Foreign relations should be pursued in our own interests, on our own terms

Whenever the issue of a new port, major investment, or defence cooperation arises in Bangladesh, a familiar set of concerns takes centre stage: What will India think? How will China react? Will the United States be displeased? These are not irrelevant questions. But when the reactions of others are given priority over our own needs, foreign policy can gradually lose sight of its own destination. Bangladesh needs to rethink this approach as it looks to the future.

These concerns have a real basis. Bangladesh shares deep geographical, riverine, border, and security ties with India. China is an important partner in infrastructure, manufacturing, and investment. The United States matters because of its influence on exports, technology, and the international order. As a result, closer ties with one country may arouse suspicion in another.

Taking this reality into account, Bangladesh needs an international posture that not only maintains relations with major powers but also expands cooperation with other partners to strengthen our capabilities and freedom of decision-making. Preserving multiple viable options, even under pressure, is what makes sovereignty meaningful in practice.

In the language of international relations, two concepts frequently arise in this context: ‘hedging’ and ‘bandwagoning’. Hedging means managing risks and preserving alternatives by maintaining relations with multiple powers amid uncertainty. Bandwagoning means strategically aligning with a powerful state in pursuit of security or other benefits. The former requires diplomatic skill and credibility, while the latter, despite offering certain immediate advantages, can constrain freedom of decision-making in the long run.

The question for Bangladesh is which approach will strengthen its capacity to make independent decisions. Hedging, too, can fail. Offering assurances to one side today and making contradictory commitments to another tomorrow can breed distrust. Nor does postponing necessary decisions simply to keep everyone happy qualify as hedging. Effective hedging rests on clearly defined national interests, consistent policies, and preparedness for crises. What Bangladesh needs is ‘strategic autonomy’ built on these foundations: the doors to cooperation will remain open, but no partner will be granted an unwritten veto over our decisions.

To achieve this independence, Bangladesh must first determine which capabilities will be essential over the next two decades: diversified exports, reliable energy, skilled employment, technological advancement, climate resilience, and maritime security. The next question should be: which country is best suited to meet each of these needs as a partner? This map of national priorities should determine the hierarchy of our international relationships.

A needs-based approach also requires clear principles for managing relations with India, China, and the United States. There is neither a possibility nor a need to make the volume of trade, investment, or security cooperation with these countries equal. What must be equal is the standard by which these relationships are managed: mutual respect, transparent agreements, sovereign decision-making, and reasonable accountability. India's importance is distinct because of geographical realities; China's role in industrialisation is different; and the United States serves different needs in terms of markets and technology. Bangladesh must build its relationships by recognising these differences, without placing any state in the position of a permanent guardian.

In the case of India, Bangladesh must manage cooperation and unresolved issues simultaneously. While expanding opportunities in connectivity, electricity, and trade, it must also pursue regular, evidence-based discussions on river water sharing, border fatalities, and barriers to market access. Cooperation cannot come at the cost of silently accepting unresolved problems. At the same time, suspending all cooperation because of existing disputes would be self-defeating.

The same logic applies to relations with China. The scale of infrastructure needs does not make every major project necessary or worthwhile. Beyond interest rates, Bangladesh must assess repayment periods, foreign exchange risks, project revenues, maintenance costs, and local employment opportunities. The value of the relationship will increase if Chinese investment can be linked to Bangladesh's industrial capacity, supply chains, and export diversification. The completion of construction alone is not a measure of success; the real test is how much that infrastructure contributes to domestic productivity.

Relations with the United States must likewise be freed from the narrow pursuit of political approval. Bangladesh needs long-term programmes focused on export markets, higher education, research, technology, and responsible investment. Treating issues such as labour rights and good governance merely as external pressure means missing opportunities to improve our own institutions. Deepening economic ties with one country does not mean taking a strategic position against another.

One important way to make these three relationships sustainable is to expand Bangladesh's network of capable partners beyond them. Here, ‘alternatives’ do not mean replacing India with Japan or choosing Europe instead of China. Rather, they mean ensuring that the country does not come to a standstill if a particular market, financier, technology source, or supplier becomes unavailable. Bargaining power comes not so much from the number of relationships a country maintains as from the availability of viable alternatives. One must be deferential when facing a closed door; having several doors open expands the freedom to choose.

Japan offers a practical example of this potential. Through JICA's Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) initiative, infrastructure, the investment climate, and connectivity have been considered as interconnected priorities. The lesson for Bangladesh is that ports must be linked to industrial zones, a skilled workforce, and domestic suppliers. Similar partnerships can also be explored with South Korea in manufacturing technology and technical training. When cooperation builds production-related knowledge alongside financing, it becomes a lasting national asset.

Alongside productive capacity, Bangladesh also needs guaranteed access to markets. The European Union, therefore, cannot be treated as a peripheral player in this strategic landscape. According to the European Commission-supported GSP Hub, 46.1 per cent of Bangladesh's exports went to the EU market in 2024. In other words, a substantial part of Bangladesh's economic future already lies beyond the three major power centres. Market access, product standards, labour rights, and environmentally sustainable production should therefore remain at the heart of Bangladesh's relationship with Europe.

Beyond the European market, Southeast Asia offers opportunities to integrate into nearby production and supply chains. Bangladesh must expand its engagement with this region beyond labour migration and formal diplomatic visits to encompass manufacturing, trade, and knowledge-based cooperation. However, treating ASEAN as a single bloc with uniform interests would make its limitations more apparent than its potential.

What is needed are targeted programmes based on each country's capabilities and Bangladesh's specific needs: port efficiency, investment management, and commercial dispute resolution with Singapore; skilled employment and worker protection with Malaysia; and integration into manufacturing networks, food processing, and market expansion with Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Cooperation in digital services and universities could provide these relationships with a long-term foundation. In assessing Vietnam's experience, Bangladesh should look not only at the volume of foreign investment but also at the participation of local suppliers and opportunities for technology transfer and learning.

Relations with the Gulf countries also require the same degree of strategic depth. Beyond sending workers and purchasing energy, Bangladesh should build shared interests in food processing, renewable energy, and investment in productive industries. However, the expansion of economic cooperation will be meaningful only when fair wages, workplace safety, and legal protection for migrant workers become central issues in bilateral discussions. It is impossible to claim that these relationships have strategic depth while keeping the rights of the very workers whose labour forms one of their principal foundations at the margins of diplomacy.

It would also be strategically short-sighted to regard Africa and Latin America as distant geographies. However, declaring vast regions collectively as ‘promising markets’ cannot substitute for proper analysis. Bangladesh needs to identify a select number of countries and assess their demand for pharmaceuticals, light engineering products, agricultural technology, education, and digital services. At the same time, it must examine payment risks, transportation costs, and local regulatory requirements. Entering new markets requires more than political goodwill; it also demands commercial intelligence, credit protection, and reliable local partners.

However, expanding the list of partners does not automatically reduce the risks of dependence. Replacing one lender with five does little to strengthen national capacity if the projects themselves are ineffective. That is why five questions must be answered before undertaking any major partnership: What is the actual economic return after accounting for costs and environmental impacts? How much will dependence increase? Will the country gain access to technology and skills? Are alternatives available in times of crisis? And how transparent is the decision-making process?

The commercial use of a port, operational rights, and military access are separate matters, each requiring distinct conditions. In digital infrastructure, data control and security must be carefully assessed. For defence equipment, diversification of suppliers must go hand in hand with guarantees of maintenance, training, and interoperability. Clear agreements, rather than vague assurances, establish the boundaries of national interests and help address the concerns of partner countries.

To translate this assessment into action, Bangladesh should begin with a limited number of priorities. Over the next five years, it could set measurable targets for developing several new export markets, securing technology partnerships in selected industries, and establishing alternative energy supply arrangements. The ministries and institutions responsible for foreign affairs, commerce, finance, energy, and security must work within a common strategic framework.

Success should be measured not by the number of official visits or memorandums of understanding signed, but by tangible investment, export growth, skills development, and reduced dependence. Rather than waiting for sweeping regional declarations, Bangladesh can begin with smaller but practical and implementable initiatives alongside willing partners.

Beyond economic cooperation, another way for Bangladesh to expand its international influence is through issue-based coalitions. Countries with shared interests can be brought together on issues such as climate reparations, migrant rights, the equitable sharing of responsibilities for refugees, and the management of marine resources. The case brought by The Gambia before the International Court of Justice over allegations of genocide against the Rohingya is a significant example. It demonstrates that even a country with limited territory or military strength can take meaningful initiatives by invoking international law.

Ultimately, the sustainability of these initiatives will depend on Bangladesh's domestic capabilities. The foundations of external independence must be built at home. A weak banking system, opaque procurement processes, and unpredictable policies can prevent even a wide network of partners from becoming genuine alternatives. In such circumstances, urgent needs for loans, markets, and political support narrow the country's bargaining space. Institutional credibility, therefore, is also an asset of foreign policy.

The goal for Bangladesh in the years ahead should not be to maintain an ideal distance from the three major powers, but to develop the capabilities necessary to cooperate with each of them while retaining the freedom to make its own decisions when necessary. The question for the future should be: Which relationships strengthen our production capacity, knowledge, security, and the dignity of our people?

* AKM Ahsan Ullah is a Professor in the Department of International Security and Migration, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei.

* This article appeared in Prothom Alo print and online and has been translated by Ayesha Kabir for Prothom Alo English Online.