations. Bangladesh has carried this burden for many years. The international community should not allow this crisis to become a forgotten one.

The first policy lesson is clear: food security policy must go beyond food supply. Bangladesh has made significant progress in increasing rice production and ensuring the supply of staple foods. However, food security is not only about supply; it is also about access, nutrition, stability, and dignity. The policy question should therefore shift from “Is there enough rice in the country?” to “Can poor households afford nutritious food throughout the year?” This requires regular monitoring of the cost of a food basket, not just overall inflation.

Second, social protection must become more responsive. Bangladesh has many programmes, but they are often fragmented, poorly targeted, and slow to respond administratively. When prices rise, floods occur, or seasonal employment declines, food-insecure households need rapid cash or food assistance. Digital databases can help, but they must be updated, inclusive, and free from political influence. Urban food insecurity also needs greater attention, as low-income urban households depend almost entirely on market purchases for food.

Third, improvements in market management are essential. Weak competition, lack of information, poor stock management, and unplanned import decisions often increase price volatility. A sound food market policy should include improved public stock management, timely imports when necessary, transparent market information, and strict action against collusive behaviour. Farmers must receive fair prices, but consumers cannot be held hostage to unfair market manipulation.

Fourth, nutrition must be at the centre of food policy. The goal is not only calorie sufficiency. School feeding, maternal nutrition, child nutrition services, nutrient-rich foods, safe water, sanitation, and primary healthcare are all essential. Food insecurity and malnutrition are related but not identical. A household may eat every day and still suffer from malnutrition.

Finally, climate resilience must be integrated into food security policy. Flood control, salinity management, climate-resilient crops, crop insurance, storage facilities, rural roads, and early warning systems are not isolated development projects—they are part of the national food security infrastructure.

Therefore, the GRFC 2026 report should be read not as a verdict of failure, but as a warning. Bangladesh has made progress, and some improvements were seen in 2025. However, 16 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is a very large number. This is especially significant for a country aiming to graduate from least developed country status and move towards upper-middle-income aspirations.

The real test is not whether Bangladesh can produce enough food in normal times. The real test is whether every household can access regular, sufficient, and nutritious food when prices rise, disasters strike, jobs are lost, or assistance declines. On that test, Bangladesh still has a long way to go.

* Selim Raihan is a Professor of Economics, University of Dhaka and Executive Director, SANEM

* The opinions expressed here are the writer's own.

* This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam