At first glance, the China–Myanmar–Bangladesh Economic Corridor appears to be an infrastructure and trade connectivity project. On closer examination, however, it is about far more than roads, railways, ports, pipelines, or industrial zones. It signals the emergence of a new geoeconomic map of Asia centered on the Bay of Bengal.
In June 2026, China proposed establishing an economic corridor linking Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China, stating that its objective is to deepen regional connectivity, trade, and investment.
The proposal comes at a time when China is already advancing the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) through Myanmar, while the strategic dynamics of connectivity between South Asia and Southeast Asia are being reshaped, redefining the roles of India, China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.
The first question is: what exactly is an economic corridor? Simply put, the China–Myanmar–Bangladesh Economic Corridor can be understood as a proposed multidimensional connectivity network linking China's Yunnan Province with northern and western Myanmar, and onward to Bangladesh's territory and port system. Such a corridor could include highways, railways, inland waterways, seaports, land ports, electricity and energy infrastructure, special economic zones, logistics hubs, and digital connectivity.
Its foundation is likely to be the existing China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). CMEC is generally regarded as an inverted Y-shaped infrastructure corridor extending from China's Yunnan Province through Mandalay in Myanmar to the deep-sea port of Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State. If Kyaukphyu's deep-sea port, pipelines, and Myanmar's internal transport links are connected with Bangladesh, the Bay of Bengal could evolve into a much larger regional trade axis.
This idea is not entirely new. The Kunming Initiative of the 1990s later developed into the concept of the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, which envisioned connecting Kolkata, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Kunming in China.
However, tensions in India–China relations, ongoing border disputes, India's objections to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Myanmar's political instability effectively stalled the BCIM project. The proposed China–Myanmar–Bangladesh Economic Corridor can therefore be seen as an alternative, a scaled-down version, or a reconfigured successor to BCIM, one in which India is currently absent, though it remains a geographically affected stakeholder.
2.
How could this be implemented? Potentially in three stages.
First, by developing existing and planned infrastructure from China to Myanmar: the Yunnan–Muse–Mandalay–Kyaukphyu route, including roads and railways, pipelines, power plants, and ports.
Second, by establishing connectivity between Myanmar and Bangladesh: through the Rakhine–Chattogram–Cox's Bazar–Matarbari region, via Teknaf or overland routes, or through maritime port links.
Third, by strengthening Bangladesh's internal economic integration: incorporating Chattogram, Matarbari, Payra, Mongla, Dhaka, Sylhet, northern Bangladesh, and the country's industrial zones into a regional supply chain.
However, the corridor's official total length, precise route, financing structure, and list of projects have not yet been clearly defined. The existing CMEC is generally reported to be about 1,700 kilometers long. If it is extended into Bangladesh, the corridor would become significantly longer, but its total length has not yet been officially confirmed.
The corridor would directly involve China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Indirectly, however, India, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan, and the ASEAN countries, as well as Japan, the United States, and European powers, would also be affected by its geopolitical implications. This is because the Bay of Bengal is no longer merely a maritime space; it is increasingly becoming a focal point for Indian Ocean security, energy transportation, maritime trade, the blue economy, submarine cable networks, regional competition, and military presence.
For China, the corridor offers a potential means of reducing its dependence on the Strait of Malacca, providing the landlocked provinces of southwestern China, including Yunnan, with access to the sea, and expanding its strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal.
For Bangladesh, it could create opportunities to expand markets, generate transit revenue, accelerate industrialisation, diversify exports, strengthen energy security, and establish practical connectivity with Southeast Asia. For Myanmar, it could bring investment in infrastructure and support the development of a port-based economy, although the country's civil war and the crisis surrounding the political legitimacy of its government leave these prospects deeply uncertain.
The question of who stands to benefit the most does not have a simple answer. China would gain strategically, as the corridor would provide it with more effective access to the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh could benefit economically if the project creates genuine domestic value through industrialisation, employment, export growth, technology transfer, and effective utiliaation of its ports. Myanmar could also benefit if the corridor promotes economic inclusion for its people, supports conflict-sensitive development, and enhances stability in its border regions.
The greatest risk, however, is that the corridor could become merely a vehicle for Chinese goods, Chinese loans, Chinese contractors, and China's strategic interests. In that case, Bangladesh and Myanmar would be reduced to the roles of consumers, borrowers, and geopolitical transit corridors, rather than becoming producers, effective negotiators, and independent policymakers.
3.
The opportunities for Bangladesh are significant, but they are conditional. For many years, Bangladesh's economy has relied on the ready-made garment industry, remittances, agriculture-based labor, and the domestic consumer market. In the context of its post-LDC graduation transition, the gradual erosion of preferential tariff benefits, the need to diversify exports, energy shortages, high logistics costs, and pressure on foreign exchange reserves, an effective regional economic corridor could create important new opportunities.
If the Chattogram–Matarbari region can be developed not merely as a port complex but as a hub for industry, logistics, cold-chain infrastructure, agricultural processing, pharmaceuticals, light engineering, information technology, and regional trade, Bangladesh would become more than just a transit route for goods. It could emerge as a center for production and value addition. However, the project's geopolitical consequences would be unavoidable.
