A battle for centrist and right-wing votes

The country has entered an election atmosphere. However, just before this phase, Bangladesh has witnessed several grave, significant, and far-reaching developments. The impact of these events is likely to extend not only to the upcoming election but much further beyond.

At various times, the activities of an overt and covert anti-election force have been felt. Immediately after the election schedule was announced, Sharif Osman Hadi—convener of Inqilab Moncho and a potential parliamentary candidate—fell victim to what can be described as a planned assassination. His killing has enraged the people of the country. There is scope to view this incident as an anti-election act, as such events create a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the electoral process in the public mind. Conversely, hundreds of thousands of people spontaneously gathered at Shahid Hadi’s funeral to express their respect and support for him.

At the same time, capitalising on this tragic incident, attacks and arson were carried out against media outlets such as Prothom Alo and The Daily Star. There are strong grounds to also consider these incidents anti-election in nature. Such violence ahead of an election points to the government’s failure to maintain law and order. There is a direct link between a peaceful environment, effective law enforcement, and the possibility of holding a free and fair election.

2.
Political polarisation has intensified in the run-up to the election. The NCP, a party formed by students who led the mass uprising, is contesting the election in alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami. Politically, this move is more than a routine electoral arrangement, as it has clarified NCP’s ideological position. Those who were curious about the party’s political orientation now have their answer.

NCP’s stance can be seen as a journey toward its “true destination.” Many of the party’s key leaders had already, in various ways, clarified their ideological positions. Moreover, it is widely discussed that Jamaat assisted NCP in organisational matters—particularly in rapidly forming committees nationwide to secure Election Commission registration and in providing manpower for NCP’s rallies and public meetings.

By ultimately choosing what it considers the “right destination,” NCP has also removed internal confusion. Those associated with the party’s weak left-leaning or centrist tendencies, or those dissatisfied with NCP’s stance on women’s issues, have already become inactive or have publicly resigned. This trend continues. As a result, NCP may become ideologically “purified” into a fully right-wing party.

What NCP will gain electorally from joining Jamaat’s alliance—at least in terms of securing seats—will only be clear after the election results. Politically, however, there is little doubt that it has lost the trust of a centrist and opinion-shaping segment of society.

3.
Historically regarded as an anti-independence force in Bangladeshi politics, Jamaat-e-Islami has advanced its political journey through alliances and movements alongside both the Awami League and the BNP. It has even been a governing partner in coalition with the BNP. Yet, Jamaat is arguably experiencing the most favourable phase of its political history at present. It has been largely successful in attempting to obscure its anti-Bangladesh stance and actions of 1971 through the mass uprising of ’24. Bringing NCP into its electoral alliance can be seen as a significant addition to that success.

There is little doubt that by aligning with NCP, Jamaat has moved further toward rehabilitating its image, long burdened by a historical crisis of legitimacy in Bangladeshi politics. In the same vein, its success in bringing the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Bir Bikram freedom fighter retired Colonel Oli, into its fold is also notable.

It appears that Jamaat is expanding its umbrella beyond Islamist groups to include a wider range of political forces. How much of a challenge this broader alliance can pose to the BNP is now the key question.

4.
The return of BNP Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman to the country after 17 years in exile could have been considered the most discussed political event of this period. His return on 25 December and his declaration before a gathering of hundreds of thousands—“I have a plan” or “we have a plan”—will be remembered as a historic moment in the country’s politics. However, the death of party chairperson Khaleda Zia, and the unprecedented public turnout at her funeral, along with the level of respect shown to her across party lines, overshadowed everything else.

The unexpected sequence of emotions and events following Tarique Rahman’s return and Khaleda Zia’s death has significantly pushed the BNP ahead in the electoral arena. Confidence within the BNP about a sweeping victory has grown, and this perception is also gaining strength among the public. Those who hold—or held—different assumptions about the election outcome may now need to recalculate.

However, confidence in a major victory often collapses at the ballot box. The 1991 election serves as an example: amid widespread claims that the Awami League had already won and would form the government, it was the BNP that ultimately emerged victorious.

After remaining out of power for a long time, the BNP has adopted a cautious political approach since the July mass uprising. Given where national politics currently stands, this strategy appears to have worked. Moreover, in the post-uprising political space without the Awami League, the BNP has sought to position itself as a centrist force, although the presence and influence of right-leaning elements within the party cannot be denied.

5.
How each political force would govern if it comes to power—how much good governance it would ensure, and what it would do to guarantee citizens’ rights and services—is one consideration. But in ideological terms, the main contest in the upcoming election will be between centrist and right-wing forces. This is because no significant left or center-left force is effectively in the race as a political power in this election. Voters will likely have to choose between these two sides.

Another major question is where the votes of supporters of the Awami League, whose activities are now banned, will go. Will they choose the “lesser evil” based on political calculation, or will they opt for a “negative” vote? Compared to any previous election, the realities and calculations this time are entirely different.

What is conventionally understood as an election has not truly taken place since 2008. As a result, there is no updated data reflecting public support for political parties based on election outcomes. Data from 17 years ago can no longer be relied upon either. In the meantime, many new voters have emerged who have never cast a ballot before. The country has passed through a period of repressive authoritarian rule.

In 2018, school students shook the foundations of that regime through the Safe Roads Movement. It can be said that, in continuity with that, the mass uprising of ’24—led by students and young people—was successful. This uprising has brought forth a new generation whose thinking and mindset are unfamiliar to many of us. Do we know, or can we reasonably predict, which way their votes will go? Are those calculating electoral outcomes taking this reality into account?

At the outset, I noted that the country has entered an election atmosphere. At the same time, I also pointed out that the activities of an overt and covert anti-election force have been felt at various times. The question now is whether that force has become completely inactive.

#AKM Zakaria is Deputy Editor, Prothom Alo
[email protected]

*The views expressed are the author’s own.

*This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam