The recent visit of Bangladesh's Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to China was not just a routine bilateral visit; it is being considered a significant event in the changing geopolitical realities of South Asia.
During this visit, held from 22 to 24 June, extensive discussions were held between the two countries on trade, investment, infrastructure, industrialisation, and economic cooperation, resulting in the signing of several Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). However, the most noteworthy aspect of the visit was the meeting between Prime Minister Tarique Rahman and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
In recent times, military tensions between India and Pakistan, conflicts in the Middle East, the Iran-Israel crisis, and uncertainties surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have added new dimensions to the international trade and security situation.
At the same time, the strategic rivalry between the United States and China and questions of power balance in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal have become more critical. In this broader context, the new dimension of Bangladesh's relationship with China has naturally become a focal point of regional interest.
If this corridor is realised, the potential economic benefits for Bangladesh are significant. Mongla Port, Chittagong Port, Bay Terminal, Matarbari Deep Sea Port, and potential economic zones could develop as important centres of regional supply systems. Bangladesh's geographical location allows it to serve as a natural bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
Although multiple MoUs were signed during the visit, there were no formal announcements on some of the previously discussed strategic projects. Nevertheless, various observers believe that there has been a policy consensus on certain issues between the two countries, and efforts may be made to implement them in the future. These include the expansion of the Mongla Port, Chinese investment, industrial zone development, and enhancing the capacity of Bangladesh's seaports.
The most talked-about topic following the visit has been the proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor. If realised, this won't just create a new trade and communication pathway between the three countries, but it could also bring significant changes in the economic connectivity of South and Southeast Asia and Bay of Bengal-centric geopolitics.
This idea is not entirely new. In the 1990s, the Kunming Initiative brought forth the concept of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. Numerous meetings between representatives of these four countries followed. The goal was to connect Kolkata, Dhaka, Chittagong, Mandalay, and Kunming through an economic and transportation network.
However, political and strategic reasons prevented the project from reaching the implementation stage, particularly due to India's reluctance, causing the BCIM to become stagnant.
The current proposal is being seen as a modified version of the BCIM concept. India is not included; instead, a tripartite economic corridor involving Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China is being proposed, although the formal route has yet to be disclosed. Various analyses suggest that it could extend from Bangladesh's border through Myanmar''s Rakhine and Mandalay to China's Yunnan Province in Kunming. Historically, this region has been a crucial path for commercial connections between South Asia and China for many centuries.
If this corridor is realised, the potential economic benefits for Bangladesh are significant. Mongla Port, Chittagong Port, Bay Terminal, Matarbari Deep Sea Port, and potential economic zones could develop as important centres of regional supply systems. Bangladesh's geographical location allows it to serve as a natural bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
By leveraging this advantage, Bangladesh could transform not only into a country providing transit facilities but also into a vital centre for regional production and supply systems. There is potential for positive impacts on industrialisation, employment, exports, and foreign investment.
Additionally, Bangladesh's long-standing goal is to increase economic connectivity with Southeast Asian countries. Such a corridor could play a vital role in boosting trade with ASEAN member countries and becoming part of the regional production chain. It could also be effective in implementing Bangladesh's declared "Look East" policy.
On the other hand, the proposal has sparked extensive discussions among India's strategic analysts. Some argue that if the corridor is realised, China's economic and strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal will be further strengthened, potentially creating new pressures on India's security environment. Some interpret it as part of China's long-term strategy surrounding India.
However, this interpretation has limitations. China already has access to Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port, oil and gas pipelines, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor in Myanmar's Bay of Bengal. In other words, China doesn't rely on Bangladesh to ensure its presence in the Bay of Bengal.
Thus, interpreting the construction of a new corridor through Bangladesh solely as a strategy to encircle India does not fully reflect reality. Instead, it can also be seen as an economic effort to make regional trade and supply chains more effective. Likewise, it should be remembered that India is also active in implementing its regional connectivity strategies.
Under the "Act East" policy, India is implementing projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Kaladan Multimodal Transit Project, and increasing connectivity between Northeast India and Southeast Asia. In other words, the expansion of regional connectivity is not solely China's strategy; India is also undertaking similar initiatives. Therefore, viewing such projects purely from the perspective of geopolitical competition hides their economic significance.
For Bangladesh, the most crucial questions are security and stability. A potential part of the corridor could pass through the Rakhine region, where the Arakan Army currently has a significant presence.
Simultaneously, the long-standing Rohingya crisis is a major reality in this area. Therefore, political stability and security are preconditions for any major infrastructure project in the region.
Here, China's role is also essential. According to international analysts, China has considerable influence over Myanmar's military government and the country's various influential armed groups. Hence, Beijing could play a positive role in establishing stability in the Rakhine region and creating a favourable environment for future Rohingya repatriation.
However, alongside economic potential, risks must also be critically considered. In various countries worldwide, projects under the Belt and Road Initiative have faced questions regarding debt burdens, cost increases, lack of transparency, and economic viability. Therefore, before adopting any new project, Bangladesh must meticulously evaluate all aspects, including economic feasibility, debt repayment capacity, environmental impact, the interests of local communities, and national security.
One of the key foundations of Bangladesh's foreign policy is maintaining balance. China is an important development partner for Bangladesh, and India is its closest neighbour and a significant partner in security and economy. Simultaneously, Bangladesh's relations with the United States, Japan, the European Union, and ASEAN countries are deepening.
Therefore, prioritising its national interests without becoming part of any single power's strategic competition is the most logical path for Bangladesh.
* M Sakhawat Hossain is a former advisor to the caretaker government
*The opinions expressed here are the author's own
#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam.