In recent times, the most frequently mentioned word in Bangladesh’s political discourse is perhaps 'reform'. Discussions and activities around reform began as soon as the interim government came to power. Numerous commissions, task forces, and committees were formed. Hundreds of recommendations and proposals have been made by these commissions, task forces, and committees. However, after 15 months of the interim government, it appears that reforms in fundamental socio-economic areas are not even being discussed.
Out of more than a thousand recommendations from five reform commissions on political and institutional matters, only 166 were discussed in the consensus commission. Even among these, political consensus has not been established on many fundamental reform issues. And in the cases where consensus has been reached, expected progress in implementation is lacking. In many instances, key elements are mysteriously omitted or altered. Examples include reforms in the police and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).
The formation of an independent police commission, long discussed as a means to manage the police force professionally while keeping it free from political and bureaucratic influence, is underway during the interim government’s tenure. However, the way it is being formed raises concerns that the commission will become a powerless institution, dominated by the ruling political party and bureaucracy, similar to the current ACC.
In this way, a police commission formed based on recommendations from a selection committee led by the home minister—without powers over appointments, transfers, and promotions—cannot function impartially. Similarly, if the recommendation regarding the Selection and Review Committee is not implemented, the ACC will continue to act according to the wishes of those in power, as before. Meanwhile, the government will claim that reforms in the police and ACC have been achieved. Such superficial reforms may earn praise, but they will play no role in democratic transformation.
The core problem in the police force is the influence of illegal orders and political interference. This influence primarily manifests in appointments, transfers, promotions, and postings. If these functions could be handled by an independent police commission, it would create opportunities to reduce political influence in the police. However, the interim government’s draft ordinance for forming the police commission does not grant it the authority over appointments, transfers, and promotions.
In other words, these powers will remain with the home ministry as before. The commission’s role will be limited to formulating policies and making recommendations. The draft ordinance does not include any binding mechanism for implementing these recommendations. Even the proposal to give the commission the power to form a three-member panel for ensuring transparency in appointing the IGP—a proposal made by the committee led by the law advisor—has been removed from the draft.
The committee responsible for selecting members of the police commission will be chaired by the home minister. This raises questions about how impartial the selection committee can be. Allegations have surfaced that by keeping the police under the home ministry as before, the bureaucracy is effectively ensuring that the police commission remains powerless. Some political circles also appear to support this.('Bureaucratic interference in the draft of the police commission', Prothom Alo, 30 November 2025)
The issue of bureaucratic obstruction also came up in the report of the Police Reform Commission. The report noted that the Public Security Division of the home ministry expressed a differing opinion regarding the formation of the Police Reform Commission. From the ministry’s comments sent to the Police Reform Commission, it is evident that the ministry stated: “If an independent police commission is formed, there will be no controlling authority. The home ministry will not be able to manage its functions or reasonably control the police force. Therefore, the Public Safety Division reasonably disagrees with the proposal to form an independent police commission.” (Police Reform Commission Report, Annex-9) This disagreement is likely reflected in the draft ordinance concerning the Police Commission.
Forming a commission does not automatically guarantee success. The most notable example of this is the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). At one time, the Bureau of Anti-Corruption functioned as a specialised agency to combat corruption. Being under the executive branch, there were widespread doubts and public dissatisfaction regarding its independence, effectiveness, and impartiality.
Against this backdrop, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established as an independent commission under the Anti-Corruption Act of 2004, replacing the bureau under the executive branch. Although the law stipulates that the ACC is an independent and impartial commission, in practice, for the past two decades, it has largely functioned as a compliant institution under the ruling party. One key reason for this is the significant influence of the ruling political party in appointing ACC commissioners through the existing selection committee.
To address this issue, the interim government’s ACC Reform Commission recommended forming a 'Selection and Review Committee' instead of the existing “Selection Committee” for appointing commissioners. This new committee would include representatives from the executive and judicial branches, as well as members from opposition parties and independent experts experienced in anti-corruption work. The committee would follow clear criteria to select commissioners transparently, impartially, and based on merit. Additionally, it would conduct quarterly reviews of the ACC’s work, organise public hearings, and provide recommendations.
Consensus on this matter was also established among all political parties in the July Charter. However, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) recently alleged that the interim government finalised the ACC ordinance while omitting this critical strategic recommendation to form the Selection and Review Committee.
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has noted that the exclusion of this recommendation from the final ordinance, despite consensus among all political parties that signed the July Charter and the approval of the relevant government authorities, indicates the government’s reluctance to implement its commitment to state reform.
TIB has also alleged that, in addition to the Selection and Review Committee, several other strategically important recommendations on which consensus had been reached were omitted from the final ordinance. TIB believes this reflects the position of self-interested and influential groups within the government, which are corruption-friendly and opposed to reforms. ('Is state reform just empty rhetoric for the government? TIB questions', Prothom Alo, 28 November 2025)
In this way, a police commission formed based on recommendations from a selection committee led by the home minister—without powers over appointments, transfers, and promotions—cannot function impartially. Similarly, if the recommendation regarding the Selection and Review Committee is not implemented, the ACC will continue to act according to the wishes of those in power, as before. Meanwhile, the government will claim that reforms in the police and ACC have been achieved. Such superficial reforms may earn praise, but they will play no role in democratic transformation.
The situation is such that, on one hand, many important reform proposals are not being implemented, and on the other, several reforms that are being implemented are done so irresponsibly. The interim government should ensure transparency and accountability in this regard. It is not only important to consider the quantity of reforms but also their qualitative value.
The situation is such that, on one hand, many important reform proposals are not being implemented, and on the other, several reforms that are being implemented are done so irresponsibly. The interim government should ensure transparency and accountability in this regard. It is not only important to consider the quantity of reforms but also their qualitative value.
It must be made clear which recommendations were made and to what extent they have been implemented. For this purpose, the government should publish a detailed central record on a dedicated website, showing all recommendations made by commissions, task forces, and committees, alongside the extent of their implementation.
#Kallol Mostafa is a writer on electricity, energy, environment, and development economics
[email protected]
#The views expressed are the author’s own