India is unlikely to view the corridor as merely an economic initiative. Concerns relating to India's northeastern states, the Siliguri Corridor, the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the security dimensions of Bangladesh–India relations make the project particularly sensitive. India has long been cautious about the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, especially because of its association with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Among Indian policymakers and strategic analysts, the proposed corridor is also increasingly being viewed as the eastern counterpart of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with CPEC on India's western flank and the Bangladesh–Myanmar–China corridor on its eastern flank. This comparison has also appeared in recent Indian media coverage. Although media narratives often emphasize security concerns, India's strategic unease over the proposal is genuine.
4.
This is where Bangladesh''s diplomatic challenge lies. Bangladesh should present the corridor not as part of a China-versus-India rivalry, but as a Bangladesh-centered regional connectivity strategy. Dhaka's position should be clear: Bangladesh is not a military or strategic proxy for any country. Bangladesh seeks connectivity, not conflict; trade, not military bases; investment, not dependence.
Bangladesh should reassure its neighbors that the corridor is intended to serve economic, not military, purposes; that it is designed to be inclusive rather than exclusive; and that it should not move forward in a way that disregards any country's legitimate security concerns. If necessary, Bangladesh could also promote the idea of eventually integrating India, Nepal, Bhutan, Thailand, and the ASEAN countries into the future trade and logistics network. China has likewise indicated that there may be opportunities to include additional countries in the future.
The most complex issue, however, is the situation in Myanmar. The country remains mired in deep political instability, civil war, military rule, ethnic conflict, and a humanitarian crisis. Since the military coup in 2021, the central government's control has collapsed across many parts of the country. More recently, China has strengthened its engagement with Myanmar's military leadership. Visits by Myanmar's current leaders to China, along with cooperation on infrastructure projects, rare earth minerals, border stability, and developments surrounding the Kyaukphyu port, all underscore China's strategic interests in Myanmar.
Under such circumstances, any corridor passing through Myanmar cannot avoid questions concerning security, legitimacy, human rights, and the participation of local communities. If a connectivity route is developed through Rakhine State, pursuing development while sidelining the Rohingya crisis would be politically shortsighted. If development results in greater displacement, militarisation, or the marginalisation of local populations, the corridor will generate conflict rather than stability.
From a geopolitical perspective, there is little doubt that the corridor would expand China's presence in the Bay of Bengal. However, greater presence does not necessarily mean conflict, just as investment does not automatically guarantee development. The ultimate outcome will depend on governance, the transparency of agreements, the terms of financing, environmental assessments, local participation, security arrangements, and the maintenance of a balanced, multilateral approach.
The most prudent approach, therefore, is to view the corridor through four interconnected pillars: economic cooperation with China, strategic trust with India, recognition of the humanitarian and security realities in Myanmar, and the protection of Bangladesh's own national development interests
For Bangladesh, the greatest risks would be opaque borrowing, non-transparent agreements, excessive reliance on foreign contractors, limited participation by domestic industries, and strategic ambiguity regarding the use of its ports. The greatest benefits, by contrast, would come from participating on the basis of clear national policy rather than on a project-by-project basis. Bangladesh should ask: Which infrastructure projects align with the country's national development strategy? Which ones will increase export earnings? Which could create a debt trap? Which pose environmental risks? Which will generate local employment? And which will simply facilitate transit without delivering meaningful benefits to the country?
5.
How can Bangladesh make the most of this opportunity?
First, Bangladesh needs a national corridor policy under which all investment and connectivity initiatives, whether from China, India, Japan, ASEAN, the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank (ADB), are aligned with the country's own development priorities.
Second, every project should be subject to full transparency, parliamentary oversight, environmental and social impact assessments, and the public disclosure of debt sustainability analyses.
Third, Bangladesh should integrate industrial policy with infrastructure development. It should approach special economic zones, workforce skills development, local supplier participation, technology transfer, export market expansion, and port-based manufacturing as interconnected components of a single strategy.
Fourth, Bangladesh should build confidence with India. Rather than excluding New Delhi, Dhaka should demonstrate that the corridor has the potential to connect, rather than divide, South Asia.
Fifth, with regard to Myanmar, Bangladesh cannot separate discussions of the corridor from the issues of Rohingya repatriation, stability in Rakhine State, and humanitarian security.
If Bangladesh can uphold transparency, strategic balance, multilateral engagement, prudent debt management, local industrialization, and diplomatic sensitivity, this corridor could strengthen the country''s position in the Bay of Bengal economy. However, if it becomes merely a conduit for competition among major powers, Bangladesh is likely to face more pressure than benefit.
The most prudent approach, therefore, is to view the corridor through four interconnected pillars: economic cooperation with China, strategic trust with India, recognition of the humanitarian and security realities in Myanmar, and the protection of Bangladesh's own national development interests. Ultimately, the success of the corridor will be determined not by the number of kilometers it spans, but by the foresight of the state.
* AKM Ahsan Ullah is Professor of International Affairs, Security, and Migration
University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei
* The views expressed here are those of the author.
* This article appeared in Prothom Alo in Bangla and has been translated by Ayesha Kabir for Prothom Alo English Online