The recent activities demanding a ban on Jatiya Party naturally raise the question: more than a year after Sheikh Hasina’s fall and escape, has it suddenly seemed to some of us that the party acted as a collaborator in keeping her illegally in power? Those who took to the streets demanding that Awami League be banned could have, at the same time, called for banning Jatiya Party and other collaborators as part of the same "package," couldn't they? So why has the demand to ban Jatiya Party suddenly become so intense after all this time?
Whether or not Jatiya Party will actually be banned is still uncertain. But this issue has now become a pawn in the politics of the present and the game of the upcoming election. So instead of focusing on the pawn, it's more important to discuss and understand the nature of the "game" itself.
Due to the long period of brutal authoritarian rule that literally brought the country to the brink of destruction, there was understandable public anger toward the Awami League. Political parties shared this anger as well.
There's no doubt that this frustration played a role in the move to ban Awami League. However, the issue is not that simple. I believe there was also a clear political calculation behind it. The same kind of calculation is now driving the demand to ban Jatiya Party.
There is no doubt that the Jatiya Party played a significant role in enabling and sustaining the Awami League’s misrule in Bangladesh.
A roadmap for the election has been announced for February. Apart from the BNP and its like-minded allies, no one else has welcomed this roadmap. Jamaat-e-Islami’s Nayeb-e-Ameer, Abdullah Mohammad Taher, has called it a “blueprint to derail a fair election.” Needless to say, this stance from Jamaat is not at all unexpected to those who closely follow the country’s political landscape.
The question now is: will Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP be able to win as many seats in the upcoming election as they are expecting? If they cannot — if the number of seats they win doesn’t even come close to the artificially generated “hype” — then the future of both parties in politics will be seriously called into question. It is likely from this perspective that the push to ban Jatiya Party has gained renewed momentum.
While Jamaat, the NCP, and Islami Andolan have tried to project a positive stance regarding the election, their various conditions have created uncertainty. Their demands include reforms, justice, improvements in law and order, implementation of the July Charter, drafting a new constitution through Constituent Assembly elections, and, more recently, an unusual demand to hold the upcoming parliamentary election under a proportional representation system. They have even issued threats to boycott or resist the election if these demands are not met.
If there are legitimate concerns about the neutrality of the government overseeing the election, and if that government has an agenda to bring a particular party to power, then — and only then — would it be justifiable for political parties to abstain from participating. Therefore, setting ever-changing conditions for participating in the election signals that those making the demands are not entirely comfortable with the idea of an election in February.
Although the Awami League has not been banned as a political party, restrictions on its political activities have made it almost certain that it will not be able to participate in the upcoming parliamentary election. As a result, based on past election experiences, many initially assumed that Jamaat-e-Islami would emerge as the second major political force — even though it still lags far behind the BNP, which enjoys the highest level of public support.
Had Jamaat been able to accept this reality of being “far behind,” it wouldn’t have posed a problem. However, in the period following 5 August, the party may have briefly believed it had gained significant public support and would win many more seats in the election. This perception may have been fueled by the noise and activity of Jamaat and Shibir activists on social media, which not only influenced the party itself but also created misconceptions among some citizens regarding Jamaat’s actual support base.
If the election is held in the first half of February, the Nationalist Citizen Party (NCP) will not even be one year old. Yet, due to the presence of several prominent faces from the popular uprising in its ranks — and because the interim government (including the Chief Adviser) has given the party special attention — the NCP has received considerable media coverage in a very short time. Beyond that, from the beginning, it has sought to present itself as a major political player by setting up offices in expensive commercial buildings and launching itself with a flashy debut.
The question now is: will Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP be able to win as many seats in the upcoming election as they are expecting? If they cannot — if the number of seats they win doesn’t even come close to the artificially generated “hype” — then the future of both parties in politics will be seriously called into question. It is likely from this perspective that the push to ban Jatiya Party has gained renewed momentum.
To political observers and analysts, it is fairly clear that if Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP are to win a significant number of seats, they will have to reach a major seat-sharing agreement with the BNP in some form. The question is, why would the BNP, facing no major electoral challenge and seemingly headed for a sweeping victory, agree to a large-scale seat-sharing deal?
In the absence of Awami League, Jatiya Party — apart from Jamaat and the NCP — still has organisational strength. In terms of public support as well, it remains a notable political force. Jatiya Party candidates are already in place, and there is speculation that in Awami League-dominated constituencies, many Awami League supporters might contest the election under the Jatiya Party’s banner.
If Awami League’s votes are combined with its own voter base, Jatiya Party has the potential to perform better in the election than it initially expected. In that case, Jamaat’s prospects — even its chance of becoming the second-largest party — would face a serious threat. More importantly, even if parties like Jamaat, NCP, and Islami Andolan decide not to contest the election, Jatiya Party would still remain in the field as a significant contender against BNP.
If Jamaat, NCP, and Islami Andolan fail to reach a reasonable understanding with the BNP through normal negotiations (and reports suggest that such talks have broken down), then these parties are likely to take a confrontational stance toward the BNP. If Jatiya Party is banned and these parties also boycott the election, then apart from BNP and its allies, no other major players would remain in the race. In that context, serious questions would inevitably arise about whether the election will take place at all — and if it does, whether it will be seen as legitimate.
Trying to extract political concessions from a major party by applying pressure is not necessarily problematic. In the political culture of our region, such practices are quite common.
But there remains a concern: could all of these actions be part of an attempt to sabotage the upcoming election? If the February election is derailed, regardless of what happens to the country, certain parties and individuals undoubtedly stand to benefit significantly.
Bangladesh now stands at a critical turning point in its history. Compared to other countries that experienced similar uprisings — such as those during the "Arab Spring" — Bangladesh has, until now, remained relatively stable in the post-uprising period. Despite criticisms of the government's various failures, it had appeared that the country was moving toward a credible election. However, a deliberate effort to destabilise the situation is increasingly coming into view. Both internal and foreign forces seem to be actively working to push Bangladesh into uncertainty by disrupting the election and creating instability.
Whether the election takes place on time will determine not only whether the country returns to a democratic path, but also its overall security. Those trying to sabotage or at least delay the election by placing various conditions are creating a serious threat to the security of the state and the nation.
After 15 years of disastrous misrule, we must now begin a long journey to restore democracy in this country — a journey that ensures economic liberation for the people, the protection of human rights, justice, and good governance. For that to happen, the 13th parliamentary election must be held in the first half of February — or even earlier, if possible.
*Zahed Ur Rahman is university teacher and political analyst
*The opinions expressed are the author’s own