Opinion
Is Awami League’s current politics self-destructive, or an attempt to seek an opportunity?
More than two years after losing power, the Awami League has once again become a subject of public discussion because of its recent activities. Flash processions, the detonation of crude bombs, and the setting of buses on fire have all sparked considerable debate.
But can we really understand what the party is trying to achieve simply by looking at these incidents? Why has its style of politics taken this turn after governing the country for so many years? Rather than seeking definitive answers to these questions, let us try to understand these developments more deeply through several different hypotheses.
First hypothesis: Are old calculations still at play?
After spending fifteen and a half years in power, do Awami League leaders and activists still consider running the country their rightful role? Are they hoping to return by relying on their old connections with the administration, police, business community, and influential figures? Is there a calculation that creating instability could open up opportunities for bargaining?
Indonesia’s President Suharto stepped down in 1998 following mass protests, after ruling the country for 31 years. However, his Golkar Party remained in the country, maintained its organisational structure, and subsequently participated in elections. In Bangladesh, even after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 and, later, the killing of the four national leaders, other Awami League leaders, including Zohra Tajuddin, remained in the country and tried to rebuild the party.
Is the situation after 5 August 2024, similar to either of these two earlier episodes? Many Awami League leaders and activists, from the central leadership to the grassroots, including Sheikh Hasina herself, have left the country or gone into hiding.
Does the Awami League believe that if an opportunity arises to re-enter the political arena, it will be able to demonstrate its strength on the streets? But given its past record of repression, arrests, and obstructing elections against opposition parties while in power, would the BNP, Jamaat, and other political parties be willing to give it that opportunity?
Another question concerns the fact that, after being in power for so long, many people's personal interests became intertwined with the Awami League. Some benefited in business, others secured jobs or government contracts, while some wielded influence in their localities. Political scientists Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, in their edited volume Patrons, Clients and Policies, show how political relationships are built not only around ideology but also through the exchange of benefits and privileges. This phenomenon is known as clientelism.
So, are the Awami League's former beneficiaries working towards the party's future, or are they simply hoping to regain the influence they have lost?
Second hypothesis: Does the fracturing of the july alliance present an opportunity for Awami League?
In July–August 2024, various political forces united against Awami League. However, following the fall of the government, disagreements emerged among BNP, Jamaat, and NCP over elections, reforms, and the governance of the country. Some may be disappointed with BNP, others may be critical of Jamaat, while still others may be dissatisfied with the activities of NCP. These issues are also being discussed on television talk shows. Does the Awami League believe that these divisions are creating an opportunity for its political comeback?
But does criticism of other political parties necessarily indicate support for the Awami League? In political psychology, confirmation bias refers to the tendency to give greater weight to information that aligns with one's existing beliefs. Are Awami League leaders also interpreting these criticisms as signs that the party is poised for a comeback?
Could developments surrounding the history and culture of the Liberation War also be reinforcing these hopes? The Dhanmondi 32 residence was demolished, ink was thrown on a portrait of Rabindranath Tagore, and shrines and dargahs belonging to people of various religious faiths came under attack. Yet many people from these very communities had also supported the July uprising.
Recently, in Cumilla, NCP leaders and activists demolished a nameplate bearing the name of an heir at the residence of martyred Dhirendranath Datta. They argued that the house should be turned into a museum rather than sold. Will people angered by such incidents turn towards the Awami League? Or are loving history and culture and supporting the Awami League two entirely separate things?
Does the Awami League also have similar calculations regarding religious minorities? Following the change of government, attacks were carried out on their homes, businesses, and places of worship. However, is the party also taking into account the generally positive experiences of Hindus during the most recent Durga Puja and the growing ties between some Hindu organisations and the BNP? Does the Awami League believe that a breakdown in these relationships will bring Hindus back to its fold?
Yet Hindus also faced attacks and persecution during the Awami League's own tenure. Does having concerns about their security necessarily mean they will support the Awami League?
But even amid political divisions, have people forgotten the loss of life and the repression during the July uprising? According to a 2025 report by the United Nations Human Rights Office, approximately 1,400 people may have been killed between July 2024 and 15 August 2024. The report also documents serious human rights violations allegedly committed by the former government's security forces and groups affiliated with the Awami League.
Does the Awami League believe that these memories will fade with time? In political psychology, collective memory refers to the lasting impact of major events on a society's shared consciousness, which can also influence political decisions in the future. Does the party understand the enduring power of the memories of July?
Third hypothesis: Reliance on India, or an opportunity arising from global developments?
To what extent is reliance on India shaping the Awami League's current political strategy? The Sheikh Hasina government maintained close relations with India for many years. Do party leaders still believe that India will stand by them? A political party that believes it has powerful friends abroad may be willing to take significant risks. Has the Awami League received any new assurances, or is it moving forward on the strength of its longstanding relationship with India? Is it also taking India's own interests into consideration?
Meanwhile, global politics remains turbulent, with the war involving Iran, the crisis in the Middle East, and tensions among major powers. Are some within the Awami League thinking that, with the world's attention focused elsewhere, an opportunity has emerged to intensify political activities in Bangladesh? But does reduced international media coverage of Bangladesh necessarily mean that foreign governments are paying less attention to the country? They, too, have interests in Bangladesh's stability, security, and economy.
Can people still be intimidated by flash processions and crude bomb explosions? Does Awami League believe that people will be frightened simply by witnessing these activities?
The economic consequences of war are also affecting ordinary people. Oil prices and transportation costs have risen in international markets. Fuel prices have also been increased in Bangladesh, putting additional pressure on transportation, production, and the cost of essential commodities. In such circumstances, if people begin to feel that "things were better before," does the Awami League interpret this as a sign that public support for the party is returning? But are dissatisfaction over the cost of living, assessments of the previous government, and preferences about who should govern the country in the future really the same thing?
Fourth hypothesis: Overconfidence, or a misreading of reality?
How much accurate information about the situation in the country are Awami League leaders receiving since losing power? From abroad, they watch videos of the party's processions and read comments from supporters on Facebook. People around them may also be reporting only positive developments. All this could create the impression that better days are returning for the party. But are the leaders hearing the views of those who remain silent?
In psychology, there is a concept known as an echo chamber. Simply put, it means repeatedly hearing opinions that reinforce one's existing preferences. Psychologist Irving Janis, through his work on groupthink, demonstrated how, when everyone in a group tries to maintain consensus, dissenting opinions and warnings about potential dangers tend to be overlooked. This can lead to a distorted perception of one's own strength.
Has Awami League's leadership now reached a point where it places greater trust in the opinions of its own supporters?
Moreover, not all Awami League leaders and activists have the same objectives. Some want to pursue politics based on the ideals of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, some want to keep the party alive, while others want to retain their leadership positions in their localities. Banners at the party's flash processions also feature photographs of local leaders alongside Sheikh Hasina. Are these individuals working for the party, or are they trying to prevent someone else from taking their place?
In political science, the principal-agent problem refers to situations in which the interests of central leadership and grassroots activists do not always align. So, are these processions being organised at the direction of the central leadership, or are local leaders simply trying to preserve their own positions? Do leaders living abroad understand this distinction?
Fifth hypothesis: How far can politics of power display go?
Political scientists Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, in their research on The Strategies of Terrorism, have shown how an organisation can use violence to demonstrate its strength and put pressure on a government. Sending such a message by taking significant risks is known as costly signalling. They also describe as provocation the strategy of attempting to provoke a government into harsh repression in order to gain public sympathy.
Could similar calculations be behind the Awami League's flash processions, crude bomb explosions, and arson attacks? Are they trying to intimidate the government, embolden their own activists, or convey the message that it is difficult to conduct the country's politics without them?
But after witnessing the bloodshed of July-August 2024 and the deaths of so many people, including children and adolescents, can people still be intimidated by flash processions and crude bomb explosions? Does Awami League believe that people will be frightened simply by witnessing these activities? Or is the party failing to take into account how much public sentiment has changed since the mass uprising?
In politics, people often regard violence committed by their own party as an act of courage, while condemning the same actions when committed by their opponents as criminal. In their book Radical American Partisanship, American political scientists Nathan Kalmoe and Lilliana Mason demonstrate how blind loyalty to one's political party can fuel hatred towards political opponents and increase support for violence.
Another American political scientist, Sean Westwood, and his fellow researchers, in their study Correcting Misperceptions of Political Violence, show that actual public support for political violence may be considerably lower than people perceive it to be. So, even if a party activist considers detonating a crude bomb an act of courage, would that same person accept killing people by setting a bus on fire?
However, violence can also produce the opposite of its intended effect. In 1998, a bombing by the Real IRA, an armed separatist organisation in Northern Ireland, killed 29 people. Among the victims were a pregnant woman and her unborn twins. The attack triggered widespread public outrage. What would happen in Bangladesh if ordinary people were killed in crude bomb explosions or in fires set to police vehicles or buses?
The Awami League has been promoting a narrative that hundreds of police officers were killed at the hands of participants in the July uprising. If police officers are killed through the party's own acts of violence, would that not undermine the credibility of this narrative? Similarly, would it not call into question the party's longstanding allegations that the BNP and Jamaat were responsible for setting buses on fire in 2013–15? In trying to demonstrate its strength, could the party end up weakening its own position?
The final word
In politics, the consequences of miscalculation are not borne by political leaders alone; ordinary people also pay the price. Does Awami League understand that the path it sees as a route back to power could, in fact, become an even greater obstacle to its return?
* Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder is a teacher and researcher in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at North South University
* The views expressed here are the author's own
* This article appeared in Prothom Alo online and has been translated into English by Ayesha Kabir for Prothom Alo English Online
