The map of power in world politics is never static. States that were once on the periphery of international decision-making may move towards the centre as they gain economic power.
The rise of BRICS should be understood within this larger historical change. It is not just a collaborative framework of emerging economies, but rather a political question concerning the uneven distribution of power, wealth, representation, and decision-making in the current international system.
The name 'BRICS' originates from the initials of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Over time, its scope has expanded significantly.
Currently, BRICS has 11 member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. Additionally, several countries have been granted partnership status.
Hence, BRICS is no longer a limited platform of five countries; it is becoming an important manifestation of the economic and political aspirations of the wider global South.
Why is BRICS important?
Post-World War II international economic and political institutions were established at a time when many of today's emerging powers had comparatively limited economic and diplomatic capacity.
However, the centre of gravity of the world economy has gradually shifted. China and India have become major economic powers; Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates play significant roles in their respective regions and the global economy.
This raises the question—if the real power distribution of the world economy changes, why should the framework for international decision-making remain unchanged? BRICS has essentially entered this area of imbalance.
One of its main goals is to make the international system more multipolar, representative, and sensitive to the developing world.
Strengthening the voice of developing countries in international monetary and developmental frameworks, increasing financing for infrastructure and sustainable development, expanding trade and investment among members, increasing opportunities for transactions in local currencies, and strengthening mutual cooperation in international crises—these are all part of BRICS' broader objectives.
A significant institutional achievement of BRICS is the New Development Bank. This bank finances projects in infrastructure, energy, water, urbanisation, transportation, environment, and sustainable development.
Its aim is not to dissolve traditional international financial institutions but to create an additional pathway for financing for developing countries.
Is BRICS a threat to other regional organisations? It is important to clarify that BRICS is not, in essence, a regional organisation.
Its members do not belong to any specific geographical region. It includes countries from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Therefore, there is no direct competition with regional organisations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or African regional institutions.
Instead, the rise of BRICS raises the most questions about the dominance of those international frameworks where Western influence has historically been strong.
However, viewing BRICS as an 'anti-Western coalition' would be an oversimplification.
India, for example, is an important member of BRICS while also having deep strategic ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia also maintain close economic and security relationships with the Western world.
Hence, the real significance of BRICS is probably not in replacing the West but in creating an alternative arena for negotiation in the international system.
What can Bangladesh achieve?
For Bangladesh, the significance of BRICS is multifaceted. Firstly, Bangladesh requires substantial infrastructure financing for its next stage of development.
Bangladesh has been a member of the New Development Bank since 2021. By the end of 2025, the amount of approved financing from the bank for Bangladesh has reached approximately 450 million USD.
In other words, Bangladesh's relationship with BRICS is not just at a level of political interest; a functional financial foundation has already been established.
Secondly, BRICS can expand Bangladesh's sphere of economic diplomacy. China and India are two very important economic partners for Bangladesh.
At the same time, the BRICS member states in the Middle East are important for Bangladesh's energy security, labour market, and investment. There is also the opportunity to expand commercial relations with countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia.
Thirdly, after graduating from the list of least developed countries, Bangladesh will need to find new sources of foreign financing, market access, and development partnerships.
BRICS can be an additional diplomatic and economic support in that period of change.
Fourthly, engagement with BRICS can give further effective multiplicity to Bangladesh's foreign policy based on 'friendship with all'.
The strategic success of a small or medium power state does not always lie in confining itself to one power centre; instead, it lies in maintaining relationships with multiple power centres and expanding its negotiating space.
So where is the obstacle?
The greater the potential, the more complex the diplomatic calculations. Bangladesh's first challenge is maintaining balance. Europe and North America are highly significant in the country’s exports, development cooperation, and financial system.
On the other hand, China, India, Japan, the Middle East, and other Asian countries are deeply connected to Bangladesh's economic and strategic interests. Therefore, if joining BRICS is presented as Bangladesh's geopolitical leaning towards one side, unnecessary diplomatic pressure could arise.
The second challenge lies within BRICS itself. The interests of its members are not identical in all areas. There is competition between China and India; a deep hostility exists between Russia and the Western world; the security priorities of Iran and other Middle Eastern countries are not the same.
Amidst such diversity, it is yet to be determined how coherent a political power BRICS will become.
Thirdly, membership itself is no guarantee of economic success. Simply joining an alliance does not automatically increase investment, trade, or development financing.
Bangladesh's diplomatic success will be achieved when Dhaka deepens its relationship with Beijing without losing Washington, maintains cooperation with Delhi while preserving its strategic independence, works with Moscow without endangering its market in Brussels, and becomes close with BRICS without presenting itself to other partners as a follower of any geopolitical camp.
For that, a clear national strategy, project preparation capacity, commercial planning, and skilled economic diplomacy are necessary.
Whether Bangladesh should join BRICS is not so straightforward. The more important question is how Bangladesh will use BRICS to serve its national interests. Membership in international organisations is not an ornament; it is a tool.
If the goal of entering BRICS is simply to achieve a new identity, its value is limited. However, if through this Bangladesh can achieve infrastructure financing, new markets, energy security, investment, technology cooperation, and a stronger voice on the political stage of the broader South, then its strategic value is much higher.
Today's world no longer revolves around a single centre. Power is spreading, new poles are forming, and alongside old alliances, new equations are arising.
In this changing world, Bangladesh does not need to choose one camp; it needs to increase the value of its position. BRICS is one of those opportunities.
Bangladesh's diplomatic success will be achieved when Dhaka deepens its relationship with Beijing without losing Washington, maintains cooperation with Delhi while preserving its strategic independence, works with Moscow without endangering its market in Brussels, and becomes close with BRICS without presenting itself to other partners as a follower of any geopolitical camp.
Because the greatest strength of small and medium-sized states is not always their military capability—often, their greatest strength is the diplomatic ability to become necessary to all rather than being someone's satellite state or dependent country.
For Bangladesh, BRICS could be a way to enhance that capability—if membership is seen as a means to achieve national interest, not as an end goal.
#AKM Ahsan Ullah is a professor, International, Security, and Migration. University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei.
Email: akmahsanullah@gmail. com
*Opinions expressed here are the author's own.
#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam.