China, India and US: Bangladesh's geopolitical risks

A question frequently arises regarding Bangladesh's foreign policy: Will the country lean more toward India, China, the United States, or some other power? While the question is intriguing, it is not particularly useful for governance. This is because modern international relations are built on specific exchanges of mutual interest, rather than permanent allegiance.

A single state can be a security partner with one country, a technology partner with another, a trade partner with a third, and a labour market partner with a fourth. Bangladesh now needs to create a map of partnership based on needs instead of choosing friends.

This necessity has become even more urgent. Bangladesh is set to graduate from the list of least developed countries on 24 November 2026. This graduation is prestigious but could also change certain trade benefits, special market access, and types of international aid.

The country's exports remain overly dependent on a few markets and garments. In 2025, about 94 per cent of the European Union's imports from Bangladesh were textile products, amounting to 23. 3 billion euros in goods trade. Therefore, in the next stage of Bangladesh's diplomacy, it is crucial to have measurable outcomes in terms of market acquisition, skills, technology, mobility, and knowledge.

Bangladesh's priority is India, which is not an emotional decision but a geographic necessity. Almost the entire land border of Bangladesh is surrounded by India; in terms of rivers, borders, electricity, roads, railways, seaports, the communication in Northeast India, and Bangladesh's access to Nepal-Bhutan, India is indispensable.

However, relations do not mean unilateral dependency. Bangladesh's goal should be to establish a structure with India where the benefits of cooperation are visible and mutual. Priorities could include managing the shared river waters, stopping civilian fatalities at the borders, rail and water connections, electricity and energy trade, easing of medical and education visas, and reducing tariff barriers in the Indian market against Bangladesh.

Only about 5 per cent of South Asia's total trade is intra-regional, yet according to the World Bank, the current $23 billion regional trade could reach at least $67 billion. There is also great potential to multiply Bangladesh’s exports to India. Hence, the relationship with India should be measured not merely by political closeness among governments but by the achieved results in market, water, border, and communication.

Japan is possibly the least controversial and most highly promising strategic partner for Bangladesh. For a long time, Japan has been a significant collaborator in infrastructure, development-financing, transportation, education, and human resource development of Bangladesh. In 2025, Japan announced an aid package of around $1.06 billion for budget support, rail modernisation, scholarships, among others.

However, relationships should not be confined to bridges, ports, or loans alone. Bangladesh’s next partnership with Japan should be focused on industrial technology, quality production, engineering education, healthcare, renewable energy, urban management, and developing skilled caregivers for the aged population. Japan’s labour shortage is an opportunity for Bangladesh, but not according to the old model of sending unskilled labourers. A joint system for language training, professional certification, behavioural training, and skill assessment before employment needs to be developed.

The same strategy is required for South Korea. Korea employs Bangladeshi workers, but the relationship’s potential is much greater than the labour market. Joint training centres can be established in electronics, shipbuilding, automated manufacturing, batteries, information technology, and technical education. Big Korean firms should not only be attracted to sell products in Bangladesh’s market but also to build production, research, and supply systems within Bangladesh.

The European union is one of Bangladesh’s major export markets. However, Bangladesh's Europe-policy has long been centered around garment tariff benefits. The relationship must be built on a new foundation after its graduation from the list of least developed countries.

Sector-specific partnerships need to be established with Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. Engineering, green industries, and technical training with Germany; water management, delta planning, and agricultural technology with the Netherlands; aviation, satellites, marine research, and culture with France; legal regular labour mobility and small industries with Italy; cooperation in renewable energy, digital governance, and social security with Nordic countries can be increased.

Bangladesh’s main goal with Europe should be to create a sustainable trade system where labour rights, environmental standards, carbon emissions, supply chain transparency, and product source identification are present. If Europe is seen only as a buyer, Bangladesh will remain confined to cheap labour; if made a partner in technology, design, research, and branding, it can climb the value chain.

The movement of students and researchers should also be central to this relationship. Long-term institutional partnerships should be built in joint degrees, laboratories, climate research, public health, artificial intelligence, and migration research. Visa facilitation is needed not just for tourists; separate movement arrangements are required for researchers, teachers, industry trainees, and young entrepreneurs.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait are extremely important for Bangladesh’s foreign employment and expatriate income. Expatriate remittances are one of the mainstays of economic stability for Bangladesh; in various months of the fiscal year 2025-26, monthly expatriate income was over 2-3 billion dollars.

However, Gulf relations are still largely limited to sending labourers, buying fuel, and religious connections. This model needs changing. Gulf countries are investing in sectors like tourism, healthcare, artificial intelligence, construction technology, food security, aviation, and financial services, moving away from oil-dependent economies. Bangladesh should develop skills partnerships with them—creating joint training and certification centres in Bangladesh according to specific occupational needs.

