What Bangladesh for a successful deal on Ganges water sharing

From a natural perspective, the most logical demand for Bangladesh regarding the Ganges Agreement would be the removal of the Farakka Barrage. To many in Bangladesh, this might seem like an impossible demand, but not to many in India itself.

Discontent among the public in India regarding the Farakka Barrage is increasing day by day. Firstly, the barrage has not maintained Kolkata as a seaport. Secondly, the barrage has resulted in upstream siltation, increased riverbed elevation causing floods, and riverbank erosion.

Due to these reasons, a strong movement demanding the removal of the Farakka dam was developed in India under the leadership of former Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar. In 2016, during the 11th Inter-State Council meeting of India, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and attended by all central government ministers and state chief ministers, Nitish Kumar announced that the Farakka Dam has done more harm than good.

Therefore, he demanded the removal of the barrage to ensure unhindered flow throughout the Ganges River.

To draw attention to the ill effects of the Farakka Dam in India, Nitish Kumar organised a two-day conference titled ''Continuous Ganga'' on 25-26 February 2017. Many renowned river researchers and activists in India attended this conference and identified the obstruction of the river flow and consequent siltation due to the Farakka and other dams as the main problem of the Ganges River.

Rajendra Singh, known as the ''Waterman of India,'' called the Farakka Dam ''inauspicious'' and a ''curse'' for Bihar and demanded its removal. Prominent Indian river researcher Himanshu Thakkar noted during the conference that the Farakka Dam is nearing 50 years of existence.

According to international practice, an evaluation is necessary after 20 years for such dams. In this context, he demanded an evaluation of the experience with the Farakka Dam.

Based on this conference held in Patna, a 11-point Patna Declaration was adopted, primarily demanding the removal of the Farakka and other dams to reestablish the natural flow of the Ganges. Following the Patna Conference, a similar conference was held in Delhi in May 2017, where another declaration following the ''Patna Declaration'' was adopted.

The demand for the removal of the Farakka Barrage is not a fantasy. This demand originated in India itself, and Bangladesh needs to fully support it. In fact, Bangladesh's statement in the discussion about renewing the Ganges Agreement should start with this demand.

However, until the Farakka Barrage is removed, Bangladesh will have to attempt to secure its fair share of the Ganges' dry-season flow under this barrage. In this context, it is noteworthy that under the ''Mujib-Indira Agreement'' of 1974, India was permitted to withdraw 11, 000 to 16, 000 cusecs of water in the dry season (January-May), so Bangladesh could receive 40,500 to 44,500 cusecs of water during those months.

According to a five-year agreement signed during the Zia government in 1977, India agreed to limit the withdrawal to 20, 000 cusecs in the dry season, so Bangladesh could receive 35, 000 cusecs of water. This agreement also included a ''minimum flow guarantee'' clause.

According to this clause, India guaranteed that the flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh would not be less than 27, 600 cusecs in the dry season. After the expiration of the 1977 agreement, there was no agreement for a long time. As a result, the flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh during this period was primarily dependent on India's will.

Under the agreement signed during the Awami League era in 1996, it was established that if the flow at Farakka was more than 75, 000 cusecs, India would withdraw 40, 000 cusecs, and the rest would flow to Bangladesh. If the flow at Farakka was between 70, 000 and 75, 000 cusecs, Bangladesh would receive 35, 000 cusecs, and India would receive the rest (i. e. , 35, 000 to 40, 000 cusecs). Finally, if the flow at Farakka was less than 70, 000 cusecs, it would be equally shared between India and Bangladesh.

This agreement lacks any clause guaranteeing a minimum flow in Bangladesh. This was concerning because, as already mentioned, due to numerous dams and barrages constructed by India upstream of the Ganges and its various tributaries, the flow of the Ganges at Farakka is gradually decreasing.

Statistics show that the average flow of the Ganges at Farakka decreased by 2,132 cusecs annually from 1997 to 2010. This reduction would be even more for the dry season flow. Therefore, if the agreement does not guarantee a minimum flow for Bangladesh, the flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh in the dry season will dangerously decline. In fact, in the period from 1997 to 2025, this has often been the case. Research indicates that during 52 per cent of the time (calculated over every 10 days) from 1997 to 2016, Bangladesh did not receive its due share of water, and this proportion was 65 per cent during the ''crisis period'' from March to May.

In light of this reality, there is no doubt that the upcoming renewal of the Ganges Agreement needs to reinstate the ''minimum flow guarantee'' clause and set it at least at 35, 000 cusecs. In this context, it is notable that since Kolkata is no longer a seaport (the nearby Haldia Port has taken over that role), withdrawing water towards the Bhagirathi is no longer as critical for India. Furthermore, the downstream tributaries such as Mayurakshi, Ajay, Damodar, Silai, Rupnarayan, and Kangsabati (Kasai) join and increase the flow of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly.

On the other hand, the Ganges in Bangladesh has no such tributaries to increase its flow. Instead, there are numerous branches and streams entirely dependent on the Ganges'' flow. Therefore, there is little reason, aside from politics, for an equal sharing of the Ganges' dry-season flow at Farakka.

Conversely, there are both natural and economic arguments for allocating 35, 000 cusecs for Bangladesh. By the laws of nature, the main flow of the Ganges has shifted from the Bhagirathi towards Bangladesh. Trying to reverse this through Farakka is an unnatural act.

Economically, the entire southwestern region of Bangladesh is dependent on the Ganges. Additionally, ensuring a minimum flow for Bangladesh may motivate the Indian government to rein in the current continuous efforts to withdraw water from the Ganges and its tributaries upstream in West Bengal, which would also benefit West Bengal.

Needless to say, for Bangladesh's position on the renewal of the Ganges Agreement to be accepted, support and sympathy within India need to be garnered. Efforts are necessary both at governmental and non-governmental levels. In the non-governmental stream, there is a growing communication between river experts and activists from Bangladesh and India, which will aid in disseminating information about and arguments for Bangladesh's stance on the renewal of the Ganges Agreement, but this is far from sufficient. The government should significantly expand and deepen this communication.

Extensive efforts at the international level are also necessary. We have already noted that the UN's 1997 convention on rivers and streams creates the potential for the international community to support and sympathise with Bangladesh's stance. However, realising this potential will require extensive efforts. UNESCO's representatives, sent multiple times to evaluate the impact of India's river-linking project, noted the degradation of the Sundarbans due to the Farakka Barrage and expressed concern about the possibility of this becoming more pronounced due to India's river-linking project.

UNESCO's observation provides an opportunity to campaign internationally for removing the Farakka Barrage or increasing the flow in the Ganges during the dry season for Bangladesh, but no government has taken any initiative in this regard. In fact, very few people in the international arena are aware of India's unfair behaviour towards Bangladesh concerning international rivers and streams. Considering the upcoming necessity of renewing the Ganges Agreement, the Bangladesh government needs to pay attention to this.

It is noteworthy that the geographical position that allows India to withdraw water from Bangladesh's rivers and streams also provides some advantages for Bangladesh in terms of India. That is, Pakistan, allowing transit and transshipment for the accelerated development of the seven northeastern states of India and the opportunity to use Bangladesh's seaports.

I proposed the ''River for Transit'' concept as early as 2013. However, the Awami League government did not accept this proposal and provided India with transit, transshipment, and port usage without conditions. Nevertheless, after the political shift in 2024, steps such as canceling the permission for Bangladeshi exporters to use Indian airports indicate that previously given opportunities can also be withdrawn later.

We hope that India will perceive the necessity for the Ganges' dry-season flow for Bangladesh with more sensitivity and accept the demand for a minimum flow guarantee of 35, 000 cusecs with an open heart, ensuring that cooperation between India and Bangladesh continues in other areas as well.

From Bangladesh's side, it is essential to have a suitable and experienced team or delegation of negotiators to successfully discuss this complex and sensitive issue with India. Currently, Bangladesh's Joint Rivers Commission is largely bureaucratic. It is difficult to say how successful Bangladesh can be in discussions with India through this commission. Including only engineers is not a solution either, as they generally lack sufficient understanding and perception regarding river and stream philosophy. Therefore, a proper reorganisation of the Joint Rivers Commission is another critical task and challenge for renewing the Ganges Agreement.

Finally, it is necessary to mention that the approval of the Ganges (Padma) Barrage Project by the Bangladesh government in the context of the upcoming necessity of renewing the Ganges Agreement is a suicidal step.

As a result, even presenting any demand for the removal of the Farakka Barrage, increasing the share of the Ganges' dry-season flow, or ensuring ''minimum flow'' will be difficult for the Bangladeshi delegation. India's experienced negotiators will quickly reveal the inconsistency in the positions of Bangladeshi representatives and be able to dismiss these claims. In light of the potential for such unfortunate consequences, we hope that the government will reconsider the Ganges (Padma) Barrage Project.

#Nazrul Islam is a professor at the Institute of Asian Growth Research and former head of the United Nations Development Research.

*Opinions expressed here are those of the author.

#This article, originally published published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam.

[First Part: How can Bangladesh prepare for renewal of Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty?]