Additional factors, imperatives and imponderables
Militarisation of almost all communities in Rakhine and its neighbouring Chin state is a reality now and may be a source of instability in Mizoram, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts and even some areas of Chittagong. Reemergence of ethnic conflicts in Manipur and Nagaland in the recent years points to Indian dilemma in handling the Kukis in the frontier areas and her nervousness to Chinese claim on parts of the Arunachal Pradesh. Meanwhile, the USA has signaled its keen interest in Burmese people’s struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights and justice trough incorporation of the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (Burma Act) in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2023.
The Act in a way acknowledges Myanmar as a prime national security subject for the US. It accords the US Administration the discretionary authority to decide whether to take active role and thus reflects a much stronger resolve on part of US to get involved in matters related to Myanmar to facilitate establishment of a democratic government in Myanmar.
The multiplicity of actors and their varied interests make things totally unpredictable in the areas bordering Bangladesh, Myanmar, India and China. Hence, any misadventure to get militarily involved (the so-called plan B) will be extremely unpredictable and might lead to regional instability, involving players with geo-strategic interests. One cannot rule out Bangladesh being sucked into a vortex of armed conflict and it may even face new kinds of militancy in retaliation. Myanmar has the connections for stoking insurgent feelings in some ethnic communities with similarity to the Kukis and the communities with Myanmarese lineage inside Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has to make a very hard innovative and bold choice of creating a balanced approach that would allow her to play a supportive role in the ethno-cultural, political, economic and security stabilisation of Arakan, while not being perceived as fanning “balkanization” of Myanmar
In the last few years, the AA leadership on a few occasions had sent indications of avoiding any conflict with Bangladesh and sought cooperation, Bangladesh officially ignored them consistently. When AA started overrunning the Tatmadaw posts in since last year, Bangladesh responded mechanically and handed over 700 fighters to Myanmar since fighting commenced in October 2023 whom the AA considers as enemy combatants. AA has no reason to be happy over this indifference from the Bangladesh side together with ARSA and RSO recruiting fighters from camps in Bangladesh and their fighting alongside the Tatmadaw soldiers.
In Bangladesh, the Rohingya community has remained mostly in the camps with limited access to shelter, health and education and with no declared right to freedom of movement beyond the camps in Cox’s Bazar. The Rohingya, especially the youth, have grown frustrated, impatient and have been showing an increasing tendency to crime. Insecurity has heightened for unbridled activities of the subalterns, RSO and ARSA. They have been resorting to forcible recruitment of youth that the Rohingya community generally complain about. A situation of Rohingya working against the Rohingya has arisen. Infighting within the Bangladesh side in the camps as well as in the northern and central Rakhine cannot be in the interest of Bangladesh.
At the union level, Tatmadaw and the NUG remain equally important stakeholders on formal commencement of the repatriation process and on resolving the legal question of citizenship for the Rohingya. But, the de facto controlling force, AA, holds all levers in Rakhine. It alone can now accept or reject the Rohingya as cohabitators of a future Rakhine and has the ultimate say.
The growing tension between India and Japan on one side, and China and Russia on the other has added further complexities on the Rohingya issue. On top of all this, there is another important factor. In addition to strategic location, Myanmar also enjoys much higher “strategic value” in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea for locational reasons and for enormous natural resources and deposits of strategic minerals. Myanmar has been taking full advantage of this perceived higher strategic importance.
As such, Bangladesh has to make a very hard innovative and bold choice of creating a balanced approach that would allow her to play a supportive role in the ethno-cultural, political, economic and security stabilisation of Arakan, while not being perceived as fanning “balkanization” of Myanmar when an inevitable process for creating a self-governing, autonomous region has started in Rakhine.
Recommendations on the way forward
Bangladesh is undoubtedly faced with a fluid, but irreversible humanitarian-security situation in Rakhine with the portend of continuation of genocidal acts, but now by a different actor. Added to this is a protracted forced displacement situation with hardly any solution in sight. Hence, Bangladesh cannot remain stuck in its policy, employed in the early months and years of the crisis and which ought to have been under periodic assessment and subject to necessary adjustments in response to irrevocable changes and newer compulsions.
Bangladesh may decide to:
i. engage all national stakeholders in particular political parties to develop a national consensus on a recalibrated Rohingya and Myanmar policy in the face of a protracted Rohingya refugee situation, deteriorating situation in Rakhine and emergence of AA as the predominant actor;
ii. Revisit the nomenclature of FDMN or refugee to denote the Rohingya, sheltered in Bangladesh;
iii. reflect seriously on what additional services and rights that could be accorded to the Rohingya, such as access to employment and education as well as freedom of movement;
iv. ensure greater security measures in the camps and their neighbouring areas to continue to keep control over the Rohingya armed groups and deny them a free run and thus reduce security vulnerabilities of the Rohingya community. These armed groups can be subject of maneuvers from external players (as evidenced from their being used by the Myanmar Army to fight the AA in the last few months);
v. maintain a minimum deterrence as a strategy to secure peace with its neighbor to the east (diplomacy from a position of strength);
vi. consider some appropriate forms of engagement with AA/ ULA and seek to extract assurances from them on non-involvement in the domestic affairs (by engaging ethnic groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts) of Bangladesh. Conducive atmosphere for return cannot be visualised without involvement of the force in effective control of the territory;
vii. engage AA/ULA to ensure basic services, freedom of movement and citizenship for the Rohingya community with the help of the international community; in exchange, facilitate humanitarian access from Bangladesh in the short term and economic interactions and trade with Rakhine in the medium term;
viii. on economic stabilization of the Rakhine state, Bangladesh may explore all options for economic interaction with the Chittagong region as well as for access for produces of Rakhine to the outside world through an appropriate value chain connectivity.
ix. engage the NUG to secure a clear pathway towards citizenship for the Rohingya community and assurances on mutually beneficial, interdependent bilateral relations with Myanmar in future;
x. assure the State Administrative Council/ Tatmadaw of non-involvement in security matters of Rakhine or Myanmar and on matters related to territorial integrity of Myanmar. Solutions on Rakhine and its position and interaction will remain for Myanmar to decide, within whatever arrangement Myanmar agrees for herself;
xi. seek to establish multilayered, interdependent relations with the Union government on trade, agriculture, disaster management and climate change in the short and medium term, and transport connectivity, energy and some aspects of security as things get stabilized in Rakhine/ Myanmar. Though many of these ideas were attempted in right earnest by Bangladesh in the 2013-16 period, they are worth trying;
xii. continue to pursue international accountability at ICJ and ICC and take appropriate part in international initiatives on restorative rights for the Rohingya as well as reconciliation among all communities or victims in Rakhine; and
xiii. engage with the countries in the neighbourhood in particular China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan on economic and security stabilisation of Rakhine and integration of the Rohingya as members of the Myanmar society with rights, dignity and on a clear pathway to citizenship. Also engage the US, EU and ASEAN on the way forward.
Given the changed ground realities, newer challenges as well as the imperative for building a wider coalition to influence Myanmar, the interested international stakeholders may be approached to:
i. Develop safe areas/ zones within Rakhine to stop fresh flow of Rohingya and even to consider them for safety of the returnees in future; engage all stakeholders in Rakhine and Myanmar to consider options of enhanced and unfettered humanitarian access (including through Bangladesh territory);ii. Strengthen humanitarian efforts in Bangladesh for the Rohingya and the host communities, and work towards an array of livelihood support for the Rohingya returnees; offer adequate humanitarian assistance to Rakhine, targeting all affected communities.
iii. Help stabilise Rakhine economically and prevent the tendency to act based on geopolitical interests;
iv. Support determined efforts towards reconciliation among various ethnicities of Rakhine, in particular between the Muslim Rohingya and the Buddhist Rakhines; without improved race relations neither repatriation nor political stabilization could be achieved;
v. Continue to work towards international accountability and explore all aspects of transitional justice in Rakhine and Myanmar; and
vi. Avail of the recent decision at the UNGA Third Committee to hold a high-level conference in the first-quarter of 2025 to propose a comprehensive, innovative, concrete and time-bound plan for a sustainable resolution of the crisis. Given the ineffectiveness of the 5-point Consensus of the ASEAN, this can be a credible basis for collective action from the international community.
The above elements, mutually complementary as they are, can only be incorporated in the future Rohingya policy framework and can be effective if Bangladesh comes out of the shadow of the trilateral initiative to involve major regional and global stakeholders. Logically, this recalibrated policy ought to be closely aligned with Bangladesh’s overall approach to developing interdependent and multilayered bilateral relations with Myanmar, similar to what was conceived in the 2013-16 period. This will however need a brand of creative and proactive diplomacy, well-grounded on a national consensus on the Rohingya issue.
* Md. Shahidul Haque & Mohammad Sufiur Rahman are faculty of SIPG/NSU. The former was a Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh and the latter a former Ambassador to Myanmar