In political science, there is a concept known as “transnational repression.” The term refers to states carrying out subversive operations beyond their own borders, inside other countries. Before the global collapse of socialism in the 1990s, this concept was commonly used to describe cross-border intelligence operations by agencies such as the CIA, KGB, MI6, and Mossad to pressure governments abroad that held opposing views. The objective was to exert political pressure on another country.
There are countless fictional portrayals of such activities in spy films, thrillers, games, and novels. In reality, incidents of transnational repression almost never occurred at the level of ordinary civilians. Subversive operations were not directed against common citizens or minor political dissidents. Instead, they took place at the level of spy-versus-spy confrontations, spies versus ruling elites, or against arms manufacturers, arms dealers, their intermediaries, and market power brokers. Double agents or defectors who passed their own country’s intelligence to foreign powers were also among the targets.
Over the past three decades, such assassinations had gradually declined to almost zero, with only two cases remaining prominent in public discourse. One was the 2006 killing of Russian citizen Alexander Litvinenko in London, and the other was the murder of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Notably, both killings were carried out as part of high-level intelligence operations. No democratic country engages in the assassination of ordinary foreign citizens or political dissidents abroad simply because they oppose that country’s policies while living in exile.
Unfortunately, India and its intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), are increasingly being discussed as an exception to this norm in Canada, the United States, and Bangladesh.
Canada is one of the world’s most peace-oriented countries. Indian immigrants—particularly Punjabis and Gujaratis—exercise remarkable influence in the country’s politics and economy. Yet recently, a significant portion of Canada’s peace-loving population has grown increasingly hostile toward India. This shift began with the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a popular Sikh leader in Canada. The Canadian government claims that the Indian government was directly involved in the assassination and that it possesses credible intelligence evidence.
In September 2023, then–Prime Minister Justin Trudeau himself stated that there were “credible allegations” of Indian involvement in Nijjar’s killing. India’s intelligence agency, RAW, is alleged to have used the notorious Bishnoi gang (named after gang leader Lawrence Bishnoi) to carry out the targeted killing of Sikh leaders who are Canadian citizens on Canadian soil. According to reports, Nijjar was not the only name on RAW’s alleged hit list.
A joint survey by the Angus Reid Institute and the Asia Pacific Foundation, published in 2024, showed that Canadian public support for India had fallen to an all-time low. While 52 per cent of Canadians held favourable views of India in a 2022 survey, that figure dropped to just 24 per cent by 2024—within a span of one year and eight months. Between 2020 and 2024, overall support declined by 26 percentage points.
India’s international image in Canada has been severely damaged. Although courts have not yet delivered a final verdict on responsibility for the incident, India has consistently denied any involvement. However, in modern diplomacy, narratives often take shape well before a final judicial ruling. These narratives are formed through a combination of state statements, intelligence findings, court documents, media investigations, and political reactions. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries have escalated, with expulsions of diplomats, visa restrictions, reduced services, and a persistent crisis of trust.
Meanwhile, the United States has not stopped at mere allegations; it has moved to the stage of filing formal charges. A case has been brought before the courts. In October 2024, the US Department of Justice announced that an Indian government employee, Vikas Yadav, had completed nearly all stages of arranging and financing a contract killing targeting US citizen Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. All communications were conducted through covert and strategically encrypted messaging.
However, before the attack could be carried out, the intermediary turned out to be an informant working for a government intelligence agency, dramatically altering the course of events. As a result, US authorities uncovered evidence of Indian subversive activities within the United States.
Providing shelter to convicted criminals has already severely undermined India’s moral and diplomatic standing. If India has knowingly harboured individuals involved in the killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, relations between the two countries could deteriorate further. The ball is now in India’s court. A sincere move toward a diplomatic resolution would be in the best interest of both countries.
Such cases do not remain confined to the realm of diplomacy; they enter the domain of the rule of law. American civil society has raised a fundamental question: how can India, while claiming to be a democratic state, become so emboldened in engaging in transnational repression on foreign soil? India has, as expected, denied these allegations as well.
More recently, in Bangladesh, Sharif Osman Hadi, an emerging young leader and convener of Inqilab Moncho, was killed by an assassin’s gunfire. A large section of the Bangladeshi population believes that the identified assassin fled to India after evading all state security surveillance systems in Bangladesh. Their suspicion and belief point to India’s responsibility for the killing. India has once again denied any involvement. Nevertheless, public distrust and skepticism toward India have deepened further, and there appears to be little chance that this wound in the collective psyche of the Bangladeshi people will heal anytime soon.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, neighbouring countries expected India to emerge as the leader of the Global South. Today, however, with the exception of its newer friendships with Afghanistan and Bhutan, India is viewed by almost all of its neighbours as a “controversial external adversary.” It was assumed that India would build a positive international image on the basis of three realities: first, a rapidly growing economy and market; second, technological capacity and human resources; and third, a major diplomatic role—particularly its aspiration to represent the Global South.
However, the killing of Nijjar in Canada and the legal case in the United States have created a fourth reality. According to the US-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations, the “targeting of diaspora dissidents under the shadow of state power” has severely damaged India’s soft power, especially its image abroad as a “democratic model.”
A state’s image is not merely a matter of truth versus falsehood; rather, it is a question of credibility and transparency. When such allegations arise against a state, international partners seek answers to two questions: first, whether the accused state is cooperating with transparent investigations; and second, whether it is demonstrating genuine institutional integrity to prevent such incidents in the future.
In recent years, much of the discussion surrounding Canada’s security and democratic processes has focused on foreign interference, disinformation, and the behaviour of diaspora communities. The “Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions,” formed in 2023 under the leadership of former Supreme Court justice Marie Josee Hogue, continues its work.
In its discussions and reports, several countries have been identified as offenders, with India being one of them. Reports published by Reuters and the Associated Press in June 2025 indicate that Canadian intelligence assessments have recommended listing India as one of the key actors involved in foreign interference. These assessments are neither driven by anti-India sentiment nor do they directly accuse India. Nevertheless, “structural suspicion” toward India is growing stronger.
India has clearly entered a strategic crisis marked by a loss of trust, particularly because both Canada and the United States are close security partners of India. According to analysis by the Wilson Centre, India may accuse these two countries of sheltering “separatists” or “extremists.” However, in both countries, strong and transparent legal frameworks and independent, investigative media mean that governments do not need to manufacture public opinion.
The Wilson Centre’s analysis suggests that the way for India to shed its image of “unreliability” lies in transparent investigations and cooperation through information sharing—along with clearly accepting or rejecting state responsibility when necessary. India, however, is doing neither. As a result, the crisis of trust continues to deepen. India has an extradition treaty with Bangladesh, but given its apparent indifference even to the concerns of Canada and the United States, it is difficult to predict how seriously India will consider Bangladesh’s demands.
Providing shelter to convicted criminals has already severely undermined India’s moral and diplomatic standing. If India has knowingly harboured individuals involved in the killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, relations between the two countries could deteriorate further. The ball is now in India’s court. A sincere move toward a diplomatic resolution would be in the best interest of both countries.
#Helal Mohiuddin is Professor of Sociology, Mayville State University, North Dakota, United States
#The views expressed are the author’s own.