Why Bangladesh needs reconciliation

It is true that establishing reconciliation is a complex and time-consuming process, not only in Bangladesh, but in any deeply divided society. While many professionals from various fields and experts working on reconciliation recognise its importance, some regard it as a utopian or unrealistic idea in Bangladesh's current context. Others described it as a long-term process that depends largely on the government's political will.

Taking into account the observations of common citizens and analysts, public discussion must continue on both the prospects and challenges of achieving reconciliation in Bangladesh.

First, it is important to clarify that reconciliation is not an alternative to the conventional justice system; rather, it serves as a complement to it. Prosecutions alone may leave behind enduring resentment and social divisions. Conversely, relying solely on reconciliation or forgiveness risks allowing many perpetrators to escape accountability. For this reason, societies emerging from violence often require a combination of justice and reconciliation to achieve lasting peace.

There are numerous international precedents for pursuing both justice and reconciliation in parallel, including in countries such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Argentina. Moreover, reconciliation processes typically begin only after a suitable political and social environment has been established and with the participation of all relevant parties. In such settings, those accused of wrongdoing may also have the opportunity to acknowledge the truth and seek forgiveness.

Second, under any political government, professionals who may have benefited unfairly from the system or ignored injustices and abuses committed during that period cannot, in many cases, be charged with criminal offenses on that basis alone. Yet, following the July uprising, lawsuits have been filed against professionals perceived to be aligned with Awami League, accusing them of involvement in killings. This presents a difficult dilemma.

On one hand, the public expects those who benefited from or enabled an abusive system to be held accountable. On the other hand, charging individuals with serious crimes such as murder or violence, and leaving them imprisoned for years despite the absence of evidence that they committed such offences, runs counter to the fundamental rights of any citizen.

It is therefore necessary to consider whether, in the effort to hold beneficiaries of a previous regime accountable, supporters and activists who were not involved in any criminal conduct are also being subjected to harassment. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission could play an important role in addressing this dilemma.

In several countries around the world, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have explicitly addressed and made recommendations on lustration, the removal of discredited or unsuitable individuals from public office, and vetting, or rigorous screening procedures. In some cases, these commissions have issued recommendations that are either binding or non-binding.

Although some countries implement vetting through independent parliamentary legislation, many have used their Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as formal investigative bodies to recommend or direct the removal of public officials who abused their authority.

For example, in Tunisia, following the Arab Spring, the Truth and Dignity Commission (2014–2018) was established to address decades of systematic repression, corruption, and human rights abuses under the regimes of Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. To facilitate the removal of corrupt and abusive officials, the commission submitted extensive evidence directly to the judiciary and relevant government ministries. It also recommended institutional purge measures and the dismissal of officials identified as responsible for abuses. However, political resistance from remnants of the former regime ultimately hindered the full implementation of many of these recommendations.

Just as Tunisia provides an example of using a range of transitional justice measures to address abuses committed under a specific regime, Kenya established a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 2008 to investigate human rights violations, economic crimes, and state repression spanning the period from independence in 1963 through the post-election violence of 2008.

With particular emphasis on the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, the commission proposed a detailed framework for a Judicial Vetting Board in its final report. The board was tasked with reviewing serving judges accused of corruption or involvement in past human rights violations. As a result of this vetting process, several High Court judges were removed from office.

International experience therefore suggests that reconciliation processes can provide a greater sense of satisfaction to both the accused and the victims than approaches that rely on only one form of redress. By combining accountability with truth-telling and acknowledgment, reconciliation offers a more balanced path toward addressing the legacy of past abuses.

On the one hand, individuals who did not commit criminal offenses but whose conduct remains controversial could be brought under a structured system of alternative sanctions. On the other hand, many activists and supporters of the accused political party who did not benefit from the previous regime could be spared years of harassment and legal uncertainty. Even those who are accused of having benefited unfairly would know precisely what they are alleged to have done and what consequences they face. Rather than living indefinitely with fear and uncertainty, a clearly defined formal process would likely be preferable for all concerned.

It is important to remember that supporting a political party is not, in itself, a crime for members of the professions. However, receiving improper benefits or failing to take action against wrongdoing committed by that party is often difficult to establish as a criminal offense under existing legal frameworks. Even where criminal liability cannot be proven, commissions of this kind can promote accountability through vetting or lustration. Such mechanisms can help institutionalize accountability not only for a single administration but also for successive governments, fostering a lasting culture of public responsibility.

It is equally important to address the second question raised in the first installment of this series on reconciliation. The election manifestos of BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and NCP all propose achieving reconciliation by prosecuting cases of enforced disappearances and killings during Awami League's approximately 15-and-a-half years in power, while rehabilitating those who suffered under that government.

But can addressing only those 15 and a half years of history erase the deep social and political divisions that have accumulated over Bangladesh's 55-year history? Did Bangladesh become divided only during the last 15 and a half years, or do the roots of these divisions stretch much further back? To answer that question, we may have to return to 1971. While that year gave birth to an independent Bangladesh, it also revealed just how deeply divided the people already were in terms of their beliefs, political views, and ideological commitments.

In his essay The Bengali Nation, Bengali Muslims, Bengali Nationalism, and Bangladesh, Syed Abul Maksud wrote: "The hardline supporters of Pakistan dedicated themselves to eliminating the forces that supported independence, continuing to kill progressive activists."

However, because more than 95 per cent of the population supported the cause of independence, those forces were unable to eliminate them. Over the decades, many of those who had opposed independence have been socially and politically rehabilitated in various ways. Yet they have never, in any clear or unequivocal manner, apologised to the people of Bangladesh for their role during the Liberation War.

This critical chapter of the Liberation War remains unresolved. Across successive governments, it has repeatedly resurfaced as a source of political and social division, further polarizing the public. Even during the first session of the current parliament, there was considerable debate over Jamaat-e-Islami's role in 1971. Yet the public has seen no meaningful or lasting resolution to the issue.

It is not only the unresolved legacy of 1971 that continues to shape Bangladesh's divisions. The decades that followed have been marked by repeated political upheavals that have profoundly shaken the nation. On 15 August 1975, then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated along with most members of his family.

The same year also witnessed the 3 November killings of the four national leaders and the November 7 killing of Khaled Mosharraf. Each of these political events has competing narratives, with opposing sides claiming different versions of history and identifying different victors and victims. As historian Mohiuddin Ahmad has observed, "To some, 7 November is the Day of the Killing of Freedom Fighters; to others, it is the Day of the Soldiers' and People's Uprising; and to still others, it is the Day of Revolution and Solidarity." (Prothom Alo, 15 May 2023.)

Later, in the early hours of 30 May 1981, then-President Ziaur Rahman was killed in a military coup in Chattogram. A judicial commission established to investigate the assassination concluded that it was "the result of serious failures in the security and intelligence system." (The Daily Star, 30 July 2026.)

In each of these assassinations, members of the armed forces were found to have been directly or indirectly involved. Yet have we, under any government, received a formal explanation from the military itself? Do these unresolved chapters bear at least some responsibility for the deepening political divisions that have become embedded in Bangladesh''s history?

It must be acknowledged that the military played a constructive role during the political transitions of 1990, 2007, and 2024. At the same time, any meaningful discussion of reconciliation today should also address the involvement of the armed forces, as well as other law enforcement agencies, in controversial incidents under different governments, and should include clear public explanations from those institutions regarding their actions.

In a deeply divided society like Bangladesh, reconciliation is not an easy undertaking. All divisions within society will not disappear overnight or simply through the establishment of a commission. However, what can happen is the beginning of a culture of coexistence and tolerance among people with different political affiliations and viewpoints in the country''s political and social spheres.

In this regard, political parties, along with the media and individuals and institutions engaged in intellectual discourse, all have responsibilities to fulfill. Political parties cannot avoid their obligations simply by making promises of reconciliation in their election manifestos. Rather, constructive plans and visible efforts from them toward reconciliation can provide a path for a divided Bangladesh to recover and move forward once again.

* Umme Wara is Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, University of Dhaka
* The views expressed in this article are the author's own.
* This article appeared in Prothom Alo print and online and has been translated by Ayesha Kabir for Prothom Alo English Online