How much do you think democratic practice, accountability and a culture of debate have been reflected in the proceedings of the first session of the new parliament formed through elections, following the fall of authoritarian rule and the mass uprising?
Kazi Maruful Islam: I see the 13th National Parliament, formed after the 12 February 2026 election, primarily as a legal and political bridge following the transition from a totalitarian or fully controlling system of governance. Politically, its significance lies in the fact that this parliament has initiated the process of giving legal legitimacy to the aspirations of the July 2024 mass uprising. Institutionally, after a long time, we are witnessing a pluralistic environment beyond one-party dominance.
However, an institutional culture of accountability has not yet developed within the parliament. Since a large number of MPs (members of parliament) are serving for the first time, shortcomings in parliamentary conduct are still evident in their behaviour. Unless the Rules of Procedure are enforced strictly and impartially, as well as the opposition’s active participation in parliamentary committees is ensured, parliament will merely become a centre of formal debate.
It is important to remember here that the strength of democracy does not depend solely on the number of how many opposition MPs or how many parties are represented in the parliament. It depends on the quality of debate, the ability to question the ruling party despite the weight of the majority, and a culture of respect for differing opinions.
There have been discussions in parliament on reforms and the July Charter. The positions of the ruling party and the opposition alliance on this are at opposite ends. In this context, how can a consensus be reached on reforms?
Kazi Maruful Islam: It is only natural that major political parties will have their own manifestos. We are seeing structural disagreements, or fault lines, among parties over issues such as a bicameral parliament and balancing the prime minister’s powers. But we must remember that in the 2026 referendum, 68 per cent of the country’s people voted in favour of the July Charter. Therefore, my clear position is that the July Charter is not the manifesto of any particular political party, rather it is a national pact written in the blood of the 2024 mass uprising. No single party has the right to ignore it.
To build consensus, the parliament now needs to function like a constituent assembly. Since the current constitution does not allow amendments to its basic structure, a special parliamentary committee could be formed from within the parliament in line with proportional representation through discussions to implement the July Charter. This committee would identify minimum common ground and possible solutions on fundamental issues among the parties. The ruling party is positive towards forming such a special committee. The opposition must also play a responsible role in this regard. We must remember that the democratic transformation of the state cannot be achieved through political obstinacy among the political parties.
How would you assess the first session of parliament overall? Where do you see its political and institutional significance?
Kazi Maruful Islam: In my view, the first session was the first, yet significant, step towards democratic transformation. Through this session, the process of giving legal legitimacy to the aspirations of the July 2024 mass uprising has been started. It was a major test for the country’s political parties — whether they could translate street movements into parliamentary language.
The willingness and discussions around assigning the post of deputy speaker and the leadership of important parliamentary committees to the opposition are extremely important for institutional balance. However, this significance will remain only if these committees can exercise genuine oversight over the bureaucracy rather than functioning merely as ‘rubber stamps’.
How do you assess the activities of the new government in the first three months? What do you consider its biggest success during this period? And in which areas have its weaknesses or limitations been most visible?
Kazi Maruful Islam: The biggest success, without question, has been ensuring a peaceful transition towards institutional democratic practice during an extremely fragile period. At the same time, gaining acceptance from the international community for Bangladesh’s new political journey is also a major achievement.
One of the defining successes of this government is its adherence to its election manifesto. We have seen the government take sincere initiatives to implement programmes such as the Family Card, Farmer Card and canal excavation schemes. I do not wish to comment on the success or necessity of these programmes — it is still too early for that. But what I do want to say is that people expect political parties to remain committed to fulfilling their electoral promises. In that regard, the government has acted quickly, which I see as positive.
However, it is true that while the government has succeeded in managing the political transition, it has been slow in structural reforms, economic management and day-to-day administration.
The primary weakness of this government is the lack of any notable progress in bringing the law and order situation fully under control. Brutal incidents, such as rape and murder, have occurred recently, and mob violence continues. Also, there are no visible significant measures to address bureaucratic inefficiency in market management or to curb the dominance of established market syndicates either.
The recent chaos surrounding fuel oil also demonstrates the absence of effective government control. Also, there appears to be a substantial gap between the government’s policy decisions and their implementation on the ground in suppressing the extortion and administrative chaos that emerged at the local level, exploiting the power vacuum during the interim government’s tenure.
How sincere do you think the government is in its efforts to curb political influence within the administration, law enforcement agencies, and state institutions?
Kazi Maruful Islam: Judging by the conduct and statements of the prime minister and high-level policymakers, it appears for now that there is goodwill and sincerity. But a state cannot function on goodwill alone — it needs institutional structures. At the field level, the old tendency of considering political loyalty in transfers and promotions has not yet completely disappeared. Unless there is fundamental reform of laws governing the police and civil service, and an independent merit-based institutional board is established, it will not be possible to reduce partisan influence through mere sincerity or good intentions.
What kind of positive or negative impact do you believe the government’s first three months have had on building public confidence?
Kazi Maruful Islam: When an elected government assumed office following the weak tenure of the interim administration, it initially brought a sense of relief to the public. But the possibility of that relief turning into lasting public confidence now risks fading again. While the restoration of freedom of expression and the end of the culture of fear have certainly made people optimistic, the general public does not concern itself with macro-level policies, they care about the price of daily essentials and their safety, both at home and in public. There is no denying that the law and order situation has dealt a negative blow to public confidence.
A series of rape incidents have taken place in the country, and in response there has been a growing tendency on social media towards a kind of mob justice or taking the law into one’s own hands. How do you assess this mob sentiment that bypasses the rule of law and the spread of hatred on social media?