At the same time, Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari investments in Bangladesh in ports, transportation, food processing, healthcare, tourism, and renewable energy can be attracted. Gulf states have a food security need; Bangladesh needs capital and technology in its agriculture and food processing sectors. Instead of merely contractual farming, a system of joint ownership, processing, and export can be built. Most crucially, state-level negotiations on minimum wages, recruitment costs, compensation, social security, and job change rights for workers are essential. The success isn’t about sending more workers but ensuring they don’t go in debt, insecure, or unskilled conditions.

While Bangladesh is a South Asian country, a significant portion of its economic future lies in Southeast Asia. Therefore, relations with Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam should be prioritised.

Singapore can be a partner in financial services, port management, urban planning, technological initiatives, and international arbitration. With Malaysia, aside from labour market collaboration, cooperation in higher education, halal economy, electronics, and healthcare is possible.

Pharmaceutical, agriculture, Muslim consumer market, defence industry, and marine cooperation with Indonesia can be enhanced. Opportunities to learn from Thailand in medicine, tourism, food processing, and Bay of Bengal communications; and from Vietnam in export-oriented industry policy, electronics, agricultural productivity, and supply chain exist.

ASEAN has shown that effective cooperation in economy and communication is possible despite political system differences. Where intra-regional trade in South Asia is about 5 per cent, it is about 25 per cent in ASEAN. Therefore, Bangladesh must forge sector-based agreements, business visas, direct flight and shipping routes, and a university network with ASEAN. The Rohingya crisis with Myanmar will complicate this east-facing policy, though the relationship with the entire Southeast Asia should not be held hostage by one country's actions.

China is an important source of imports, infrastructure partner, supplier of manufacturing machinery, and a significant strategic power for Bangladesh. Bangladeshi priorities with China should be focused on reducing trade deficits, market access for Bangladeshi products, production relocation, technology, renewal energy, and reliable supply of industrial raw materials. Joint investment and export-oriented production should be prioritised over loan-dependent projects.

The United States is one of Bangladesh’s key export markets and a significant centre for higher education, research, technology, health, and expatriate networks. According to export data, the US was Bangladesh’s largest single export destination in the fiscal year 2024-25. Bangladesh’s relationship with the US should not only be confined to discussions about elections, sanctions, or security, but be directed towards market access, cotton and textile supply chains, technology investment, university research, pharmaceuticals, and knowledge and capital transfer from expatriate Bangladeshis.

The issue is that in the US-China rivalry and India-China disputes, one relationship may seem suspicious to the other. The solution is not secretive balance, but declared transparency. Bangladesh needs to express openly which project with whom, why, under what economic evaluation, and on what terms it is being undertaken. Parliamentary review, loan risk analysis, and open tenders in matters of defence, ports, or significant infrastructure could reduce suspicion.

A deep relationship with one country can concern another. Excess Chinese strategic presence is India's concern; leaning towards the US’s security framework is China’s problem; human rights and labour standards are significant to Western countries; the Muslim world watches Bangladesh’s stance on issues like Palestine.

The effective path to avoiding these risks is not to repeatedly state ‘friendship with all’; rather, to keep relationships issue-based. For example, industry and infrastructure with China, quality development with Japan, markets, and technology with the US, connectivity and water with India, green exports with Europe, labour and investment with the Gulf, and production and regional linkage with ASEAN.

Secondly, no state should be allowed to be Bangladesh’s sole gateway. Energy, arms, loans, imports, exports, and labour market—each needs to have multiple alternatives. Thirdly, bilateral agreements should rely on institutions instead of personal political relations. Agreements that stand even if the government changes make sustainable diplomacy.

Bangladesh does not need many friends; there is a need for such partners whose relationships yield tangible benefits in the lives of citizens—creating more jobs, easing visas, creating education opportunities, bringing technology, diversifying exports, and increasing the state's bargaining power. Although the world is now divided into camps of loyalty, successful nations do not deposit their futures in just one camp.

Therefore, the next principle of Bangladesh’s foreign policy could be—neighbourly in geography, multidimensional in the economy, ambitious in technology, and transparent in diplomacy. The depth of relationships should not be measured by photos, visits, or joint statements, but by how many new markets opened, how many skilled workers got honourable jobs, how much research was generated, how many students got opportunities for mobility, and how effective the passport became in general citizens' lives.

#AKM Ahsan Ullah is Professor, International, Security, and Migration, University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei

*The opinions expressed here are the author's own.

#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam