How can the Teesta project be kept free of geopolitical influence?

While reviewing PowerChina’s Teesta project, Professor Dr. Khalequzzaman, a professor of geology at the University of Pennsylvania, and I did not limit ourselves to exposing its various shortcomings. We also presented an alternative. The key features of this alternative were as follows:

1. Abandoning the goal of forcibly transforming a braided river into a single-channel river.
2. Discarding the objective of abruptly reducing the river’s average width from approximately 3 kilometers to 816 meters.
3. Prioritising the prevention of riverbank erosion as an immediate measure.
4. Initially establishing a desired “provisional stable bank” along the Teesta by following the points along its banks that have proven stable over approximately the past decade.
5. Using geobags and other appropriate indigenous technologies instead of Western-style rigid structures to establish this provisional stable bank.

6. After establishing the provisional stable bank, gradually reducing the width of those sections of the Teesta considered undesirably wide by adding further layers of geobags.
7. Rather than mechanically imposing a uniform width on the Teesta throughout its course, allowing its width to vary according to the specific conditions of different locations and giving the river’s natural behavior a role in determining its bends and width.
8. Following an open approach to restoring the connections between the Teesta and its floodplain, as well as those between the river and all its distributaries and tributaries; revitalizing the entire Teesta basin and transforming it into a network of dispersed water-storage areas.
9. Making decisions about the chars (riverine islands and sandbars) already formed in the river on the basis of a flexible approach.
10. Fully informing local communities about the envisioned transformation of the Teesta; giving due weight to their opinions when making decisions about the specific aspects of this transformation; and creating as many opportunities as possible for their direct participation in implementing the project.

The philosophy underlying this alternative proposal is to adopt a nature-based approach to rivers, not to regard them as adversaries or act against them, but to accept them as living entities and manage them in cooperation with them.

PowerChina’s proposal to narrow the Teesta to 816 meters relied entirely on groynes. It called for the construction of 50 new groynes along the two banks of the river and the reconstruction of 15 existing ones. A groyne is a rigid structure made of concrete that has been used in Western countries. Other examples of rigid structures include spurs, hard points, and concrete revetments. These structures have been used to prevent riverbank erosion along various rivers in Bangladesh, including the Jamuna, but they have not proved effective.

I have discussed the comparison between rigid structures and geobag technology in detail in two books: Water Development in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future and Water Development in Bangladesh: The Crisis of the Current Approach and Proposals for Alternative Pathways. There is no need to repeat that discussion here. Briefly, rigid structures are inflexible. Once constructed, they offer no scope for modification, extension, or dismantling. Geobag technology, by contrast, is strong yet flexible, allowing structures to be modified through the addition or removal of components. Both sand and geotextile materials are inexpensive and readily available in Bangladesh. Consequently, geobag technology is far less costly than rigid structures.

Recently, the use of geobags in the Pabna Irrigation Project, the Meghna-Dhonagoda Project, and the Meghna-Jamuna Riverbank Erosion Mitigation Project has produced comparatively good results. Drawing on these experiences, researchers have shown that the cost of constructing concrete-block-based revetments in Sirajganj and spurs at Betil-Enayetpur was 67.8 billion taka and 27.9 billion taka per kilometer, respectively. In contrast, constructing a geobag-based revetment at Kalitala cost only 2.8 billion taka per kilometer.

During the first 10 years after project implementation, the Sirajganj revetment and the Betil-Enayetpur spurs required repairs and reconstruction six and seven times, respectively. The associated expenditures amounted to 30 per cent and 120 per cent, respectively, of their original implementation costs. By contrast, both figures for the Kalitala geobag revetment were zero.

Thus, the suitability of geobag technology over rigid structures for river management in Bangladesh has been conclusively demonstrated. It is worth noting that 15 groynes had previously been constructed to prevent erosion along the banks of the Teesta, but they proved ineffective. Despite this experience, it is surprising that Bangladesh’s water authorities became enthusiastic about PowerChina’s project, which relies entirely on groynes.

Professor Muhammad Yunus’s interim government was not close to India as the previous Awami League government had been. Therefore, from a geopolitical perspective, this government faced relatively few obstacles to moving forward with PowerChina’s project. In fact, the government showed considerable enthusiasm for the PowerChina proposal. During his visit to China, Muhammad Yunus announced that the project would be implemented with China’s assistance. He also urged the Chinese authorities to prepare a 50-year master plan for the rivers of Bangladesh.

The interim government’s adviser for water resources also expressed considerable enthusiasm for PowerChina’s project.

First, however, given the government’s close relationship with the United States, there were certain difficulties associated with becoming overly enthusiastic about expanding ties with China. Second, it was inappropriate for an interim government with a limited tenure to make decisions about a long-term project such as the Teesta. Third, it was during this government’s tenure that we highlighted the problems with PowerChina’s revised project of 2023. For whatever reasons, PowerChina’s project ultimately made little progress under the interim government.

