We are gripped with the fear of opportunity slipping from our grasp. As a democratic state, Bangladesh stumbled right at the very beginning of its journey. After 1971, we veered away from democracy, moved towards a one-party rule and fell into an extended period of military rule and authoritarianism.
The 1990 uprising gave us another chance to return to democracy. The three political alliances agreed on a framework for governing the state. But once in power, the winning party and alliances broke those commitments one by one. Their focus was on consolidating their own power and devising ways to avoid relinquishing it. In doing so, the very institutions that needed to be steadily strengthened and consolidated were instead weakened and eventually rendered ineffective. As a result, the people of Bangladesh were thrust into the throes of a prolonged and harsh authoritarian rule.
The mass uprising of 2024 overthrew this monstrous regime and created fresh opportunities and possibilities. People began to hope that this time change would come about, no matter what. Reforms would be implemented so that no government in the future can become authoritarian and carry out enforced disappearances, killings and other such horrific acts. The law enforcement agencies would remain accountable, so that governments could not use these forces at will, so that human rights violations can be brought to justice and people’s freedom of expression is ensured.
The tenure of the interim government that took charge after the uprising was not very smooth. The country went through various uncertainties during this time. However, they undertook several reform initiatives and made efforts to build consensus among political parties on different aspects of future governance. The July National Charter, prepared under the mediation of the National Consensus Commission, was a result of that effort. Although not fully inclusive, the interim government ultimately managed to hold an acceptable election, and through it, the journey of democracy has begun anew.
But once bitten, twice shy. We cannot quite shrug off our sense of fear and doubt. We cannot be certain that this opportunity will not slip away again. And the stance of BNP on several important reform issues and laws has further deepened this uncertainty.
We know that the party that won the election, BNP, had already recorded its objections or notes of dissent on several aspects of the July National Charter. Whether the people like it or not, it is only natural that a party holding a two-thirds majority in parliament will not implement provisions it objects to. However, it now seems that BNP is also backing away from matters it had agreed to in the July Charter, or is trying to reshape them to suit itself.
Let me mention a few examples among many. The July Charter outlines reforms to be carried out through laws, ordinances, rules, and executive orders. In the case of the judiciary, BNP had objections on only two issues: one was the formation of an independent criminal investigation service, and the other was the non-recognition of any organization of lawyers affiliated with political parties in elections to bar associations and the bar council. Beyond these, BNP had agreed to all other matters, including a code of conduct for judges and the establishment of a Supreme Court Secretariat. Yet we saw that the government repealed the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance 2025.
There was extensive discussion both at home and abroad about enforced disappearances during the rule of the Awami League government. Soon after taking power, the interim government signed the international convention against enforced disappearances. It also repealed two ordinances related to the prevention of and remedy for such disappearances.
Out of the 133 ordinances issued during the interim government’s tenure, 20 have been repealed or have lost their validity. In other words, the BNP government did not want to pass these. If we consider most of the repealed or lapsed ordinances—such as the ordinance on the appointment of Supreme Court judges, the two ordinances related to the Supreme Court Secretariat, the separate National Parliament Secretariat, the three ordinances concerning the National Human Rights Commission, the two ordinances on the prevention of and remedy for enforced disappearances, the amendment ordinance of the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Bangladesh Police Commission ordinance, it becomes clear that measures related to judicial independence, accountability, good governance, human rights, and anti-corruption initiatives have been the ones most affected.
From the government’s behaviour, it is natural to assume that, like previous governments, they are trying to consolidate their authority and control over the state apparatus. We know that such initiatives tend to weaken accountability and the balance of power.
The question, therefore, naturally arises: what kind of government does BNP actually want to be? A strong, controlling government that maintains its dominance over the state apparatus, or an accountable one? In a weak democracy like ours, when a government becomes too powerful, it often leads to the spread of corruption and the onset of repressive rule, ultimately turning into authoritarianism and dictatorship. We have experienced this before.
Two government ministers have reassured us that the repealed or lapsed bills will be reintroduced. They have said the bills will undergo further review and consultation with stakeholders. However, political observers and analysts are viewing the government’s stance on accountability-related laws with suspicion.
By not passing these ordinances, the BNP has, to a considerable extent, handed over the sole agency of the mass uprising and reform agenda to Jamaat and the NCP. These two parties have now emerged as the bearers of reform.
Among the public as well, a perception has emerged that the government will reshape these laws to suit its own interests, with the aim of consolidating its power and strengthening control. Some have questioned that if the government had no such intention, it could have passed the ordinances and later amended them if any issues were identified.
We have seen that the government has passed some ordinances with amendments after “review and scrutiny.” While passing the Bank Resolution Ordinance, the government added a new clause. This clause allows the merged weak banks to be returned to their previous owners. Analysts and observers in the banking sector have not viewed positively the provision that enables ownership to be handed back to those whose corruption and plundering led to the collapse of these banks.
Again, although the importance of consultation with “stakeholders” was emphasised, amendments to the Labour (Amendment) Bill were introduced unilaterally. In defining “worker,” reducing the number of trade unions, and matters related to the provident fund, the interests of the owners were effectively protected. The opinions of workers, who are the key “stakeholders”, were not taken into account here.
It remains a major question how the repealed and lapsed ordinances will be further “reviewed,” or with which “stakeholders” discussions will be held to draft the bills. By not passing the reform-oriented ordinances necessary for building an accountable, democratic, and humanitarian state, BNP has sent a message that carries political costs, costs it has already begun to pay.
By not passing these ordinances, the BNP has, to a considerable extent, handed over the sole agency of the mass uprising and reform agenda to Jamaat and the NCP. These two parties have now emerged as the bearers of reform. They have begun movements demanding the implementation of reforms in line with the July Charter.
BNP should, in keeping with its promises, quickly introduce bills and pass these laws. However, it must remember that people will compare the new bills it brings with the repealed and ineffective ordinances. Hopefully, BNP will take this into account. Ultimately, it is through this process that it will become clear what kind of governance BNP intends to establish in the country, whether it seeks to assert full control and authority over the state apparatus, or to ensure accountable governance.
* AKM Zakaria is Associate Editor of Prothom Alo. Email: [email protected]
* The views expressed here are those of the author.
* This opinion has appeared in Prothom Alo (print and online) and has been translated here by Ayesha Kabir for Prothom Alo English Online