Politics in the country has become alarmingly cloudy, either unintentionally or by deliberate design. This suggests that some quarter is trying to take advantage of the situation—fishing in troubled waters.
Recent events have sparked public concern, fear of the unknown, and a sense of unease. It appears that the key stakeholders of the state, government, and politics are not behaving responsibly.
The current interim government, formed through a mass uprising, came to power with an unprecedented level of public support. Except for the fallen and defeated group, all major political parties in the country have expressed their support for this government.
This government was expected to be the strongest in Bangladesh’s history. Yet, as it approaches its tenth month in office, the reality seems to be the opposite.
People are beginning to see the government as weak. The hopes that arose following the mass uprising have not been fulfilled. Citizens expected the government to take a strong stance against all forms of discrimination, establish good governance, take action against corruption, improve efficiency in public administration, maintain law and order, and most importantly, make visible progress in both electoral reforms and the restoration of democracy. Instead, what people are witnessing is the emergence of mob rule in the country.
We are witnessing a situation in which individuals are using platforms like Facebook and YouTube to mobilise mobs, issue threats, and make various demands—and the government is meeting many of these demands in different ways. Both political and non-political groups are raising demands to serve their own interests, setting deadlines, and the government appears to be surrendering to this pressure.
This raises serious questions about whether the interests of the country, its people, and the political and democratic future of the nation are being considered at all. This trend is growing day by day. Various segments of society are beginning to take advantage of the situation.
What happened surrounding the demonstrations by dismissed members of the armed forces is unprecedented. Given that there are also malicious forces within the state and society, it's becoming evident that they are becoming active in this environment as well.
The fact that the political climate has become murky—or has been deliberately made so—has only been possible because of the government's weakness. Additionally, there are reports of internal divisions and factionalism within the government itself.
If the interim government's rule had brought comfort to the people, if signs of change had begun to emerge clearly, if people had started experiencing the benefits of good governance, and if the reform initiatives had inspired hope, then the public would have been willing to wait for the necessary reforms. But since the government failed to deliver on these fronts, the demand for holding elections quickly has grown stronger.
It’s often unclear where some government decisions are coming from or who is actually making them. Even some of the advisors have admitted that they are kept in the dark when it comes to certain decisions.
Altogether, the situation seems to have reached a worrisome level. There is a growing sense of uncertainty among the public and political parties about whether elections will be held at all. There is even speculation that the interim government’s term may be extended—something that, it appears, some within the government might actually want.
When the interim government was formed following the mass uprising, questions immediately arose about the length of its tenure. Many said at the time that the duration of this government would depend on its performance. So, what were those tasks?
They included implementing the necessary reforms as demanded by the people, ensuring good governance, and establishing peace and stability in the country. If the interim government had been able to accomplish these tasks, the public was ready to allow it sufficient time—up until a new democratic journey could begin. But the key question remains: how long is this 'sufficient time'? How many months or years does that mean?
Although not necessarily at the very beginning of its tenure, the interim government should have clarified as soon as possible that a set of reforms would be necessary to ensure a transition to democracy, prevent the future rise of fascism, and enable free and fair elections—and that implementing these reforms would require a specific amount of time (clearly stated in months or years).
Since the interim government's mandate came from the mass uprising, and since these goals reflected the demands of that very uprising, it would have been difficult for any political party to oppose the government’s transparent stance on such issues. However, instead of doing that, the interim government has left its tenure in a state of ambiguity. At various times, Professor Muhammad Yunus has hinted that he envisioned a timeframe of about two and a half to three years.
If the interim government's rule had brought comfort to the people, if signs of change had begun to emerge clearly, if people had started experiencing the benefits of good governance, and if the reform initiatives had inspired hope, then the public would have been willing to wait for the necessary reforms. But since the government failed to deliver on these fronts, the demand for holding elections quickly has grown stronger.
It is clear that, under pressure over the election timeline, Professor Muhammad Yunus announced a possible timeframe for elections: either December 2025 or June 2026.
The BNP, currently the largest political party in Bangladesh, is unwilling to accept this December-June ambiguity. They are now voicing strong demands for a clear timeline, insisting that elections be held by this December.
Some like-minded parties support the BNP’s stance. Jamaat's position remains unclear. The NCP—the student group that led the mass uprising—does not appear to be in a hurry for elections. They are firmly committed to ensuring necessary reforms before any election takes place.
Given the evident weakness of the government, many now view early elections as the only solution. However, disagreements among the political parties that participated in the mass uprising—particularly around reforms and related issues—have thrown everything into uncertainty.
Adding to the complexity is the fact that a faction within the government itself seems to favour staying in power for an extended period. Not just the political parties, but the key actors in post-uprising Bangladesh—the government, armed forces, BNP, NCP, and other political forces—are clearly divided on various issues. As previously mentioned, this murky environment creates an opening for opportunistic elements to exploit the situation.
In such a scenario, any misstep by the government, the armed forces, the BNP, or the NCP could worsen the situation significantly. Ultimately, the defeated and discredited forces that lost power after the mass uprising would be the ones to benefit.
A recent example of the escalating tensions is the dispute over the reinstatement of Ishraque Hossain as mayor of Dhaka South. This minor issue has led to a serious conflict between the BNP and a government advisor, which has extended to the NCP. Although the matter itself may not be significant, both sides appear to be using it as a platform to demonstrate political strength. Many are now fearing that it could spark broader conflict.
Various groups in the country are now emerging with a mix of reasonable, unreasonable, and often strange demands. We are seeing mob mobilisations, frequent threats or attempts to lay siege to the chief advisor’s residence at Jamuna, disputes over whether to hand over port operations to foreign entities, the corridor issue for Rakhine state, and strained relations with India—all of these developments are contributing to an increasingly complex and volatile situation, and the people of the country are clearly sensing it.
In such a context, is Bangladesh in a position to bear the burden of a conflict between the BNP and the NCP—or any clash stemming from this tension?
Can we not hope that, in honour of the thousands of martyrs who sacrificed their lives in the mass uprising, all concerned parties will rise above narrow or factional interests and act with political wisdom?
To overcome the current atmosphere of anxiety and uncertainty, and to protect the country from potential conflict, there is no alternative to mutual understanding and coordination among the key stakeholders—namely, the government, the armed forces, the BNP, the NCP, and other political forces.
In this critical period for the nation, the armed forces have a special role to play in maintaining law and order and ensuring national security. It is everyone's responsibility to ensure that the armed forces remain above all political controversy.
Yesterday, in a high-level meeting on national security and law and order chaired by the chief advisor, the chiefs of the army, navy, and air force were present. The expectation is that this meeting will contribute effectively to managing the overall situation and maintaining peace and stability.
*AKM Zakaria is deputy editor at Prothom Alo. He can be reached at akmzakaria@gmail.com. The article is of the writer's own view.
*This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been written in English by Rabiul Islam