Before the 13th parliamentary election, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) showed considerable enthusiasm for PowerChina’s project. In particular, the party’s leaders from the Rangpur Division organized a massive torchlight procession along the Teesta and a large human chain in Dhaka, demanding implementation of the Teesta Master Plan.

The BNP government is ostensibly not close to India either and is careful in maintaining its relations with the United States. At the same time, however, it is interested in improving relations with China. Amid these three-way geopolitical tensions, it remains unclear what decision the government has made regarding the Teesta. The water resources minister has, however, announced at various forums that the government wants to resolve the Teesta problem by relying on domestic expertise.

It is unclear precisely why the BNP government is emphasising domestic expertise. The geopolitical triangle mentioned above may play a role. Another noteworthy consideration is that, in projects generally designed and implemented by foreign companies, local experts and officials typically serve as “junior partners” and benefit from their involvement.

That prospect did not appear likely with PowerChina’s project, however, because the Chinese were simultaneously responsible for both designing and implementing it. It is said that this was one reason for some dissatisfaction with PowerChina’s project within the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) and among professionals in Bangladesh’s water sector. It is difficult to say whether this dissatisfaction was another factor behind the government’s change of attitude toward the project.

Whatever the reasons, if the government has genuinely decided to resolve the Teesta problem on the basis of domestic capabilities, that is welcome news. For this effort to succeed, however, it must be grounded in a sound philosophy of rivers and river management.

There are contradictory indications in this regard. One encouraging sign was a symposium organised on September 17 by the Department of Water Resources Engineering at the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), attended by the water resources minister and government officials. The keynote paper and other presentations at the symposium echoed the ideas underpinning the alternative proposal outlined above, as advocated by the Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA), the Bangladesh Environment Network (BEN), and the Teesta River Protection Movement. This is an encouraging development.

On the other hand, various sources indicate that the Institute of Water Modelling (IWM) has been assigned responsibility for preparing the concept paper for an alternative Teesta project. It is difficult to be enthusiastic about this news.

First, this organisation, composed primarily of engineers, continues to adhere largely to a utilitarian approach to rivers. It does not adequately understand their natural functions and views them mainly as mechanical systems rather than as ecological and living entities.

Second, various reports prepared by the organisation suggest that, rather than seeking objective solutions to problems, it is more interested in providing recommendations that suit the preferences of the commissioning agencies.

Therefore, we, representing BAPA, BEN, and the Teesta River Protection Movement, urge the government to ensure that the process of developing an alternative project for the Teesta is conducted transparently rather than in secrecy.

• Disclose the names of the individuals appointed to the 11-member committee.
• Give an appropriate role in the process to organizations that have been campaigning for 20–30 years to resolve the Teesta problem.
• Take steps to benefit from the participation of expatriate Bangladeshi experts who are conducting valuable research on the Teesta and contributing to the struggle to protect the river.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the Teesta project must be kept free from the harmful effects of geopolitics. The way to achieve this is to design and implement the project on the basis of domestic capabilities. However, the kind of domestic capabilities on which the project will rely is no less important. Sadly, the kind of national capacity that was expected to develop over the more than five decades since independence has failed to materialise.

The expectation was that the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) would become a “center of excellence” for water-related expertise in Bangladesh. Over time, however, its capacity seems to have diminished rather than grown. For any substantial intellectual or technical undertaking, it has become necessary to turn to external consulting firms. Corruption has compounded the problem.

Many other water-related research and consulting organisations, too, remain largely attached to the thinking of the 1950s and 1960s. A striking example was evident during the previous government’s formulation of the so-called Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100. At a time when the Netherlands itself was moving away from the polder approach and embracing the idea of “Room for the River,” these organisations were enthusiastic about building more polders and embankments in Bangladesh. Therefore, the idea of resolving the Teesta problem on the basis of national capabilities is sound. However, attention must also be paid to identifying and utilizing the right kinds of national capabilities to achieve this objective.

Several factors make it easier to resolve the Teesta problem through domestic capabilities. First, technological simplicity. Stabilizing the banks of the Teesta with geobags does not require sophisticated technology. This is not nuclear power generation! There is, therefore, no need to turn to foreign countries for the necessary technology.

Second, this technological simplicity creates opportunities for public participation in implementing the project, even through voluntary labor. River protection could become a massive patriotic undertaking.

Third, low cost. This work can be completed with a very modest budget. Consequently, there will be no need to turn to foreign countries for loans, either. Those who view projects merely as a means of making money may be disappointed by this prospect. The public, however, will be spared the burden of taking on even more debt.

Whether Bangladesh will move forward along this path in the future remains to be seen.

* Nazrul Islam is a professor at the Asian Growth Research Institute and former head of development research at the United Nations.
* The opinions expressed here are the author's own.
* This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Ayesha Kabir