In Bangladesh's policy circles, developing vibrant secondary financial markets has been a familiar talking point for some time. Yet, year after year, meaningful market reforms stay near the bottom of the economic agenda. The reason is clear. We often praise the general idea of secondary markets, but we rarely explain the real, everyday damage caused by their absence. When weak trading is seen merely as a minor headache for brokers rather than a major drag on national growth, the urgency to act disappears.
Across Bangladesh's fixed income, currency, and equity markets, we have built entry gates without exits. This lack of easy buying and selling acts as a silent tax on the entire economy. When secondary trading is thin, financial risks cannot be properly priced, hedged, or shared with investors who are willing to carry them. Instead, those risks stay trapped on the balance sheets of commercial banks and local companies.
Without a reliable bond market, banks take on dangerous timing mismatches between short-term deposits and long-term loans. Without active currency forward markets, businesses raise their prices to protect themselves against sudden exchange rate swings. Without deep stock markets, institutional investors stay away, and poor corporate management goes unpunished. At the same time, foreign direct and portfolio investors hesitate to commit capital, and regulators are left flying blind. Until we treat market liquidity as basic economic infrastructure, borrowing costs will remain high and our banking system will stay overburdened.
Fixed income: Loans dressed up as bonds
Consider the fixed-income market first. We often complain about our underdeveloped capital market, yet we eagerly celebrate the oversubscription of new corporate bonds and sukuk issues. Almost nobody pauses to ask who bought those bonds or whether they will ever trade. In reality, commercial banks buy the vast majority of these issues and lock them away until maturity. A bond that never trades in the secondary market is simply a bank loan in disguise. It does nothing to share risk outside the banking system or create a live market price for credit.
Today, Bangladesh's financial system still relies on commercial banks for roughly 80 per cent of all debt financing. Corporate bonds make up less than one-tenth of one per cent of gross domestic product, and secondary trading in corporate debt is almost non-existent. Even in government securities, where trading on Bangladesh Bank's electronic platform has grown, the market still lacks a continuous, reliable benchmark for long-term interest rates.
This gap creates serious problems for both borrowers and lenders. Suppose a mid-sized Bangladeshi manufacturer wants to build a factory that will take seven to ten years to pay off. The company cannot easily raise money by selling a ten-year fixed-rate bond to broad public investors. Large non-bank institutions, such as insurance companies and pension funds, refuse to buy long-term bonds that they cannot easily sell before maturity. As a result, the manufacturer must rely on bank financing whose interest rates change every six to twelve months. This leaves long-term business investments exposed to sudden interest rate hikes.
At the same time, commercial banks face a dangerous mismatch. Around 70 per cent of bank deposits mature within a single year, yet banks use these short-term funds to finance multi-year factory and infrastructure projects. Because banks cannot easily sell these loans or package them into tradable securities, they must hold every loan until it is paid off. When interest rates rise or the economy slows down, bank profit margins shrink rapidly. Worse, banks remain stuck with bad loans because there is no secondary market where distressed debt can be sold at a discount to specialized buyers.
Currencies: Hedging paralysis and higher prices
A similar bottleneck holds back our foreign exchange market. Bangladesh Bank has taken positive steps toward a more market-based exchange rate system. However, daily trading between banks is still concentrated in immediate spot deals and very short-term swaps. Longer-term forward contracts and currency hedging tools remain rare. Because commercial banks lack a deep secondary market to offset forward dollar commitments, they either refuse to offer forward contracts to mid-sized businesses or charge very high fees for them.
This inability to lock in future exchange rates directly fuels inflation and hurts exporters. An importer bringing in wheat, fertilizer, or industrial raw materials on a 90-day payment term cannot secure a fixed exchange rate in advance. To protect against a sudden drop in the Taka, the importer adds a large safety cushion to its local selling price. Ordinary consumers end up paying this hidden tax at the market.
Garment exporters face a similar squeeze. Many global buyers now take 90 to 120 days to pay for shipments. Traditional methods of matching export earnings against import bills no longer cover this time gap. Thin profit margins are left exposed to sudden currency swings. Furthermore, when dollar supplies tighten, the lack of continuous two-way trading encourages banks to hoard whatever dollars they hold. This widens the gap between buying and selling rates and delays international trade payments.
Equities: Trapped capital and weak governance
In the stock market, low liquidity harms both business innovation and corporate discipline. A strong stock exchange gives early-stage investors a reliable way to sell their shares once a company grows. Yet daily trading on the Dhaka Stock Exchange is often sluggish. Past regulatory measures, such as prolonged artificial floor prices that froze trading, are still fresh in investors' minds. Because of this, listing on the stock exchange no longer guarantees a smooth exit.
Global venture capital and private equity funds looking at promising Bangladeshi technology or logistics startups see this exit problem clearly. They either demand steep discounts on company valuations or insist that founders register their holding companies in Singapore or the United States before investing growth capital. Meanwhile, well-run local conglomerates avoid listing on the stock exchange altogether. They know that a market driven mostly by short-term retail speculation will not reward steady, long-term profit growth. As a result, top companies stay private, leaving public investors with fewer quality stocks to choose from.