Kazi Maruful Islam: This is a terrifying manifestation of the deepest crisis within our social and legal structures. We understand the reasons behind this intense public outrage—it stems from judicial delays and the undue influence of power. These factors have caused people to lose faith in the courts. But rendering the legal system ineffective can never be a solution.
We must understand that mob justice is not justice at all rather it is a violent advertisement of the failure of the institutional justice system. Put another way, it is a form of organised violence. Whenever we take the law into our own hands, we do not punish the criminal — instead, we turn the state itself into a criminal.
An agitated crowd does not care about evidence or legal procedures. As a result, an entirely innocent person can also become victims of digital lynching due to rumours or personal vendettas. We are seeing disturbing levels of slut-shaming and hate speech against women spreading on Facebook around rape incidents. This is deeply unfortunate and reflects a form of psychological distortion.
When, instead of placing the perpetrator in the dock, social media turns the victim woman’s clothing or lifestyle into the subject of public trial, it becomes clear that the criminal is not alone — society itself has mentally become complicit in the crime. Cyberbullying and mob justice divert people’s attention away from the central issue of the crime— the rape itself.
What is unfortunate is that our laws for combating digital crime are often used to suppress political dissent, yet we do not see the, enforced strictly enough to prevent this kind of hate speech and character assassination against women online.
Factually, we need to ask why such heinous crimes as rape are taking place in society; what changes within society are encouraging or emboldening people to commit such crimes. Taking the law into one’s own hands, or encouraging others to do so, effectively amounts to endorsing violence. Rape itself is an extreme form of violence. One form of violence fuels another and helps normalise it.
For now, a possible short-term solution would be to make the entire process — from investigation to verdict — more victim-friendly, while increasing both the number and capacity of judges in the Women and Children Repression Prevention Tribunals to reduce the backlog of cases.
How effectively has the government been able to address public concerns over commoidity prices, employment and the investment climate?
Kazi Maruful Islam: I would describe the current situation as a ‘stagflationary trap’ —a juncture of high inflation and slow growth. According to the latest 2026 forecasts by the ADB and IMF, Bangladesh’s GDP growth has fallen to around 4.7 per cent, while inflation remains above 9.04 per cent. Food inflation, in particular, has pushed the real income of ordinary people into negative territory.
How would you explain the current economic situation? Is the economy still in crisis, or is it gradually moving towards stability?
Kazi Maruful Islam: In my view, the economy is still in deep crisis. Although the central bank has adopted a contractionary monetary policy by raising interest rates, ordinary people are not seeing any benefit in the retail market because extortion and syndicates in the supply chain remain intact. The slow flow of credit to the private sector is preventing the creation of new jobs. Investors are still looking for a clear long-term political roadmap. As a result, a kind of stagnation has emerged in both domestic and foreign investment.
Among international economic pressure, debt-dependent development and internal policy weaknesses, which factors do you think are having the greatest impact on Bangladesh’s economy?
Kazi Maruful Islam: International pressures, the Ukraine war or the Middle East war are merely catalysts. The real damage, however, has been caused by internal policy weaknesses and the lack of institutional good governance. Bangladesh’s tax-to-GDP ratio is among the lowest in the world, at around 6.6 per cent. Yet we are losing huge amounts of revenue through tax exemptions. At the same time, the grace periods for foreign loans taken for mega projects in previous years have ended, meaning the burden of repaying both principal and interest is now pressing heavily on the country.
Let us turn briefly to the elections. What do you think could be the biggest challenges in ensuring that the local government elections scheduled for September-October this year is free and competitive? What lessons should the current government learn from the experience of past local government elections?
Kazi Maruful Islam: The greatest challenge is to thwart the old tendencies of muscle power, taking control of the polling grounds, and the establishment of single-party dominance at the local level. Following the victory of a major party in the parliamentary elections, naturally efforts can be seen among their local activists to seize control of the field. Some among them may even harbour the desire to be elected uncontested.
Past local elections have taught us that no matter how strong the Election Commission is at the centre, the elections will not be credible unless the local administration—specifically the DCs, SPs, or UNOs—maintains a completely neutral stance. The current government must learn from past experiences of politicisation and ensure that it does not provide an unfair advantage to any particular party in the local elections.
From the perspective of development studies, what are the greatest risks and opportunities currently facing Bangladesh’s development model?
Kazi Maruful Islam: From a development studies perspective, our primary risk is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few in the name of growth, alongside jobless growth. Therefore, my core observation is that Bangladesh must now break away from the so-called patchwork development model of crony capitalism.
Our sustainable future should not be measured by growth figures, but by strong, independent, and corruption-free institutional capacity. Opportunities will only arise when we can transform our vast youth population into human capital through institutional investment in AI, IT, freelancing, and smart technology-driven small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
The last question: what is your forecast for the political and economic situation over the coming year?
Kazi Maruful Islam: The next year will be extremely crucial for Bangladesh; it could be described as a ‘make-or-break period’. Politically, there will be intense bargaining and street-level pressure between the government and opposition camps in the parliament regarding the implementation of the July Charter and its legal reforms. If the government can conduct the local government elections in September–October in a completely fair and efficient manner, political stability will be long-lasting. Otherwise, political polarisation may turn violent again.
As for the economy, the pressure of inflation will persist for the general public over the next six months due to IMF reform proposals and strict fiscal policies. However, if strict governance can be ensured in the banking sector, defaulted loans are recovered, and visible progress is made in repatriating laundered money, the macroeconomy will gradually begin to stabilise towards the end of the year. The entire outcome depends on enhancing the capacity of our institutions.
Thank you for your time.
Kazi Maruful Islam: Thank you very much.