Revisiting the Rohingya policy of Bangladesh

Rohingya camps in BangladeshProthom Alo file photo

The Rohingya crisis lingers on for over seven years. Bangladesh is now faced with a protracted Rohingya refugee situation with no prospect of their repatriation in the near future. The situation in Rakhine has been deteriorating creating various kinds of instabilities in which the Arakan Army has emerged as the de facto authority.  The central authority of Myanmar at Nay Pyi Taw is under unprecedented challenges from a combined coalition of forces of the National Unity Government/ People’s Defence Forces and an array of emboldened ethnic armed groups. At the global level, the Rohingya crisis is getting overshadowed by conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. A fatigue appears to be developing in humanitarian assistance and international protection.  Besides, the international community is getting more influenced by strategic rivalries among major powers in Asia.

Tensions surrounding the emerging concept of the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road Initiative have started being felt in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean region. Meanwhile, the July-August revolution has overthrown the Awami League government and a vastly different Interim Government has taken over governance in Bangladesh with strong focus on reforms of institutions and policies. All these now demand a deep reflection on the, rather ineffectual, Rohingya policy of Bangladesh.

Rohingya refugee children walk along the road at Balukhali camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 16 November 2018.
Reuters file photo

Contrasting approach from Bangladesh and Myanmar on Rohingya

Myanmar has historically seen the Rohingya, an ethnicity with tremendous racial, linguistic and religious link with the erstwhile Bengal, and perceived them as aliens. Therefore, the state of Burma/ Myanmar continued to see the Rohingya through a prism of insecurity. Their policy and actions have been motivated by a desire to ensure demographic balance in the northern Rakhine and by long-defined national priority to “defend the western gate”. This has been a term used by the Buddhist nationalists and the Myanmar Army, known in Myanmar as the Tatmadaw, to signify that Myanmar’s insecurity comes from its western neighbor- Bangladesh, either demographically (through infiltration by the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh- the Rohingya) or from insurgent / terrorist activities by Rohingya outfits like the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Myanmar’s security-based narrative has an implicit aim of projecting Bangladesh as an adversarial neighbor, if not an avowed enemy, by indirectly referring to perceived military threats from Bangladesh.

Myanmar has in the 2010s used to amplify threats from an almost defunct- RSO, while the much bigger threat from the Arakan Army used to be underestimated. After the violence of 2016 and 2017, Myanmar wasted no time to securitise the discourse on the Rohingya crisis by citing the attacks by ARSA as acts of (Islamic) terrorism and by extension terming the Rohingya as a community hosting and abetting terrorists. Myanmar thus made all efforts to justify the use of indiscriminate force. China, Russia and to a lesser extent India found merit in Myanmar’s justifications on (disproportionate and indiscriminate) use of force and characterization of the ARSA attacks as acts of terrorism and insurgency which needed a robust military response.

Ethnic Rakhine people who fled from Maungdaw after Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had attacked, cook their meal at Buthidaung, Myanmar 28 August 2017.
Reuters

As the crisis unfolded in 2016-17, Bangladesh considered a host of factors, forces, values and interests while designing a policy framework for Rohingya crisis management, comprising of sustainable return. The policy framework was developed following the general approach towards Myanmar, based on the principles of non-interference in the internal matters of another country and good neighborliness. The policy framework had three major components- a) humanitarian (to save lives and ensure basic/ HR rights while sheltered in Bangladesh), b) address “root causes” in Rakhine/Myanmar and ensure safety, security and livelihood for sustainable return, and c) holding perpetrators accountable. In the process, Bangladesh’s approach to Myanmar, regional stakeholders and international partners got duly adjusted. Additionally, Bangladesh remained firm in its commitment to the principle of non-refoulement and voluntariness as regards return of the Rohingya to Rakhine. With hindsight knowledge, it can be said without doubt that the Myanmar side never appreciated this approach, founded on pacifism from their neighbor.

 Given her principal focus on early repatriation, Bangladesh always had strong reservations to some provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention like most of the Asian countries. Notable among them have been the ones on wage earning employment (Article-17), self-employment (Article-18), freedom of movement (article-26) and the right to choose residence (article-28) and naturalization (article-34). These were seen as elements that could incentivize local integration that Bangladesh could not afford. Then, Bangladesh found significant difficulties on public education (presumably in Bangla that in a way would have given credence to the Myanmar narrative of painting the Rohingya as illegal immigration from Bangladesh). Such obligations for Bangladesh were politically, demographically and economically not viable and therefore not acceptable. Bangladesh thus settled on the nomenclature- forcibly displaced Myanmar national (FDMN).

 In response to Bangladesh’s approach, Myanmar sought to be noncooperative even on humanitarian access. They accorded restricted access to a select domestic humanitarian actors and very limited access to ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, the AHA Centre. Their policy was to firmly deny humanitarian access to all external actors, UN agencies and INGOs alike. On accountability, at first, they tried to deny instances of atrocities, then sought to trivilialise them, and finally created a domestic mechanism to whitewash Myanmar army and others involved in atrocity crimes. Myanmar tried to deny their obligation by legally contesting the case at the International Court of Justice, but eventually will have no option but to accept their responsibility.

Rohingyas taking shelter in Bangladesh
File photo

 Bilaterally with Bangladesh, Myanmar created a hype of insecurity from the western gate. The Myanmar Army- Tatmadaw- and their paramilitary forces stoked tension by incidences of firing at the border, attacks on fishermen on the Naf River, illegal border crossing, and by numerous violations of the Bangladesh airspace. These all seemed to have been done to draw Bangladesh into a full-fledged armed conflict so that the Rohingya issue could be relegated to a secondary issue. Bangladesh has largely succeeded in avoiding this trap of being pulled into an armed conflict.