Shallow trading also weakens corporate governance. In deep stock markets, large institutional funds hold company directors accountable. When a company mismanages money or ignores minority shareholders, institutional investors sell their shares in large numbers. This drives down the stock price, makes future borrowing more expensive, and puts pressure on company leadership to change.
In Dhaka, thin order books make it nearly impossible for a large fund to buy or sell a major stake without crashing the price against itself. Rather than getting trapped in stocks they cannot sell, institutional investors park their money in safe government treasury bills. Company sponsors face little market pressure to improve governance, and minority shareholders remain stranded.
Foreign capital: Why global investors stay on the sidelines
Weak secondary markets also explain why Bangladesh struggles to attract foreign portfolio investment and high-value foreign direct investment. Global asset managers evaluating emerging markets look closely at exit liquidity before investing a single dollar. Foreign portfolio investors need to know they can enter large positions in local stocks or government bonds, hedge their Taka exposure through liquid currency forwards, and repatriate funds smoothly without moving prices against themselves. When daily turnover is thin and currency hedging is unavailable, global funds simply exclude the market from their portfolios.
Foreign direct investors care about secondary market depth just as much. Multinational companies building factories, energy projects, or logistics hubs rarely fund their entire operations with foreign equity alone. They rely on local bond markets to raise long-term Taka debt, active currency markets to hedge imported machinery and dividend repatriations, and a credible stock exchange to list local subsidiaries over time. Without these secondary market supports, foreign direct investors face higher financing costs and trapped currency risk, driving them toward regional peers with deeper financial plumbing.
Regulators flying blind
Most critically, weak secondary markets leave financial regulators and policymakers flying blind. In mature economies, active secondary trading performs two vital public functions: real-time signaling and broad risk sharing. Continuous price movements in government bonds, corporate debt, and currency forward contracts act like a live dashboard. They warn officials about rising inflation expectations, cash shortages, or business stress long before those problems appear in monthly government statistics. Without these live market signals, central bankers and regulators must rely on outdated reports. As a result, policy decisions, such as interest rate changes or currency adjustments, often arrive too late, strike too early, or miss the true scale of the problem.
Equally damaging is the breakdown of risk sharing and market oversight. Deep secondary markets work like shock absorbers. They spread interest rate, currency, and credit risks across thousands of different investors, including insurers, pension funds, mutual funds, and foreign institutions. This broad participation also strengthens regulatory enforcement. In thin, fragmented markets, small groups can easily manipulate prices or trade on inside information without being noticed.
Until capital can exit our financial markets as easily as it enters, Bangladesh's financial system will remain a bottleneck rather than an engine for the next stage of economic growth
When risk is shared across a deep, transparent secondary market, abnormal price swings stand out immediately, helping regulators detect manipulation, curb insider trading, and enforce superior market governance. Without that depth, risk stays concentrated inside commercial banks, trapping authorities in a reactive cycle of emergency bailouts, loan forbearance, and blunt price controls that damage market trust even further.
The path to deeper, more resilient markets
Moving beyond empty slogans requires treating market liquidity as essential national infrastructure, just like ports, highways, and power grids. Policymakers and regulators must deliver five specific reforms.
First, authorities must modernize market technology and settlement plumbing. High transaction costs, fragmented platforms, and manual paperwork discourage frequent trading. Bangladesh needs unified, automated electronic order-matching platforms connected to central clearing counterparties and straight-through processing. Automating trade execution, custody, and settlement will lower transaction fees, speed up cash transfers, and give regulators real-time surveillance tools to flag insider trading and price manipulation automatically.
Second, regulators must permanently abandon artificial price controls. Floor prices on stocks and rigid caps on interest rates or exchange rates destroy market trust. Buyers and sellers must be allowed to discover true market-clearing prices without fearing that regulators will suddenly freeze their ability to exit.
Third, Bangladesh Bank should enforce genuine two-way market making. Licensed primary dealers in government bonds and authorized dealer banks in foreign exchange must be required to quote continuous, binding buy and sell prices throughout the trading day. To make this workable, the central bank should provide these market makers with dedicated short-term repo funding and clear hedging facilities.
Fourth, the government must remove tax and regulatory penalties on corporate bonds. Currently, high stamp duties, registration fees, and slow approval timelines make issuing a corporate bond far costlier and slower than taking a bank loan. Regulators should introduce fast-track shelf registration for credit-rated companies and give bond interest the same tax treatment as bank deposits.
Fifth, policy reforms must unlock long-term domestic savings alongside seamless foreign participation. Insurance companies, provident funds, and pension schemes hold vast pools of patient money, yet outdated investment rules restrict them mostly to fixed bank deposits and government savings certificates. Updating these rules, establishing an independent daily bond pricing agency, and simplifying custodial and currency repatriation rules for foreign funds will bring steady institutional depth to our markets.
Until capital can exit our financial markets as easily as it enters, Bangladesh's financial system will remain a bottleneck rather than an engine for the next stage of economic growth.
* Sajed ul Islam is a senior banking executive and financial markets specialist with three decades of global institutional experience across treasury, capital markets, and corporate governance.
