Arrest of 1/11 figure Masud Uddin: Army intervention and crisis of democracy

Retired Lieutenant General Masud Uddin Chowdhury of the Bangladesh Army has been arrested. Apart from HM Ershad, there are few precedents in Bangladesh of such a high-ranking military officer being arrested. The issue of civil–military relations in the country’s politics remains highly sensitive and is often kept beyond public debate in the name of national security.

Recently, a high-profile case involving enforced disappearances and killings has emerged at the International Crimes Tribunal, where proceedings are underway against several retired and serving military officers. One key question that has arisen is whether military personnel should be tried under military law or under ordinary civil law. In such contexts, the special status of the armed forces tends to be emphasised.

The cases currently filed against Masud Uddin concern criminal offences. He is no longer in military service. His arrest has sparked speculation that the government may revisit his role during the 1/11 upheaval and the subsequent military-backed caretaker government.

Among the most notorious businesses in Bangladesh is the so-called manpower export trade. Allegations are widespread that unscrupulous operators lure young men with promises of prosperous careers abroad, extracting large sums of money before sending them overseas under uncertain and often exploitative conditions. If such allegations are to be pursued seriously, then all major figures in these trafficking syndicates should be held accountable. That this is not happening raises the question: why only Masud Uddin? This inevitably brings attention back to 1/11.

It is worth noting that during the 1/11 administration, Masud Uddin served as coordinator of the National Coordination Committee on Combating Serious Crimes. There have long been allegations of arrests, harassment and coercive interrogations of politicians, businesspersons and others, as well as extortion under threat of detention. One alleged victim of such treatment was Tarique Rahman, son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and now Prime Minister himself. How far this matter will be pursued remains to be seen.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is now in power and considers itself a victim of the 1/11 incidents. Subsequent developments, including revelations in the memoir of India’s former foreign minister (and later president) Pranab Mukherjee, point to India’s involvement at the time. The December 2008 election, held when the BNP was politically weakened, resulted in a landslide victory for the Awami League, bringing Sheikh Hasina to power.

Senior military figures involved in the 1/11 intervention were largely unable to remain in the country. Masud Uddin, however, appeared to be an exception. Following a power struggle with Army Chief General Moeen U Ahmed, he was removed from the army but subsequently appointed High Commissioner to Australia in 2008. The Awami League government extended his tenure several times. Upon returning, he entered business and later became a Member of Parliament from Feni from the Jatiya Party, largely because of the coaxing of Sheikh Hasina.

It is not difficult to infer that, while other architects of 1/11 were sidelined, Masud Uddin retained considerable influence and secured a place in the highest legislative body. Many interpret this as a form of political reciprocation by Sheikh Hasina. Some go further, suggesting that the so-called “grand design” behind 1/11, facilitating the Awami League’s return to power, resulted in his reward.

After returning to power for a second term, Sheikh Hasina is widely accused of undermining the electoral system in an attempt to prolong her rule. Given that 1/11 created the conditions for her grip over the political affairs and power, it has often been characterised as a conspiracy. Was it indeed a conspiracy?

Military intervention is not new in Bangladesh. It began in 1975, re-emerged in 1982, and occurred again in 2007 under the banner of 1/11. The perpetrators of the 1975 coup were punished for the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, while the leader of the 1982 coup, HM Ershad, was later convicted in corruption cases. However, neither coup was formally investigated or tried. We don’t know why it was so. Sheikh Hasina described the 1/11 episode as the outcome of their movement, so taking action against those involved was never considered. However, she remained aggrieved over her own arrest.

Bangladesh has witnessed both military coups and mass uprisings, most recently in 2024. When does a mass uprising take place? It is not that some people sit together and decide - we don’t like this government; let’s topple it. Such upheavals do not occur arbitrarily. They arise gradually when governments lose legitimacy, governance deteriorates, and a significant portion of the public and political class becomes receptive to change. This pattern was evident in 1975, 1982, 2007 and 2024. However, the military’s role in 2024 was somewhat different.

The armed forces in Bangladesh constitute one of the most cohesive professional groups in the country. Their discipline and command structure set them apart from other professions. Their relative distance from everyday political and economic life often shields them from corruption, enhancing their reputation for professionalism. As a result, they command public respect. Yet, when they perceive political governance to be failing, they may come to view themselves as saviours, a perception that segments of the public sometimes welcome. We sometimes heard people saying–why is the military still not taking charge?

In times of crisis, the military has rarely missed opportunities to intervene, often seeing it as their duty to “correct” errant politicians. It must also be acknowledged that politicians themselves frequently create the conditions that invite such interventions. When coups occur, those removed from power consider themselves as victims, while those outside power often welcome and benefit from them.

Military intervention is ultimately detrimental to democracy. Although such interventions have declined globally, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, they still occur in countries where democratic institutions are weak and ruling elites are corrupt. In such contexts, electoral systems often mask the dominance of family- or party-based syndicates.

Where democratic norms are robust, where elections are credible, political consensus exists on national interests, freedoms of expression and organisation are upheld, and justice is accessible, military intervention becomes highly unlikely.

Thus, military involvement in politics must be understood as a manifestation of democratic failure. Until democracy is firmly institutionalised, the risk of intervention will persist. The fundamental requirement is responsible politics and a broad national consensus against military interference. One can only hope that, even belatedly, this lesson will be learned.