There is a growing recognition now that challenges of present-day Rakhine may be greatly ameliorated by humanitarian access, economic stabilisation related assistance from Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s domestic limitations and divergences with the international community

 The Awami League-led government started losing touch with the people for flawed elections in 2014 and then in 2018. Its relations with the opposition parties reached a nadir. The government did not even try to engage opposition parties or the civil society to create a national consensus on the Rohingya crisis, based on which a comprehensive Rohingya policy could have been adopted and all national stakeholders would have implemented mandated tasks in coherence and seamless coordination.

Engagements between the Rakhine and the Rohingya community for livelihood and economic enterprises have long collapsed, making both communities poor and depriving them of basic services

While generally enjoying significant support at the global level at the beginning of the crisis, Bangladesh failed to secure crucially important support from India, China and also from Japan. This stemmed greatly from Awami League’s over-dependence on India for political survival and Bangladesh’s over-dependence on China for economic and military reasons. In the midst of lack of national consensus, influence of lobbying groups for these countries has been another negative factor that created further hurdles for Bangladesh’s diplomatic set up.

Since the manipulated election of 2014, the AL Government also started losing its legitimacy, although Bangladesh sought to shore up its importance through balancing strategic partners. Relations with the Western countries came under severe strain and that with the US went beyond repairs. They started raising serious concerns on lack of democratic practice, deteriorating rule of law, intolerance against the opposition, absence of inclusivity and transparency in governance etc. These also impacted relations with the UN system.

On the question of greater access to skills and education, freedom of movement and other rights related priorities of the West and United Nations in general, there was no meeting of minds with the international community. Bangladesh’s inflexible attitude on relocation of some Rohingya to Bhasanchar also dented its standing in the international arena as far as her commitment to refugee rights are concerned. The UN and majority of the international community did not like its total rejection of local integration as part of durable solutions. These internal coordination and governance issues as well as divergence with the international community in a way deprived the Bangladesh diplomatic set-up a spring board to reflect on creative solutions and to mount a robust diplomacy to sustain the initial international support towards the Rohingya and Bangladesh.

Changed ground realities in Rakhine

Since the 2016-17 period, ground realities in Myanmar have been gradually changing. A major shift took place since the ouster of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government in February 2021, and the National Unity Government was formed. A fierce resistance movement started, led by ethnic Bamars. Disunity among this predominant community is unprecedented in the history of Myanmar and significantly eroded legitimacy of the State Administrative Council. Crackdown failed to achieve its objectives. It rather solidified public rejection of the coup and led to armed resistance all across the Union. Ethnic Armed Organisations mounted serious challenges to the Tatmadaw and the latter has been losing significant territory to the EAOs all over the country. The Three Brotherhood Alliance, of which AA is a part, then launched a major offensive by October 2023, popularly known as 1027 operations and ousted the Tatmadaw from many military posts and [progressively took control of large swathes of land.

This photo taken on 21 May, 2024 shows a destroyed house and burned trees following fighting between Myanmar’s military and the Arakan Army (AA) ethnic minority armed group in a village in Minbya Township in western Rakhine State
AFP

By October 2024, the Arakan Army has taken control of the entire north and central Rakhine, except for Sittwe and a few other areas in the south. It has emerged as the de facto authority in the Mayu- Kaladan- Lemro region where the Rohingya emerged over centuries as the majority among the population. But, AA is reported to have unleashed retaliatory attacks on the Rohingya and resorted to arson in response to Rohingya fighters joining the Tatmadaw forces and their stated involvement in arson in some Buddhist-Rakhine villages in Buthidaung. If the Rohingya outfits, RSO, ARSA and Arakan Rohingya Army, continue to challenge the AA dominance, there is a strong likelihood of more displacements, and tens of thousands have reported to have already crossed over to Bangladesh.

Engagements between the Rakhine and the Rohingya community for livelihood and economic enterprises have long collapsed, making both communities poor and depriving them of basic services. Unending conflict has led to breakdown of agriculture and economy of the State, making both communities extremely vulnerable. There is a growing recognition now that challenges of present-day Rakhine may be greatly ameliorated by humanitarian access, economic stabilisation related assistance from Bangladesh.

 While this territorial hold allows AA to establish its own civilian administration, it faces a great disadvantage to govern the area without much resources and being fully dependent on the central authority in Nay Pyi Taw for power, energy and infrastructure. Though the AA/ United League of Arakan (ULA) now has a historic opportunity to realise their Arakan dream, it is unclear at this stage whether this will be as part of a truly federative structure within the Union of Myanmar or a quasi-autonomous region like the territory governed by the United Wa Army in the Shan state. In any case, they face tremendous challenges to transform the state into a self-governing entity or an autonomous region, with or without the ability to engage external stakeholders.

Naval blockade by the Tatmadaw and absence of recognition and help from Bangladesh make them vulnerable. The Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO), created by ALA/AA, has been articulating the need for prioritization of innovative and alternative cross-border humanitarian aid. While control over the territory signifies strengths of the AA, its multiple constraints to govern indicate its weaknesses too.

* Md. Shahidul Haque & Mohammad Sufiur Rahman are faculty of SIPG/NSU. The former was a Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh and the latter a former Ambassador to Myanmar