Dynastic rule versus cronyism in politics

In South Asian politics, dynastic rule has been widely discussed but not cronyism. The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its current dominance in Indian politics has drawn renewed attention to the role of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), prompting fresh analyses of organisational control in politics.

The Indian organisation in question is religious in nature, but organisational dominance in politics need not be rooted in religion alone. In Pakistan, for instance, the influence of the military establishment on politics is well known. In West Bengal, there was once the dominance of a rigid ‘party system’. These are all variations of organisational control.

In Bangladesh, too, multiple organised groups have attempted to influence or control politics. However, none has yet acquired the capacity to fully dominate the political class.

Under the current circumstances, however, religiously oriented organisations appear to have found an opportunity to compete directly with dynastic politics. This has made a comparison between dynastic rule and organisational control increasingly necessary.

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A physician’s child becoming a physician, or a musician’s child becoming a musician, is generally viewed positively by society. But when a politician’s child enters politics, society tends to view it negatively, and not without reason. That point will be addressed shortly. First, however, one clarification is necessary.

When a politician runs a public institution, politics becomes a profession. If a child wishes to become a politician, that is, to take up politics as a profession, should parents object, regardless of their own profession? They should not. Nor is there anything inherently wrong with parents wishing their children to follow in their professional footsteps and preparing them accordingly.

There are many examples in democratic states around the world where family members of political leaders have assumed office through democratic means. There is nothing inherently problematic in that either.

The problem arises when democratic conditions are absent; when there is no equal opportunity for all. The roots of this problem lie in multiple structural and historical contexts. Examining these contexts helps explain why societies view politicians’ children entering politics with suspicion.

In societies that have not fully shed feudal mindsets, dynastic control of power remains deeply entrenched. The belief that a ruler’s child, effectively, the son, should inherit power has a long historical lineage.

From clan rule to monarchy, this principle governed societies for thousands of years. It is therefore natural that inertia persists when transitioning to new systems. Traces of monarchy still exist in various forms across the world. Even citizens of modern societies are not entirely free from these attitudes, largely because modern ideas and practices have not spread evenly everywhere.

Many societies still prefer to keep powerful families in power, often because doing so offers personal advantages. What they perceive as privilege, however, is in fact their rightful entitlement under modern democratic norms. This realisation remains suppressed in semi-feudal societies, largely due to a lack of comprehensive understanding of democracy.

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A survey conducted in Bangladesh sought to assess public understanding of democracy. It revealed that for most citizens, democracy primarily means the scope to cast a vote, particularly in parliamentary elections. This understanding does not conflict with older mindsets, allowing the practice of sustaining dynastic power through voting to continue uninterrupted.

So what is the solution? Not everyone can or wants to become a political representative. Does this mean there is no escape from dynastic dominance? There is, indeed, a way.

The solution lies in implementing democratic principles comprehensively. One of democracy’s core tenets is the equal protection of rights for all citizens. If this is realised in practice, citizens will no longer need to exchange their vote for personal or institutional favours.

And if individuals nonetheless attempt to give or receive undue advantages, both parties must be brought under the rule of law and punished accordingly.

Even relatives of ruling politicians can lose elections in countries where democracy functions effectively. Family identity alone does not guarantee victory. Where power is abused, courts can disqualify candidates, while relatively independent media expose misconduct, undermining electoral campaigns.

In such systems, family members and non-family members face the same advantages and disadvantages. Under these conditions, a politician’s relative entering politics does not pose a problem.

Cronyism, however, operates differently. An organisation is itself a form of family,bound not by blood but by ideology. These ideological bonds can be as strong as, if not stronger than, blood ties. History offers numerous examples where ideological allegiance has severed familial relationships. Unlike families, whose size is limited, ideological organisations can expand indefinitely.

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Such organisations often evolve into cults, syndicates, components of a ‘deep state’, clandestine networks, or even distinct political sects within a religion. In India, Hindutva has effectively become a political sect within Hinduism.

These Hindutva-oriented organisations, and the political entities nourished by them, have made Rahul Gandhi’s political path increasingly difficult by campaigning aggressively against dynastic politics. The Nehru family legacy no longer guarantees leadership within the Congress Party.

Internal party dynamics play a role here, as do broader structural and practical considerations. In many cases, parties promote descendants of historically successful leaders to prevent fragmentation. While this may preserve organisational unity, it simultaneously renders such leaders vulnerable to opposition narratives.

Narendra Modi, for example, successfully sells the story of a tea-seller rising to become prime minister. The message resonates, “If I can do it, so can you, if dynastic politics is defeated.”

Rahul Gandhi cannot make a similar claim. Ironically, however, the truth favours Gandhi’s argument: it was precisely the democratic institutions developed during the era of dynastic politics that enabled a non-elite outsider like Modi to rise to power.

Yet as organisational control increasingly dismantles democratic structures and replaces them with ideological dominance, pathways for ordinary citizens outside such organisations are rapidly closing.

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In Bangladesh, organisational forces are using democratic mechanisms to impose organisational rule. From the outside, the process appears democratic, but beneath the surface it cultivates deeply anti-democratic ideas within public consciousness.

These organisations typically operate under the guise of cultural programmes, social welfare initiatives, educational institutions or spiritual gatherings. Rather than seizing power directly, they gradually colonise society’s mental infrastructure, beliefs, values and conceptions of the state.

Democratic institutions remain as hollow shells, while an invisible ideological authority governs from within. Consequently, regardless of electoral outcomes, the influence of such organisations persists within the state apparatus. This is why organisational control can be more dangerous than dynastic rule.

In Bangladesh, several religious and ideological organisations have long sought political influence. Sometimes they form political parties; at other times they embed supporters within larger parties. This undermines genuine political pluralism.

The problem extends beyond politics. Education, culture and administrative structures also fall under ideological shadow. The result is not “competition between ideas” but “competition for domination”.

Society becomes loyalty-based rather than reason-based. Where dynastic loyalty is rooted in blood, organisational loyalty is rooted in ideology; yet both aim to control democracy.

In an ideal democratic environment, dynastic rule cannot thrive unless family members are exceptionally visionary and charismatic leaders. That ideal environment does not currently exist in Bangladesh.

Many experts believe that proposed reforms could move the country closer to that ideal. Yet even with reform, it remains unclear how free Bangladesh can remain from organisational dominance.

This is because dynastic rule is visible and individual-centred; organisational control is invisible and emotion-centred. Organisations quietly occupy society’s sensitive emotional spaces, disengaging citizens from critical thought. Though often temporary, when this occurs during elections, the damage to democracy is profound and long-lasting.

Nevertheless, hope remains in genuinely free elections. When citizens are informed, they tend to choose the lesser evil. Global experience shows that organisational dominance cannot substitute for democratic culture or a free civil society.

Ultimately, the only effective way to resist both dynastic rule and cronyism is through political transparency, impartial rule of law, universal education, and equal leadership opportunities for all citizens, men and women alike.

When citizens understand that power is equally accessible to all, they can escape captivity to families or organisations. Democracy must always be understood not merely as a voting process, but as a sustained psychological, ethical and socio-cultural practice.

For that reason, if Bangladesh is to achieve a functional and resilient democracy, the ideological pressure exerted by political sects must be resisted continuously.

* Dr Ahmed Shamim is a linguist and coordinator of language instruction programmes at Cornell University.